JPRS 76849

20 November 1980

West Europe Report

No. 1657

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

JPRS 76849

20 November 1980

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1657

CONTENTS

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

BELGIUM

Col, Van Miert Debate Government Attitude on Euromissiles
(LE SOIR, 4 Oct 80)..... 1

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Admiral Discusses Role of Naval Forces in NATO
(MARINE-RUNDSCHAU, Oct 80)..... 8

FRANCE

Nuclear War's Result Projected by Assembly Report
(LE MONDE, 26-27 Oct 80)..... 13

Intervention Forces Reviewed, Organization Noted
(Jacques Isnard; LE MONDE, 30 Sep 80)..... 15

Inflation Seen Cutting Military's Purchasing Power
(LE MONDE, 26-27 Oct 80)..... 17

Air Force Aircraft Purchase Plans Viewed
(Jacques Isnard; LE MONDE, 15 Oct 80)..... 19

COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PCF Discusses Economics With Cameroon, Swiss Delegations
(L 'HUMANITE, 25 Oct, 1 Nov 80)..... 21

Cameroon Delegation
Swiss Labor Party

BELGIUM

Royal Palace Releases List of New Government
(LE SOIR, 24 Oct 80)..... 23

Cabinet Composition Given
Negotiations Difficult to the End
Members Portrayed
Philippe Busquin, A Physicist
Mark Eyskens--Realistic Economist
Philippe Maystadt--Young Lion
Andre Degroeve--Brussels Region
Old Names Among New Leaders
Economic Problems Prevail
Francophones Occupy Interior, Justice

Gol, Van Miert Debate Domestic Problems, Cooperation
(LE SOIR, 3 Oct 80)..... 36

CYPRUS

Measures To Cope With Cooperatives Crisis Proposed
(TA NEA, 12 Oct 80)..... 44

AKEL Party Deputy Demands Return of Nikos Sampson
(KHARAVGI, 10 Oct 80)..... 46

Physicians Comment on New Health Plan
(TA NEA, 12 Oct 80)..... 48

High Quantities of DDT Found in Human Bodies
(TA NEA, 12 Oct 80)..... 52

Health Minister: Hormone Fears Unfounded
(CYPRUS MAIL, 30 Oct 80)..... 57

Briefs
Women Live Longer 58
Upsurge in Marriages 58
Population of Aged Rises 58

FRANCE

PCF's Ballanger Comments on Senate, 1981 Elections
(Robert Ballanger Interview; LE MONDE, 10 Oct 80)..... 60

CFDT's Maire Interviewed, Accuses Giscard
(Edmond Maire Interview; LE POINT, 6 Oct 80)..... 64

Communist Doumeng More Involved in International Politics
(Christine Clerc; LE FIGARO MAGAZINE, 4 Oct 80)..... 69

Rocard's Background, Aspirations, Ambitions Discussed
(Daniele Molho; LE POINT, 27 Oct 80)..... 73

CNPF's Geyrac Interviewed on Business Strategy, Aims
(Francois Geyrac Interview; L'USINE NOUVELLE, 2 Oct 80)..... 79

Representatives Distressed by Slow Equipping of Army
(LE MONDE, 28 Oct 80)..... 91

Commercial, Cultural Ties With Nigeria Becoming Stronger
(LE MONDE, 12-13 Oct 80)..... 94

GREECE

Local Law Experts Oppose Life Sentence Abolishment
(TO VIMA, 22 Oct 80)..... 96

Social Insurance Foundation Services Criticized
(Spyros Giannopoulos Interview; TA NEA, 7 Oct 80)..... 99

NETHERLANDS

New CDA Chairman Bukman Interviewed on Political Views
(Alice Oppenheim; ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE, 11 Oct 80)..... 103

CDA's Position in Dutch Poltical Life Discussed
(Dieudonnée ten Berge; ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE, 11 Oct 80)..... 110

PORTUGAL

Political Reaction to Eanes' Second Press Conference
(DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 15 Oct 80; O JORNAL, 17-23 Oct 80)..... 114

Summary of Press Conference
Excerpts of Controversial Statements
AD, UDP Reaction, by Julio Castro Caldas
Communist Criticism
Socialist Reaction
Analysis of Eanes' Comments, by Jose Ribeiro e Castro
Analysis of Eanes' Strategy, by Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos
Eanes Clarifies Statements, Ramalho Eanes Interview

Mario Soares on Developing Issues in Presidential Campaign
(O JORNAL, various dates)..... 137

Prospects for the Left, by Mario Soares
Socialist Support for Eanes, Mario Soares Interview

GOL, VAN MIERT DEBATE GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE ON EUROMISSILES

Brussels LE SOIR in French 4 Oct 80 p 2

[Debate between Jean Gol and Karel Van Miert, organized by LE SOIR; participants: Yves Benoit, Frank de Bondt, Christian-Guy Smal, Yvon Tousseint, Francis Unwin, and Luc Vandendriessche]

[Text] Gol: Let's stop giving lessons to the United States. You are dividing NATO and helping the USSR. Van Miert: That is an idiotic and unworthy line of reasoning. You are engaging in McCarthyism. Gol and Van Miert: The prime minister supports us.

As we saw yesterday in the first part of the debate organized by this newspaper, Mr Gol and Mr Van Miert, in order to continue cooperating within the government, intend to avoid repeating the ambiguities which they accuse leaders of major parties of maintaining. The second part of this debate is devoted to conditions under which 48 NATO cruise missiles are to be placed in Belgium. But it is precisely on this issue, as we shall see, that the unequivocal statements of both men are nevertheless imbued with a fundamental ambiguity which, as it happens, is not of their making.

They have totally opposite interpretations of the Belgian Government's "attitude" in the matter, as it was presented on Friday, 19 September. For Mr Gol, Belgium will accept the "Cruises", if such is the decision reached in concert with our Atlantic allies, in case of failure of American-Soviet negotiations in Geneva concerning Euromissiles. For Mr Van Miert, even in case of failure, the Belgian Government reserves the right to take stock of the situation before reaching a decision concerning the placement of the cruise missiles.

Therefore disagreement is total. And both Mr Gol and Mr Van Miert invoke the positions taken by Wilfried Martens, in support of their own. Yet it is clear that the prime minister cannot simultaneously take opposite views, supporting the position of the leader of the Liberal Party and that of the leader of the Flemish Socialists at the same time.

[Question] Under present circumstances, is Belgium's membership in the Atlantic Alliance the surest way to ensure its security?

[Gol] Undeniably.

[Van Miert] We do not question NATO membership. But this membership must also mean "having a say" in the Alliance's most fundamental problems.

[Gol] To this I would answer that it is possible only if there is concerted European action within the Alliance. I believe that European cooperation within NATO is desirable -- Eurogroup is one element of this cooperation -- but this element is not enough since France does not belong to Eurogroup. For the future, I think that the concept of the community will have to be extended to include defense. If not, Europe will not have the means for its defense. Therefore I am in favor of whatever can strengthen European integration in this connection. But to believe that Belgium can play an independent role in defense matters is to be duped to the advantage of those who want to divide the Alliance. For reasons which are not always honorable.

[Question] For reasons which are not always honorable. Whom do you have in mind?

[Gol] I have in mind the Soviet Union. Certainly not Mr Van Miert. But I repeat, that for a small country to attempt to conduct autonomous policy with respect to defense is to divide the Alliance. I am really shocked by the fact that the Europeans continually want to teach the Americans a lesson. And Belgium is not in a position to give any at this time. Nor are others, for that matter. We are always passing judgement. But we do not often act in realistic terms.

TV Peeping Toms

Let's take an example. Carter's "adventure" in Iran certainly was a failure. Since it did not succeed, he became the scapegoat. But I was shocked and indignant to see people all around me lampooning the United States in most European countries. They reminded me of peeping-toms in front of their TV sets. Europe, incapable of defending what I hold to be the interests of the Western world, was doing no more than giving lessons. In fact, we hope that the Americans, feeling how important the defense of Europe is to them, will make an effort in any case, even if we do not participate or do not participate enough in the common effort. It is by gambling on the idea that "the Americans will not quit on us" that the European countries end up refusing the effort they should be making. It's humiliating.

[Van Miert] I have always been a supporter of an integrated Europe. Let us not forget however, that when the United States supported European integration, they were working from the premise that the Europeans were

going to pursue a parellel if not identical policy with that of the United States, and Kissinger restated it once he was in power: Europe had a strictly regional role. There was no question of dealing with the Near East, for example. Or with petroleum. I have observed that Europe has attempted to define its identity on several occasions -- at the urging of France primarily -- and that this is when rivalries emerged, because we do have to admit that interests are divergent in a certain number of areas.

To a certain extent this is also true in the matter of security: look at Berlin. Berlin cannot be defended exclusively with weapons. The defense of Berlin is both military and political. Geography forces us to see things in another perspective. And here I can begin to understand Gen de Gaulle. If the Atlantic Alliance is to retain any meaning, you have to make allowances for two legitimacies where defense and security are concerned. We should stimulate European identity to the utmost.

However, I do not believe that it is presently possible to create a European defense, strictly speaking. For our part we still think in terms of the NATO context. However the situation has changed: the United States is no longer alone in possessing nuclear weapons. China is no longer in the shadow of the USSR, and is beginning to set in motion a military collaboration with Washington. In the area of defense, things have also changed. There are gaps in the nuclear "umbrella." Under these conditions a new answer must be provided for the question of how to assure our security. We are saying that in this new nuclear strategy -- look at Directive 59 recently signed by President Carter -- a war in several stages is being envisioned. Well, the first stage would be for Europe.

At that point, we have to see where our interest lies in collaboration with our Alliance partners. But we do not want a war with Europe as intermediary. There is no talk now of denuclearized zones as there was some years ago. Quite the opposite. The major powers are placing more and more nuclear weapons in Europe. It is the area of the world that has the greatest numbers of them. Our position is that this development has to be controlled.

[Question] Do you sincerely think that negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union could lead to results such that Belgium would be in a position to adopt a different policy from the one being considered?

[Van Miert] But this will be the continuation of what is already started. There was SALT I, and then SALT II, and as far as the SS 20 is concerned, for instance, the problem has been set aside for the next phase, SALT III. As for rockets, they have been around for a long time. The new factor is that the process has been interrupted. Certainly the Russians have made a defense effort. But so have the Americans: reports indicate that both sides have all the means necessary to kill one another. What we want is to abandon this mad arms race and come back to negotiations with the goal of controlling nuclear proliferation. This is SALT III. We should pick up the thread again.

[Gol] We have Mr Van Miert's words but we also have his acts. He takes a cosmic view but I feel uneasy. Because after paying tribute to the Alliance, he places the United States and the Soviet Union on the same footing, as if we were in a potential position of neutrality. But in reality we are an integral part of NATO firts, and then a part of European identity. If this identity is achieved tomorrow on the basis of a defense policy, our effort will have to be greater than the one we are willing to make now. A European defense force will cost us more.

When Mr Schmidt held discussions with Mr Brezhnev and even obtained certain trade contracts, it was after saying that he would install European strategic missiles at home. That is not European isolation. Italy has said: "We will install them" So did England. The European major powers said: "We will install them." As for France, it is not in NATO but it has its strike capability. Thus Belgium is isolated in the European context.

[Van Miert] That is totally untrue! Look at Western Europe. France is not a part of it. Ireland is not in NATO. Norway and Denmark are in NATO but refuse nuclear arms on their soil. Can't we admit that things have changed on a worldwide scale. And the new American strategy envisions a conflict in stages. Things have to be seen realistically, that has nothing to do with neutrality.

USSR: Friendly or Not

[Question] But did you not undermine the Atlantic influence during a time of negotiation?

[Van Miert] Always the same story. The eternal speech. If you make a remark you undermine the Alliance. The Romanians are undermining the Soviets because they have a policy of their own. The Polish strikers are undermining the security of the East, and so on. You know, I have never been a Marxist and never will be. I am against all authoritarian systems and therefore also against the communist system. I am one of those who fight against that kind of system, first through political means. And it is not by chance that Radio-Prague calls me a CIA agent, because I support dissidents and I am among those who demand recognition of Afghan resistance. I feel that in Europe, some people have taken a cowardly position in this matter.

[Gol] Mr Van Miert says that the international situation has changed. But it has not changed in the direction of detente. Detente's golden hour is behind us. Generally speaking, the West, and the Atlantic Alliance, are on the defensive. As for the installation of missiles in Europe, and in Belgium, let's not forget the starting point of the whole thing: the Soviets are installing SS 20 rockets at the rate of one every 5 days. But to negotiate reciprocal disarmament, both parties have to disarm. Just as we were about to attempt to reestablish a balance in this

direction, positions such as the one taken by Mr Van Miert -- and which exerted pressure on the Belgian Government -- only weaken us in such a way that there is nothing left for the Soviets to ask.

Objectively, Mr Van Miert's attitude undermines the Atlantic Alliance in negotiations. "War with Europe as intermediary"? This is not a new problem, nor is the one of "flexible counteraction" which makes you fear an atomic war in several stages. But what is new is the gradual division and fragmentation of the Atlantic Alliance without a coherent European force being substituted for this fragmentation. Also new is increased Soviet advance into the areas near European frontiers. This is what is new and I find no cause for rejoicing in it.

From then on it's a question of what you believe in. You believe in USSR desire to be amiable toward those who make an effort at disarmament, and a gesture of weakness. As for me, I believe that the Soviet Union will make concessions only when faced with a block which it cannot divide as easily as it could if faced with positions such as you have taken and tried to impose on the Belgian Government. This being said, I note an interesting shift on the part of the Belgian Government where Euromissiles are concerned. I see that in its communique of 19 September, the Belgian Government is clear, as is Mr Martens in his recent letter to Mr Brezhnev. These texts say in essence that in the event that negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union do not yield results, Belgium will take the steps agreed upon with its NATO allies.

There will be no "subsequent understandings among allies" in case negotiations fail. It is already settled: in case of failure, the decision of 12 December 1979 on missile deployment goes into effect. Thus, Mr Van Miert's efforts appear limited since -- and this is my feeling -- the decision will ultimately go "in the right direction."

[Question] Let's go back to the famous statement: "Belgium, in solidarity with its allies, will take all the measures which will have been agreed upon..."

[Van Miert] The prime minister has confirmed that there would be no automatic action. And I repeat that if such had been the case, our ministers would never have given their consent (to the government communique). This is cut-and-dry.

[Question] The prime minister stated all this on radio, and even added this comment: "We are not NATO's robots." He said that on radio, but wrote the opposite to Mr Brezhnev.

[Gol] Yes, all the measures which have been agreed upon.

[Van Miert] I'm sticking to the government's text. To its decision. To its decision and to no other. We accepted it in good faith. Our consent was given on that condition.

[Gol] The text of the government communique is not clear; it does not satisfy me. But Mr Van Miert was wrong to proclaim victory too early, because the text of the letter to Mr Brezhnev and the diplomatic instructions given to our ambassadors are very clear and suit me perfectly. It should be noted that the PSC (French: Christian Social Party) and the CVP (Flemish: Christian Social Party) rallied to the government's "mystery text", even though they always proclaimed that they wanted a firm decision. No doubt they wanted either to find a short-term way out...or else, trick you. Or both.

[Van Miert] There is no other interpretation than this one: no automatic action. We won't discuss it any more.

[Gol] Why don't you challenge the prime minister about his letter to Brezhnev!

[Van Miert] What I'm talking about is the government's decision. If it's not going to be respected anymore, let's come out and say so.

Rejoining the Ranks

[Question] But in the final analysis, is it possible to imagine Belgium in an isolated position?

[Van Miert] At the present time there is no decision about installation of the missiles, and two hypothetical situations exist: in case of failure, we ask to be able to evaluate the situation. We must not anticipate events. If negotiations bring no results, we'll have to see...

[Gol] Do you think that Belgium will put the blame on the United States? As for me, my position is this: our NATO allies have clearly understood the message of the government. We are rejoining ranks. Let's wait for the problem to arise again before we discuss it again

[Van Miert] Mr Gol, I'm adament: the only thing that matters is the government's decision. You are going to try to change that decision with diplomatic notes. But it will not happen. It's clear-cut. Instead of indulging in McCarthyism about those who want to negotiate and saying it's like Munich, we should take up the logical sequel of the negotiation process (notably SALT negotiations.)

[Gol] I reject this accusation of McCarthyism, which consists in putting people on trial for their political opinions. We are not anywhere near this in Belgium.

[Question] The personality of Mr Van Miert has been put in question.

[Gol] I disapprove of personal remarks, although the Flemish press does not abstain from them in connection with me. But I have the right to say that the positions taken by your party objectively serve the interests of the Soviet Union.

[Van Miert] In other words, we wouldn't be allowed to speak. It's with this kind of logic -- but on the other side -- that Czechoslovakia was invaded and that an attempt is being made to silence workers in Poland. This is an idiotic and unworthy line of reasoning.

[Gol] I'm saying that it's idiotic to compare the situation in a totalitarian country like the Soviet Union with the situation under a free system like ours.

[Question] Gentlemen, it appears to us that you have now covered the issue. You are each claiming for your own, the divergent interpretations that the prime minister has made of the government text. One thing seems clear to us: logically, Mr Martens cannot agree with Mr Gol and Mr Van Miert at one and the same time. And yet that's what he has done...

11,023
CSO: 3100

ADMIRAL DISCUSSES ROLE OF NAVAL FORCES IN NATO

Stuttgart MARINE-RUNDSCHAU in German Oct 80 pp 579-582

[Text]

As long as man has been familiar with navigation there have been armed ships ploughing the seas. In the beginning navigation was always connected with adventures leading beyond the rainbow. Curiosity, craving for knowledge, hunting for treasures, and expansion of power were the first causes to motivate such action. Vast countries lying beyond the oceans and rivers were thus explored and conquered. Native tribes and whole nations were christianized, exploited, annihilated or they became beneficiaries of an early trade. Armed forces deployed at sea had to secure the gains and to protect the shipping traffic. Trade and commerce brought welfare and new ideas and they sponsored arts and sciences.

With the establishment of trade centres power groups began to form, competing with, and waging war against, one another. Consistent guerilla warfare among traders or against pirates was beyond the merchantmen's capability of protecting themselves. Special ships had to be designed and assigned for escort duty and they were adequately armed and equipped. In the course of the centuries they were assembled to form larger groups for which special offensive and defensive tactics were developed. The struggle for predominance and secure sea trade was fought in numberless battles.

In other words: since about 3,000 years the principle of protecting the sea lanes of communication for friendly forces and ships as well as that of intercepting the enemy's sea lanes has consistently been valid.

These problems have become particularly urgent in the light of the East-West conflict of the late twentieth century. It is true that the system of deterrence, of flexible response which is to be activated in case of aggression against one of the NATO members has rendered even a regionally limited war improbable but the diverse and mostly contrary objectives pursued in the field of politics, ideology, and economy have not been given up by either side. Only the methods and means to reach them have changed and the main efforts were repeatedly shifted to other areas. Naval forces are increasingly gaining importance, constituting the hardware in this correlation of power. We, therefore, have to ask for the nature of these incompatible aims.

After an evolution in different ways and structures for centuries today's Western World united to form an economic system based on the free exchange of raw materials, semi-manufactured and manufactured goods. In our opinion this freedom of commerce is a natural consequence of the principle of human freedom which can only be guaranteed in a parliamentarian democracy. A complex network of contracts, development aids, investment agreements, credit assistance etc. interlace the Western industrial nations with one another and with less developed countries as well which mostly gained their independence in the course of the decolonization process. The industrial nations of the West are not self-supporting, they rather need both energy supply and raw materials for their production. Countries that are not or but little industrialized act as both suppliers and buyers of investment goods, semi-manufactured and manufactured goods to raise the standard of life of their own populations and to produce less demanding goods in the course of time by themselves. This world-wide economic system makes allowance for the fact that the industrial nations are both dependent on imports and have a lead in the field of technical and technological know-how as well. The system establishes dependence on the basis of economic common sense. The awareness of this dependence constitutes a firm tie for the participants in these economic relations, creating both a feeling of security and a need for protection. It is quite understandable that there is a desire to enlarge the basis of peaceful cooperation by extending the world-wide economic interrelations. The exchange of goods taking place across the seas to a very high extent, it is clear that the industrial nations in case of crisis or war have to do everything already in times of peace to provide for the most important goods being securely loaded and shipped in all parts of the world.

While the industrial nations of the West, some of which are being qualified as sea powers on account of their large fleets and their strategic and economic positions, are faced with the situation described above the Soviet Union has so far been a continental power. The Soviet Union including the remaining Warsaw Pact states has to a large extent established a system of self-support regarding her independence of foreign raw materials. An economic system run by military-like orders gives the impression of all economic procedures being almost carried out like those of a large industrial enterprise. Without any obligation to protect the sea lanes of communication her high-seas fleet thus constitutes a power potential to a large extent available for other purposes.

This statement is all the more important as the Western economic system is open and transparent to everybody. Bottlenecks in the production or other difficulties of the shipping traffic can thus be detected and harm can be done. In addition, Soviet shipping companies and freight agencies to an ever increasing degree arrange for Western goods to be carried by Eastern shipping systems whereas penetrating into the almost exclusively land-bound economic structure of the East is hardly possible.

In this context a statement made by the frequently quoted Admiral Gorshkov is worth to be considered somewhat more closely. He writes, »The sea power of our state (note: i. e. its naval fleet, its merchant fleet, fishing fleet, and fleet of research vessels) serves the purpose of creating favorable conditions for the building-up of Communism, for the vehement growth of our economic potential, and for the unrelenting strengthening of the defense capability of our country.«

The ideological component ranks first, it being important on account of its directly referring to the post-colonial liberation movements of socialist-communist nature. Visits of warships paid to foreign harbours (their number in 1978 was greater than those paid by the USN) serve the purpose of demonstrating the interest taken in the domestic development of the countries visited; they also serve to influence both politicians and populations and to protect the delivery of war matériel in support of the struggle for power. Eventually spheres of influence outside the continental Soviet-dominated zones are to be gained. Quite realistically F. Engels states that »a modern warship is not only a product of the heavy industry but at the same time an example of its capacity.« Since the Soviet industry is having a hard time demonstrating its capacity in the field of industrial goods for the civil population show-pieces of the arms industry gain importance in creating favorable conditions for developing Communism.

The »vehement growth of the economic potential« seems to belong to the tasks to be fulfilled by all of the four fleets. Obviously this idea is backed by the conviction that the liberal economic system of the West can only be vanquished by undermining it and rendering it incapable of survival through sea power. The collapse of parliamentarian democracy would be a natural consequence. So the Soviet Union will continue striving to further both the exploration and exploitation of the sea and the sea bottom by the means of a sea power, to commit other countries to dependence and to penetrate into the foreign shipping lines through dumping prices in order to get foreign currency.

Hidden behind the »strengthening of the defense capability of our country« are several activities: the build-up of the strategic nuclear component in submarines and of the submarine attack potential against merchant vessels, the defense potential against NATO naval forces, particularly in the field of ASW, the establishment of bases (in Vietnam, Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba), the build-up of permanent alert units, the activation of world-wide reconnaissance, information, and intelligence systems a.o.

All of the three components which are but briefly described in this context are, of course, closely connected with each other and are liable to a common strategic thought. After centuries of conflicts among sea powers, after two world wars between sea powers and continental powers with similar economic and governmental structures it is a matter of fact that now a confrontation between traditional sea powers and a Soviet Union striving to become such a power has begun. Gorshkov speaking of the Soviet Union as a sea power can only orient himself towards the historic pattern of Western sea power. As far as he merely refers to military power he certainly remembers

the words of Czar Peter I, »Any sovereign who only possesses an army has but one hand while he who owns a fleet has two hands«. But the Soviet Admiral thinks more comprehensively. To him it is clear that political and ideological influence, economic relations, and strategic positions can only be gained at sea by deploying the four fleets and thus eventually obtaining the status of a sea power.

The North Atlantic Alliance has geographically limited automatic support in case of an aggression against one of its members. In this field its defense potential is convincing and the Soviet Union is well aware of this fact, the employment of force being, therefore, almost unlikely. This statement would suffice for a self-supporting Europe and would not require any further consideration. But the necessity of having to import 97 per cent of the EC's energy supply from overseas and the almost total dependence on precious metals for the manufacturing industries point to the dangers which might arise outside the territory of the treaty. A delivery stop in the delivering countries, an interruption of loading activities, a delay, prevention or even destruction of goods on their way to the harbours of destination during times of crisis or regionally limited wars could be of serious consequences to Western Europe's economy. Both naval and ground forces are capable of accomplishing adequate surveillance and security missions to prevent such measures.

Moreover, naval forces have a wide spectrum of employment possibilities. They are mobile by nature and they are – if properly directed and guided by their control and command organizations – flexible enough to shift their main efforts from one point to the other. They can be committed both offensively and defensively.

Naval forces are capable of carrying troops on board their ships until the time of debarkation has come. Through visits to ports and purposeful conduct in selected sea areas they can stress the political will of a country and influence the policy of other states. Both the visits and the presence of armed and unarmed fleets may at an early time cause weaker nations to take a political decision to set their confidence in a power which they expect to rule the seas in case of war. Both the presence and conduct of naval forces may neutralize and frustate the opponent's potential. All these capabilities can absolutely be associated with the coverage of a sea-oriented policy, the following examples will illustrate this:

- When in 1946 the Soviet Union demanded the cession of some Caucasian regions from Turkey and asked her »to commonly defend the straits« – i. e. the Bosporus-Dardanelles region – an American naval task force appeared in Istanbul and the pressure exercised by the Soviets ceased.
- In July 1958 the Americans were able to land troops in Lebanon without let and hindrance. When in 1969 a similar crisis in Lebanon developed the Sixth Fleet was no longer alone, the Eskadra operated close-by. A renewed military support to Lebanon had to be cancelled.
- The Soviets shipped arms to Angola and had the transports escorted by naval forces. The USA did not interfere to avoid confrontation with the Red military power.
- In February 1980, i. e. after the occupation of Afghanistan and after having committed a naval task force to the Indian Ocean, the Soviet government believed to be so strongly

represented in this oil region that they had TASS divulge the news that an understanding concerning the access of all interested partners to the oil of the Middle East was feasible if the Americans abstained from taking military measures. Perhaps it is not unfounded to ask whether the OPEC countries would have had the courage to raise the prices to such an exaggerated height without the antagonistic force of the Soviet Union!

In all these instances the existence of appropriate naval forces enabled the politicians of both super-powers to proceed with method.

Other nations too create naval potentials. The number of navies has increased from 65 to 130 in the last twenty years and 50 % of all missiles are installed in boats and ships of the Third World. The imminent danger of a territorialization of large sea areas due to the 3rd Conference on Maritime Law, the disputed status of lucrative deep sea mining, and the possibly irrational decisions of some fanatical and ideologically dazzled politicians do not let the future security of the seas appear in a peaceful light though the comprehensive law is aimed at obtaining both justice and security. Legal norms have too often been interpreted and carried through in favour of the strongest power for mere reasons of political opportunity.

In summary the following points emerge from this brief expose:

1. In the present naval forces and naval aviation are an indispensable component of international policy for the West. In peacetime they serve as a deterrence against attacks from the sea on the territory of the Alliance as well as to protect and defend its political and economic interests. Naval forces can be used for crisis management as well as for deliberate escalation and de-escalation. In case of war they fight against attacking enemy forces and protect friendly supply routes across the sea.
2. The Soviet Union realizes that she cannot carry through her communist world revolution and her Russian power politics as a continental power without using military force. She is, therefore, trying to obtain the status of a sea power by building up efficient naval forces and civil fleets and by gaining strategic positions and spheres of influence in order to undercut the political and economic system of the West and thus making it dependent on foreign powers.
3. In the present confrontation the sea powers of the West essentially based on the mighty US potential in the defense of their global economic and vital interrelations find themselves opposed by a self-supporting continental power whose maritime potential is to a large degree unrestrained and, thus, available for an aggressive policy.

Unless the industrial nations of the Free World want to become lingeringly dependent on the Soviet Union they must – in addition to political, economic, and armament measures – also organizationally plan the use of their naval forces in such a way that those nations' interests can be effectively protected. The naval forces of the West must be so powerful that the Soviet Union can never count on deriving advantage from the use of her naval fleet.

CSO: 3120

NUCLEAR WAR'S RESULT PROJECTED BY ASSEMBLY REPORT

Paris LE MONDE in French 26-27 Oct 80 p 8

[Article: "French Nuclear Force Could Presently Cause 20 Million Dead and As Many Wounded in a War"]

[Text] The French nuclear force is capable of bringing about the elimination of 20 million individuals and the wounding of an equivalent number on enemy territory, according to a study which derives its estimates from the effects of the American strike against Hiroshima. This at least is what has been revealed for the first time by Mr Jacques Cressard, RPR [Rally for the Republic] deputy from Ille-et-Vilaine, in the report dealing with the 1981 defense budget bill, introduced in the name of the National Assembly's Finance Committee.

In 1981, according to the reporting official, France will have five nuclear missile-firing submarines, each carrying 16 missiles equipped with a thermonuclear payload in the megaton range[1], nine S-3 missiles sited in Haute-Provence, and boosters for an identical warhead, plus 37 Mirage-IV bombers each carrying one AN-22, 60-kiloton bomb.

This fire power, roughly, adds up to 80 megatons, of which close to 86 percent could be fired by the submarines of the strategic ocean force.

"On the basis of the effects of the strike made against the city of Hiroshima," writes Mr Cressard, "the combined strike delivered by three submarines, nine S-3 missiles, and 37 Mirage-IV aircraft (assuming that all our equipment is available and that all our warheads hit their targets) would be capable of causing the death of 20 million individuals, wounding an equivalent number, plus major disorganization of enemy nationwide activities.

In his calculations, the reporting official took the figure of three operational submarines out of a total of five. At this time, as a matter of fact, France constantly keeps two submarines on patrol at sea and it has three units on station for 7 months out of every 12. On the other hand, it must be noted that the nuclear destruction effect also depends on the state of construction of cities aimed at as well as civil defense measures taken.

"Through these capacities," the RPR reported adds, "France's force appears undeniably as a deterrent force. It must be noted however that the hard-hit enemy will not be totally wiped out; the damage rate which we are today capable of inflicting appears to be a minimum rate which must be boosted."

"The switch to the M-4 system should enable us," Mr Crissard also wrote, "to achieve a major advance since our capacity (with four submarines and 18 S-3 missiles on the line) would enable us to reach a figure of more than 60 million killed and as many wounded."

Starting in 1985, as a matter of fact, the submarines will carry 16 M-4 missiles, each equipped with six thermonuclear payloads of 150 kilotons, MIRV, and, 3 years before that, in 1982, the Albion Plateau, in Haute-Provence, will hold 18 S-3 missile silos (instead of the present nine).

The six submarines--already in service or under construction, as in the case of the last unit--which make up the strategic ocean force will gradually be equipped with M-4 missiles, with the exception of the first of them, the "Redoutable," which is too old to be modernized. The M-4 missile should then be used in completely equipping the remaining five submarines in 1991. By that date, this nuclear ocean fleet could be aimed at 480 different targets, thanks to its multiple warhead missiles.

The reporting officer of the National Assembly's Finance Committee however noted that the destruction of an enemy population (60 million) equal to the population of France would be guaranteed within 10 years, "although the capacity for neutralizing rockets and warheads would undoubtedly also have advanced." It is thus true, he concludes, "that the constant pursuit of research by the two very big powers cannot enable us to believe--as we had believed once upon a time--that our nuclear capacity is an intangible gain.

FOOTNOTE

1. A megaton is equivalent to the destructive power of 1 million tons of TNT, the conventional explosive used during World War II, which today is used as a reference in calculations. A kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT. The Hiroshima bomb in August 1945 had a power of 18 kilotons.

9058
CSO: 3100

INTERVENTION FORCES REVIEWED, ORGANIZATION NOTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Dep 80 p 48

[Article by Jacques Isnard: "At the Caylus Field (Tarn-et-Garonne)--Giscard d'Estaing Decorates 11 Officers and Noncommissioned Officers of the External Intervention Forces"]

[Text] Caylus--In the late morning of Monday 29 September, at the Caylus military camp (Tarn-et-Garonne), 4,800 men of the 11th Paratroop Division marched past President Giscard d'Estaing, who had come to decorate 11 officers and noncommissioned officers of the external intervention forces who in the last 4 years had taken part in several operations in Africa for the army or the air force. At the conclusion of this parade, the President assembled with the commanding officers and representatives of these various units.

Among the recipients, Col Yann Rousseau-Dumarcet, who commands the 3d Marine Infantry Regiment, which is normally stationed at Vannes (Bretagne) and has been engaged mainly in Chad and in the Central African Republic, was made an officer of the Legion of Honor.

In his address, the chief of state recalled that "a great country such as France must have as its first rule the avoidance of blind alleys in the matter of security." He said that he had asked the minister of defense to create "a women's paratroop detachment so as to give a humanitarian level to combat actions." After repeating his "categorical rejection of the imprudent proposals to shorten the period of national military service," Giscard d'Estaing asked the minister of defense to establish a 5-year plan to develop sports activities, to provide the draftees with modern combat materiel, and finally, to organize reserves "capable of taking part, on short notice, in the same combat action" as the active armed services.

Two Specialized Units

The 11th Parachute Division assigns 2,000 of its men, on the average, to permanent overseas missions. With reserve movements, this makes 6,000 men leaving France each year.

Since 1974, the Paratroop Division has taken part in seven major external actions (Lebanon, Zaire, Mauritania, Chad, Central African Republic, New Hebrides and Uganda). The 11th Paratroop Division has lost nine men in the course of all these operations.

The ground forces for external intervention comprise:

(1) the 11th Paratroop Division, with a strength of 15,000, half of whom are draftee volunteers, formed principally into three enlisted regiments (the 2nd Foreign Paratroop Regiment, at Calvi; the 3rd Infantry Paratroop Regiment, at Carcassonne; the 8th Marine Infantry Paratroop Regiment, at Castres) and three draftee regiments (the 1st Light Infantry Paratroop Regiment, at Pau; the 9th Light Infantry Paratroop Regiment, at Toulouse; the 1st Marine Infantry Paratroop Regiment, at Mont-de-Marsan). In addition to these combat forces, there is a general staff at Toulouse and a number of organic division elements.

(2) the 9th Marine Infantry Division, with a strength of 7,500, nearly half of whom are draftees, comprising principally four motorized infantry regiments (the 1st Marine Infantry Regiment, at Granville; the 2nd Marine Infantry Regiment, at Le Mans; the 3rd Marine Infantry Regiment, at Vannes; the 41st Infantry Regiment, at Chateaulin), a light armored-car regiment (the Marine Armored Infantry Regiment, at Vannes) and a ground-to-ground and ground-to-air artillery regiment (the 11th Marine Artillery Regiment, at Lande-d'Ouee, near Rennes).

In France there are two other paratroop regiments that do not come under the 11th Paratroop Division but rather under the chief of general staff of the armed forces; these are units responsible for gathering intelligence for the government: the 1st Marine Infantry Paratroop Regiment, at Bayonne, which belongs to the ministerial reserve for overseas intervention missions, and the 13th Paratroop Dragoon Regiment, at Dieuze (Moselle) and at Langenargen (FRG), whose mission is to seek intelligence, within the enemy apparatus, for the 1st Army.

In addition, it is planned to form, before 1982, the 31st Armored and Motorized Semibrigade, whose command post will be at Frejus (Var) and which will comprise the 21st Marine Infantry Regiment (with AMX-10 RC light wheeled armored vehicles and VAB armored outpost vehicles) and the 2nd Foreign Infantry Regiment of Corte, with three combat companies and one support company (120-mm mortars and Milan antitank missiles).

The principal mission of the 11th Parachute Division is external intervention, but as its secondary mission, it is a reserve at the disposal of the chief of staff of the armed forces, who can put it entirely or partly under the orders of the territorial command or of the 1st Army command (for action in the enemy's rear or commando operations) in a European theater of operations.

11267
CSO: 3100

INFLATION SEEN CUTTING MILITARY'S PURCHASING POWER

Paris LE MONDE in French 26-27 Oct 80 p 8

[Article: "Inflation Reduced Armed Forces Purchasing Power by F25 Billion"]

[Text] Since the start of military planning, covering national defense expenditures (operations and conventional or nuclear equipment) between 1977 and 1982, the decline of the purchasing power of the French armed forces, due to money erosion, has been estimated at more than F25 billion or 24 percent of the 1981 budget estimate.

These estimates show up in the report by Mr Jacques Cressard, RPR [Rally for the Republic] deputy from Ille-et-Vilaine, introduced in the name of the Assembly's Finance Committee on the 1981 military budget bill. In particular, there was a shortage of F10.5 billion for the Army, F8.3 billion for the Air Force, F3.7 billion for the National Gendarmerie, and F3 billion for the Navy.

In 1976, when the administration submitted to parliament the law spelling out the annual expenditure estimates between 1977 and 1982 (including these last-mentioned two years), this 6-year plan--as the RPR reporting official recalled--was based on a growth of the PIB (gross domestic output) of 11.8 percent per year in terms of value, that is, 4.5 percent in terms of volume increase and 7.3 percent due to the nominal evolution of prices.

Now, writes Mr Cressard, "The economic situation has turned upside down the financial basis on which the work of the defense ministry rested. Growth has gradually slowed down while prices have been rising faster and this has trimmed the purchasing power of military fund allocations. This trimming effect was minor in the beginning but continued all this time."

Year by year, the deputy gave figures on the losses recorded by the three services, all of which have been affected, to the exclusion of the so-called common section of the defense budget which in particular covers nuclear research expenditures, as well as weapons research and manufacture.

Two reasons were given to explain the loss of armed forces purchasing power: a deliberate underestimation of price indexes by the administration and the fact that military materiel manufacture has been subjected to the full blast of general inflation; in electronics, for example, certain prices reveal annual "drifts" on the order of 25 percent.

"We must however," observed Mr Cressard, "not minimize the negative effects of this inflation. That inflation will have cost us, in terms of value, 60 Mirage 2000 aircraft for the Air Force, plus three corvettes for the Navy, and the value of equipment for three armored divisions for the Army."

The cost of equipping one armored division in 1980 was estimated at F1.98 billion and its annual operating cost (military personnel pay, benefits, operations, personnel allowances and equipment maintenance) has a price tag of F330 million on it. Just one corvette costs F790 million and its annual operation has been estimated to cost us F34.5 million. Finally, one Mirage 2000 aircraft is estimated to have a price tag of F71 million on it.

5058
CSO: 3100

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT PURCHASE PLANS VIEWED

LD2913O7 Paris LE MONDE in French 15 Oct 80 p 16

[Report by Jacques Isnard: "In 1981 France Will Order 21 Additional Mirage F-1 Aircraft To Compensate for Delay in the Development of the Mirage-2000"]

[Text] France will order 21 Mirage F-1 air defense interceptors in 1981 even though no purchase of this kind was envisaged for next year. These additional aircraft are to replace a squadron of old Mirage-III aircraft which should in principle have been replaced by the new Mirage-2000 if the latter had been ready on time. However, it now appears that, as the Defense Ministry itself admits, development of the Mirage-2000 is between 6 months and a year behind schedule.

This decision should also enable the builder of the Mirage F-1 and his industrial associates to give a new impetus to their exports, which have been marking time. Since the beginning of the year the private Dassault-Breguet group has only sold two military aircraft--two Mirage-III aircraft sold to Switzerland as replacements. However, some other foreign contracts are to be announced by the end of 1980.

A total of 614 Mirage F-1 aircraft, which have been produced at a rate of 7 aircraft per month, have been sold, including 225 series aircraft and 6 prototypes to France (LE MONDE note: In addition to these 231 aircraft sold to France, 73 Mirage F-1 aircraft have been sold to Spain, 18 to Ecuador, 40 to Greece, 60 to Iraq, 36 to Jordan, 20 to Kuwait, 38 to Libya, 50 to Morocco and 48 to South Africa). As a result of the new French order for 1981, the total number of Mirage F-1 aircraft in the French Air Force's possession will increase to 246 series aircraft, to which must still be added 6 prototypes modified with a view to being used either as operational units or for personnel training.

At the beginning of his 6-year term of office Mr Giscard d'Estaing decided at a Defense Council meeting that the delta-wing single-jet Mirage-2000 aircraft should gradually replace the Mirage-III and Mirage F-1 aircraft to combat squadrons. Furthermore, the head of state decided that the French fleet of aircraft able to compete with the most modern aircraft in service

abroad would consist of 450 combat aircraft. In order to maintain this potential and compensate for any losses through either accident or absolescence, the French Air Force was to order some 40 aircraft annually.

It has turned out since the president adopted these decisions that the construction of Mirage-2000 aircraft has fallen behind schedule, mainly because the builders experienced difficulties with developing the aircraft's radar and regulating its jet engine's design performance.

With its pulse doppler radar (LE MONDE note: The doppler action makes it possible to distinguish on scope-radar fixed echoes from mobile echoes--the most important in the military sphere--by eliminating the former), the first Mirage-2000 aircraft are unlikely to be ready as units before mid-1983 and as for the first aircraft equipped with multifunctional doppler radar, which will be improved with a view to enabling it to intercept any enemy aircraft flying at a very low altitude, the air force will not start receiving them before May 1985. At the same time, the thrust of the M-53 jet engine will have to be increased considerably for any post-1985 models.

According to the Defense Ministry, the program is now at least 6 to 12 months behind schedule. In order, however, to maintain the fleet's renewal rate, it is planned to order next year 43 aircraft--22 Mirage-2000 aircraft (that is, 15 fewer than the number initially announced) and 21 Mirage F-1 aircraft. The 1981 draft budget has assigned for this purpose FR3,730,000,000 and FR2,533,000,000 respectively in the form of program authorizations.

As a result of this order, which shows how the air force is interested in the Mirage F-1 aircraft, France can hope to be able to give an indirect new impetus to exports of the range designed by Dassault-Breguet.

Stagnation of Sales

In fact, this private group's sales of military equipment abroad have stagnated since the beginning of the year.

It seems that the Dassault-Breguet Company is now faced with the following situation: on the one hand production of its Mirage-2000 aircraft is behind schedule while on the other the existence of a twin-jet Mirage-4000 prototype prompts customers to wait before ordering one of these models until prospects for the supplier's industrial strategy become either clearer or more assured.

In view of the circumstances, various aircraft within the range can occasionally do each other harm. Countries which would, nonetheless, like to strengthen their combat squadrons as a matter of urgency and want to approach France with this end in mind will henceforth have to fall back on the Mirage F-1 aircraft, whose inaugural flight took place as long ago as December 1966 and which remains for the time being the builders' stock in trade.

CSO: 3100

PCF DISCUSSES ECONOMICS WITH CAMEROON, SWISS DELEGATIONS

Cameroon Delegation

LD041123 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 25 Oct 80 p 7

[Unattributed report: "Meeting Between Union of Cameroon Populations and PCF"]

[Text] On Thursday, a delegation of the Union of Cameroon Populations (UPC) and of the National Manifesto for the Installation of Democracy, (MANIDEM)--a United People's Front organized round the UPC, met a PCF delegation [venue not specified]. The two delegations exchanged information on the situations in the respective countries. They agreed to intensify their joint struggle against imperialism in general and French imperialism in particular. They restated their desire to strengthen the fraternal relations existing between the two parties.

Swiss Labor Party

LD061621 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 1 Nov 80 p 7

[Unattributed report: "PCF-Swiss Labor Party Talks"]

[Text] During his visit to Geneva on 31 October 1980 PCF Secretary General Georges Marchais, accompanied by Central Committee member Gerard Streiff and foreign policy section member Roger Trugnan, had talks at Swiss Labor Party headquarters with the party's honorary president Jean Vincent, Secretary General Armand Magnin, secretariat members Hasjorg Hoser and Karl Odermatt, and Politburo members Andre Hediger and Andre Muret.

These talks took place in the atmosphere of friendship and solidarity which has long characterized relations between the two parties. They gave rise to fruitful exchanges of information on the situation in both countries, particularly on economic activity, the living conditions of manual and intellectual workers, the tendency to increasingly limit rights and freedoms and major international problems. The two delegations expressed the same concern over the revival of the arms race demonstrated by the increase in military budgets, NATO's decision to deploy new U.S. nuclear missiles in

Europe and the U.S. refusal to ratify the SALT II agreements. Indeed, these measures show imperialism's anxiety at the peoples' strong thrust toward independence and freedom. In order to try to maintain its domination, imperialism has no hesitation in posing serious threats to peace.

Both the Swiss Labor Party and the PCF consider that safeguarding and consolidating peace is a major concern which is part of the battle for human happiness, democracy and socialism.

While tens of millions of people are suffering from famine, while whole peoples are condemned to underdevelopment and poverty, it is vital to end the infernal arms race, to seek balanced arms reductions without undermining countries' security. It is possible. The forces exist to prevent the international situation from evolving along dangerous paths, provided that they look beyond their differences and unite and mobilize for a world without weapons and without war.

From this viewpoint it is encouraging to note the opening in Geneva of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, at the latter's suggestion, relating to all medium-range missiles and taking all aspects of the problem into account.

The Madrid conference must also be held and must be successful, it must fulfill the expectation of the continent's peoples by convening a European disarmament conference.

The PCF and Swiss Labor Party will step up their struggles with increasing determination to attain their common objectives of social progress, freedom, peace and disarmament.

[illegible]

ROYAL PALACE RELEASES LIST OF NEW GOVERNMENT

Cabinet Composition Given

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] "No one could really say that this sort of thing happens too often!" This thought was expressed in a playful tone amid the bursting flashbulbs by Mr Desmarets during the traditional "family photo" of the Fourth Martens Cabinet. The Christian Social vice premier was particularly relaxed, something which was not the case with all of his colleagues; along with the old campaigners of national politics, some young wolves had made their entry and were unable to conceal a certain degree of apprehension, if not timidity. "Well, here we have the deputy-assistant folks coming in!" Mr Desmarets, decidedly voluble, greeted the rather belated arrival of Mr Guy Mathot under the glaring light of flashbulbs and spotlights. "Guy, you are going to have to tighten your belt!" "That is what it's there for," was the reply. All members of Mr Martens' new team are far from sharing the view on this approach. Mrs Rika De Backer, secretary of state for the Flemish community, is suffering the effects of a shrunken chairmanship function. On the other hand, Mr Andre Degroeve--beaming with contentment, is visibly savoring his title as minister for the Brussels Region. Mr Martens, for his part, remains cautious. "So, this time all is well?" he was asked. He made a move with his head which said neither yes, nor no, as if to indicate "we shall see."

Negotiations Difficult to the End

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by J. v. S.: "Negotiations Reportedly very Tough until the End"]

[Text] "Thou shalt give birth in pain!" The cabinet-maker and the negotiators involved in the four-man two-party talks were bound to recall that phrase from the Bible throughout the last hours. But on Tuesday night, Mr Martens was able to repeat what the proverb said: "All things come to him who knows how to wait."

As a matter of fact, the list published on Wednesday noon by LE SOIR was not officially confirmed until 1600. The country thus had a new administration which had already been Christened "Martens IV." It consists of 25 ministers (eight from the CVP [Social Christian Party], seven from the PS [Socialist Party], five from the SP [Socialist Party], and five from the PSC [Social Christian Party]) and seven secretaries of state (three from the CVP, two from the PSC, one from the PS, and one from the SP). In other words, 20 "national" ministers and 12 "regional" and "community" ministers and secretaries of state. It is understood here of course that the linguistic parity provided for by the Constitution is implemented on the level of the ministers, since the head of government is considered a "linguistic asexual."

We might also note that Mr Willy Claes remains with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, a job from which some people in vain tried to oust him. As for the newcomers, they in the end will turn out to be rather small in number: Messrs Frank Swaelen, Philippe Busquin, and Melchior Wathelet will be in for the first time; Messrs Philippe Maystadt, Daniel Coens, Andre Degroeve, and Mme Lydia De Pauw will be celebrating their return to affairs of government after a brief absence.

In introducing his cabinet to the press, Mr Martens confirmed that the ministerial general policy committee, a kind of restricted supercabinet, would be maintained and would have nine members (two for each of the four parties, plus the premier). The members of this committee are yet to be appointed but Messrs Spitaels, Claes, Desmarets, and Chabert are considered to be sure appointees.

Answering various questions, the premier explained why, in the Ministry of National Education, the Flemish socialist minister will be once again flanked by a social-Christian deputy, whereas the French-speaking socialist minister will not have any "mother-in-law." "The situation is different in the country's two regions. Besides, No demand along those lines has been coming from the French-speaking side."

The new administration got down to work quickly. The first cabinet meeting took place on Wednesday night. A group of ministers was to devote the session that Thursday to finalize the government declaration. The latter will be submitted to the ministers and secretaries of state on Friday morning and will be introduced into the chambers on Friday afternoon.

Members Portrayed

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Oct 80 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Frank Swaelen--A CVP Cadre for Defense"]

[Text] While he is not a paratrooper, as his predecessor Charles Poswick was, the new national defense minister, Mr Frank Swaelen, is no less athletic. During his rare moments off the job, he plays tennis, volleyball, and he likes to swim. When it comes to sports, he runs his little community of Hove, near Antwerp. There are three children in his family.

Tall and straight like an arrow, he is affability personified. But his gentleness does not prevent him from being a very skillful and dangerous negotiator so that his knowledge of the particular case under discussion is never wrong. This was discovered over many years when he was on the school agreement commission where he represented the CVP and several months ago when a new charter for radio had to be drafted.

Like quite a few others, Mr Swaelen began his political career in the CVP-Jongeren [Youth Group], where he was the editor-in-chief of the group's publication for 8 years. Born in 1930, this doctor of laws who graduated from Louvain and who also has a Harvard degree, in 1966 became national secretary of the CVP-PSC and in 1968 succeeded Mr Derinne as deputy for Antwerp.

Philippe Busquin, A Physicist

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Oct 80 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Philippe Busquin, a Highly-Educated Physicist"]

[Text] Philippe Busquin, 39, undoubtedly is the least-known figure in the new administration. He had above all been a physicist and a specialist in the nuclear field. A former high school teacher, he succeeded Guy Mathot as minister of national education.

With his bushy, dark and curly hair, his back slightly arched, he conceals a nature open to dialogue and pleasant contact behind some rather timid features.

This socialist from Seneffe has a degree in physics, ULB [Free University of Brussels], and an advanced degree in environmental protection from that same university. He is also an assistant at the School of Medicine.

After becoming deputy for Charleroi, he was the youngest permanent deputy of the province of Hainaut. He is deputy administrator of the economic research bureau of that province and chairman of the board of directors of the Fleurus Radio Components Institute.

He holds a position in the PS bureau where he distinguished himself during the formation of the three-party cabinet by virtue of an attitude of opposition to that cabinet formula. In the Socialist Party, he chairs two committees--the committee on energy problems and the committee on environment and water.

His wife, who holds a degree in Germanistics, is a teacher at the Gosselies High School.

Mark Eyskens--Realistic Economist

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by Dv.: "Mark Eyskens--An Economist of the Possible"]

[Text] His only athletic activity is biking and just walking around his yard--that is our new finance minister, Mr Mark Eyskens. He has a weakness for "the White Lady," we are told. And he is the model father of five children. He has a pleasing air and mischievous blue eyes which can become quite piercing when he wants to. As Mr Vanden Boeynants said one day about him: "The people should not take me for a little boy in the choir, just because I helped celebrate Mass." The same could apply to the minister.

Son of the Viscount Gaston Eyskens, minister of state, former premier, and minister of finance, the moment came for Mark Eyskens almost 4 years to the day ago to make a name for himself when Mr Leo Tindemans suggested to him the job of secretary of state for the Flemish regional economy. That job has now been done and nobody doubts it now in the Seraglio.

A jurist, economist and philosopher by education, he undoutedly has the kind of "diplomatic approach" which is required but, what is even more important, he had an opportunity to work out in the fields. While teaching a course at the University of Louvain, starting in 1962, he collaborated for two years with the minister of finance at that time, Mr Andre Dequae and he did so at the moment when the latter was carrying out the reform of direct taxation and prepared the introduction of the VAT. Starting in 1966, he became a full professor.

Getting into active politics, he cut his work load back and, as is the tradition at Louvain, became a special professor. By the way, he entered politics through the front door: more than 30,000 votes were cast for him the first time he ran, in 1977.

The new minister granted an interview to our newspaper 3 years ago. It seems to us perhaps worthwhile to recall some of his remarks which still apply.

"The man in the street is capable of understanding situations," he noted, "and he is also capable of mustering more courage than we give him credit

for. This is a hide-and-seek game. We are living in a time of great distrust. Everybody is constantly afraid of being fooled by the other fellow. We must return to the objectivity of facts in many respects. When you face a problem and when you have statistics to deal with, there is evidence which everybody must admit."

As for the minister's economic doctrine, he described it as follows: "We must restore the profitability of the enterprises and we must not forget that profits mean jobs the day after tomorrow. But it is the business community which must decide what is to be done with the profits."

Let us finally reveal, with perhaps a slightly doubtful smile, that Mr Eyskens, secretary of state for economy, declared: "We must also ease the tax burden which has reached its limits in Belgium." What does the finance minister think about that today?

Philippe Maystadt--Young Lion

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Oct 80 p 2

["Unattributed article: "Philippe Maystadt, the Young Christian-Democratic Wolf"]

[Text] Mr Philippe Maystadt, 31, whom at other times we described as being the Don Quixote of the PSC, has already been a member of a cabinet but in a very ephemeral fashion. He had in fact been secretary of state for the Walloon regional economy in the Martens II two-party Roman-style red cabinet. Belonging to the left-wing of his party (the DC [Christian Democratic Party]), this young wolf had to yield his place in the Martens III three-party cabinet to a representative of the CEPIC [Political Center of Christian Independents and Cadres], Mr Pierre Mainil. In the new administration Mr Maystadt went up one notch. He became minister of civil service, science policy, and environment and will be a member of the restricted general policy cabinet.

Graduating from the university, he had a choice between a job with a multinational oil company or at the university. He became an assistant. He then rapidly tried to get into politics, becoming a close collaborator of Mr Califice, minister of Walloon affairs in the First Tindemans Cabinet.

In private life, he is a soccer fan and he is also enthusiastic about the Tour de France [bicycle race]. In the circle of his family, he remains just a big boy. During his hours of relaxation, he loves to work huge puzzles. Could this be a task which he will again run into as he joins the administration.

Andre Degroeve--Brussels Region

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by J. Ly.: "Andre Degroeve (Socialist Party) to the Brussels Region--For What Kind of Policy?"]

[Text] A direct heritage of the institutional reform adopted under the preceding cabinet, the regional and community executives are called upon to play an important political role; only the future however will tell whether this vocation will become reality. It is not less true that the makeup of the executive branches in the Fourth Martens Cabinet reveals changes that are devoid of political interest and significance.

So it goes with the "double retrogradation" of the two Social Christian chairpersons: Mrs Cecil Goor (PSC) leaves her post at the head of the Brussels executive to Mr Andre Degroeve (PS) while Mrs Rika De Backer (CVP) stepped down from the chairmanship of the Flemish executive to the benefit of Mr Gaston Geens (CVP).

The (Walloon and Brussels) regional executive branches will be again in socialist hands (Mr Jean-Maurice Dehousse retains the chairmanship of the Walloon regional executive. To work out and implement what solution in Brussels?). Both the FDF [Francophone Democratic Front] and the liberals declared that they were ready to provide the support necessary for the new coalition--from the outside--in order to achieve the two-thirds parliamentary majority which does not have--provided however that the formula proposed to resolve the "Brussels problem complex" be equitable and reasonable.

While asserting the need for resolving the fate of Brussels, Mr Martens nevertheless emphasized economic and social recovery. While it may be urgent and indispensable, does not this policy entail the risk of relegating to second place the continuation and completion of the reform undertaken by the earlier administration? This question is all the more pressing since the new coalition at first sight seems to be having trouble in coping with two policies--on economic and social matters and in the field of reforms--both of which have priority.

The principal Brussels actors will be three in number: around bright Andre Degroeve will be two women, the calm Cecile Goor and the combative Lydia De Pauw (SP). The latter, nicknamed "the red lioness," will find it as easy to take a swipe at somebody with her paw as she does to make a stroke with the pen. And it must be admitted that she does not draw badly at all. But this is not done to put balm upon those who are leery of her caustic manners. Andre Degroeve, a real nice fellow, could very well become the arbiter in this crimping of ponytails.

Old Names Among New Leaders

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Oct 80 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Some Known Names among New Leaders"]

[Text] Among the other new faces in the Martens IV team, at least three names are already known--those of Mr Andre Degroeve and Mr Daniel Coens as well as Mrs Lydia De Pauw, who held office as secretaries of state in the First or Second Martens Cabinet. Victims of the entry of Liberals into the following cabinet, they are returning today, precisely because of the departure of the liberals. There are thus in the end only three really new faces in this administration and they are those of Mr Busquin and Mr Swaelen, whom we talked about elsewhere, as well as Mr Wathelet, who is responsible for representing the PSC within the executive Branch of the Walloon region.

Andre Degroeve

Andre Degroeve, the new minister for the Brussels region, has been a socialist deputy from Brussels since 1971. He is 49 years old. He started out in the information service of the Professional Union of Insurance Enterprises before moving on to SNI [National Information Secretariat?]; after that he went into private industry, got his degree of doctor of laws at the ULB and also has a degree in political science.

After having been the first deputy mayor for public education and youth at Foret, he became mayor of that community where he presided over a body made up for the rest by FDF.

Andre Degroeve was also attached to the office of Mr Leburton in 1965 and was president of the Brussels federation of the PS.

He was secretary of state for the French community in the Second Martens Cabinet.

Daniel Coens, a sociologist, was born in 1938 and was elected to parliament for the first time in 1971 as CVP deputy. He is mayor of Sijsele and a member of the general affairs, civil service, culture, and public health committee.

A researcher at the Social Studies Institute of KUL [Royal University of Leyden], he teaches at the Higher Institute of Family Sciences at Brussels and is also an advisor for Flemish Catholic worker wives.

He was secretary of state for Flemish affairs in the First and Second Martens Cabinets.

Lydia De Pauw

Lydia De Pauw was born at Uccle in June 1929. She studied in succession at Schaerbeek, Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, the ULB, and Columbia University in New York. A teacher of art history at the VUB, she also made her mark in the print room of the Royal Library.

Lydia De Pauw participated in the creation of the Flemish Socialist Federation of Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde (Rode Leeuwen) and has been a member of the Brussels Metropolitan Area Council since 1971.

She held already positions as secretary of state for the Brussels region in the First and Second Martens Cabinets.

Melchior Wathelet

Melchior Wathelet is really the "junior" in this cabinet. Born in 1949, he is only 31 years old. He studied at the University of Liege and got his degrees in law and economics. He then earned an M.A. at Harvard. A researcher at the University of Liege in European law, he entered parliament in 1977 as "unaffiliated" PSC deputy. He is his party's political secretary together with Phillip Maystadt (the other young wolf in the PSC) and has been teaching since 1978. A member of the school agreement committee, reporter on the budget, leader of the PSC group, this year, in the French community council, he was one of the negotiators involved in the formation of this cabinet.

The Fourth Martens Cabinet

Ministers on the National Level

Wilfried Martens, 44, CVP deputy, Ghent, premier.

Guy Spitaels, 49, PS senator, Ath, vice premier and minister of communications.

Willy Claes, 41, SP deputy, Hasselt, vice premier and minister of economic affairs.

Jose Desmarets, 55, PSC deputy, Brussels, vice premier, minister of middle classes and planning, deputy minister of the French community.

Jos Chabert, 47, CVP senator, Hal-Vilvorde, minister of public works and of institutional reforms (Dutch sector).

Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb, 44, PSC deputy, Arlon, minister of foreign affairs.

Willy Calewaert, 64, SP senator, Antwerp, minister of national education (Dutch sector).

Albert Lavens, 59, CVP senator, Courtrai, minister of agriculture.

Luc Dhoore, 51, CVP deputy, Hasselt, minister of social welfare and public health.

Guy Mathot, 39, PS deputy, Liege, minister of interior and budget.

Robert Urbain, 49, PS deputy, Mons, minister of foreign trade.

Mark Eyskens, 46, CVP deputy, Louvain, minister of finance.

Roger De Wulf, 51, SP deputy, Hal-Vilvorde, minister of employment and labor.

Philippe Moureaux, 41, extraparliamentary PS, Brussels, minister of justice and of institutional reforms (French sector).

Daniel Coens, 42, CVP deputy, Bruges, minister of development cooperation.

Philippe Maystadt, 32, PSC deputy, Charleroi, minister of civil service, science policy, and environment.

Pierre Mainil, 55, PSC senator, Soignies, minister of pensions.

Freddy Willockx, 33, SP deputy, Saint-Nicolas-Waes, minister of post office, telegraph, and telephone.

Frank Swaelen, 50, CVP deputy, Anvers, minister of national defense.

Philippe Busquin, 39, PS deputy, Charleroi, minister of national education (French sector).

Regional and Community Executives

Flemish Executive Branch

President

Gaston Geens, 49, CVP senator, Louvain, minister of Flemish community and deputy minister of national education.

Members

Marc Galle, 50, SP deputy, Alost, minister of Flemish community.

Rika De Backer-Van Ocken, 57, CVP senator, Antwerp, secretary of state for the Flemish community.

Paul Akkermans, 56, CVP senator, Antwerp, secretary of state for Flemish community.

Rika Steyaert, 55, CVP deputy, Brussels, secretary of state for Flemish Community.

Willy Calewaert, in his capacity of minister of national education.

French Community Executive Branch

President

Michel Hansenne, 40, PSC deputy, Liege, minister of French community.

Members

Jose Desmarets, in his capacity as deputy minister of French community.

Philippe Busquin, in his capacity as minister of national education.

Walloon Region Executive Branch

President

Jean-Maurice Dehousse, 43, PS deputy, Liege, minister of Walloon region.

Members

Elie Deworme, 48, PS senator, Virton, secretary of state for the Walloon region.

Melchior Wathelet, 31, PSC deputy, Verviers, secretary of state for the Walloon region.

Brussels Region Executive Branch

President

Andre Degroeve, 49, PS deputy, Brussels, minister of Brussels region.

Members

Cecile Goor-Eyben, 57, PSC senator, Brussels, secretary of state for Brussels region.

Lydia De Pauw-Deveen, 51, SP senator, Brussels, secretary of state for Brussels region.

Note: the two Brussels members of the community executive branches, Mr Desmarets and Miss Steyaert, also participate in the work of the Brussels regional executive branch, but without a deliberative vote.

Economic Problems Prevail

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by Vdd.: "Ten Men to Take the Shock from All Social Coordination"]

[Text] There is no doubt that there has never been an administration which, even before having been constituted, committed itself to a program as detailed and as precise as a clockwork. But the economic crisis demands that. The 70 pages of its birth certificate are almost entirely arranged in an "economic and social recovery plan."

Tax and budget restoration, revival of employment, industrial and energy policy, assistance to small and medium enterprises, social security reform, and moderation in all revenues. We find it all there. In detail, moreover. Martens IV will thus concentrate its full time, its energy, except for its Sunday rest, on economic and social matters. That at least is what it hopes to do. The rest will come later.

There will be ten on the new team to shoulder this job alone, to share their nights with their social conversation partners, to set up a big conference on jobs, and finally to promise us "blood, sweat, and tears."

Here they are, the veterans who "have been at work" already under the preceding administration: Premier Wilfried Martens (CVP) and his "hard core" of three vice premiers: Guy Spitaels (PS), Willy Claes (SP), and Jose Desmarets (PSC). So far, political and linguistic balance has been scrupulously preserved.

Next they will be joined by the officials in charge of the economic departments, that is, Mark Eyskens (CVP) who, with the finance ministry will be responsible for providing his colleagues with the ways and means to support their recovery policy--one little saying is already making the rounds: with a fellow like Mark in finance, the Belgian franc will come off better; Guy Mathot (PS) who will learn to show his teeth everytime anybody touches his budget; and the immovable Willy Claes (SP), with his rescue plans in the [ministry of] economic affairs.

The "socials" will be much numerous. In the CVP, Luk Dehoore is carving up the lion's share for himself by tieing the Department of Public to "his" Social Welfare. It is he who, in the final analysis, will inherit the only "big" ministry which some people are thinking of creating by gathering several similar authorities under the same minister. While public health is essentially a management problem, social welfare on the other hand is getting ready for some happy days with the overall reform, with the restoration of sickness insurance, and Dr Wynen's nose is once again pointed toward the horizon.

Looking at the PSC, we have Pierre Mainil succeeding the liberal Herman De Croo in the department of pensions. But this time he has the not at all encouraging job of inventing ways for finding 24 billions somehow to prevent the disaster of bankruptcy.

Roger De Wulf (SP) remains with Employment and Labor which he has been with for a year and a half. But this time he could no longer be happy with running the unemployment situation, implementing the Spitaels plan, or pushing his own program of bonuses for early retirement. This time he will be at the center of the revival program and the national labor conference which is being prepared.

That leaves us with the "new little fellow," Philippe Maystadt of the PSC who, in taking his first steps as a minister, along with the civil service, inherits the at least difficult "2-percent" job; and then we have the man on the right-wing of the PSC, Jose Desmarets, who, with the ministry of middle classes, will somehow find his own electorate.

Francophones Occupy Interior, Justice

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by J. v. S.: "Two French-Speaking Socialists in Justice and Interior"]

[Text] On Monday afternoon, several scores of thousands of persons demonstrated in the streets of Brussels to protest against the rebirth of fascism and racism. After several days, the Antwerp prosecutor at last decided to prosecute several members of the VMO [Flemish Militant Order]. Calm was temporarily restored in Fourons, but there were incidents over last weekend at Comines. In this context, the Socialist Party managed to place two of its representatives who are most in the public eye in Interior and Justice. Guy Mathot from Liege, on Loi Street, and Philippe Moureaux, from Brussels, on Poelaert Square. Responsibility for the maintenance of order and, indirectly, responsibility for prosecution to be undertaken as part of the effort to maintain order will thus be held by the same political party.

The arrival of Mr Moureaux in the Ministry of Justice is a little bit of an event. As a matter of fact, ever since Liberation, the socialists were responsible for that department only on three occasions: Henry Rolin for a 2 weeks in March 1946; Pierre Vermeylen, from April 1961 until July 1965; and Alfons Vranckx, from January 1969 until January 1972.

We know that, when he was minister of the interior, Mr Moureaux declared that it was up to his colleague in Justice to issue instructions, as the case may be, to the prosecutors in order to ask them rigorously and quickly to implement the Law of 1934 on private militia forces. But he is now in the office which had been occupied by Mr Vanderpoorten.

As for Mr Mathot, he left National Education after having succeeded in getting out of some rather notorious tight spots unscathed. He is credited with the intention of keeping Gen Guy Sokay as the head of the office which would guarantee the continuity of ministry policy.

Regarding the gendarmerie, the appointments on the government level could facilitate control here. It is known that the forces of the General Beaurir are under the triple control of Interior, Justice and National Defense.

5058
CSO: 3100

GOL, VAN MIERT DEBATE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, COOPERATION

Brussels LE SOIR in French 3 Oct 80 p 2

[Debate between Jean Gol and Karel Van Miert, organized by LE SOIR; participants: Yves Benoit, Frank de Bondt, Christian-Guy Smal, Yvon Toussaint, Francis Urwin, and Luc Vandendriessche]

[Text] Gol: Ready to sign a new lease. Bosses are too lax. Santa Claus is a thing of the past. Van Miert: Advantages, no privileges. Hunt down abuses. The SP (Socialist Party), a pragmatic party.

The Gol and Van Miert combination is enough to make the head of government shudder. With such partners within the unobtainable majority, Mr Martens hardly needs adversaries in the opposition. And yet, if we have brought together the leaders of the PRL (Liberal Reform Party) and the SP, it is not with the intent of adding an episode to the daily incidents offered by the spectacle of governmental disunity. Our purpose is to find out if their apparently unnatural association is the political aberration which part of public opinion feels it to be, watching them both behave as the spoilsports of a government which never has a festive mood. This notion of them may be mistaken: in this explosive confrontation, Gol and Van Miert have shown that beyond their radically opposed ideas, they have a parallel approach to political life, to major current problems, and to methods of resolving them, all of which denote as much agreement as contradiction. Besides, they themselves are not displeased at the idea of continuing to cooperate within the government. But they both insist that this must be done on clear and specific bases which must be redefined. In this way they hope to avoid repeating the ambiguities which they accuse major party leaders of gleefully maintaining. Gol has said: "You can see that there is no junta of party leaders." Van Miert stressed further that "there isn't even a league of party leaders anymore."

[Question] The present government coalition is very broad. It holds together people who at first glance don't have much in common, and who on a daily basis issue divergent and outspoken analyses under the pressure of events. You yourselves are both good examples.

On the other hand it seems that the present government is held by public opinion to be the government of procrastination, of nondecision, which takes one step forward and two steps back.

Doesn't the second of these observations result from the first one? In other words the coalition is so broad, and made up of people whose views are so different that -- by definition -- the government cannot appear otherwise.

How can you coexist in this coalition?

[Gol] During government negotiations we did not always oppose the French-speaking liberals and the Flemish Socialists. Far from it. Things are now being presented as black-and-white, but it is certain, for example, that on the question of the separation of conjugal incomes, we were rather allies than opponents. And if people had listened to Mr Van Miert and myself, there might have been more things accomplished in favor of this separation and maybe less in other areas which don't seem so important to us.

Therefore I don't think that it's a good thing to oversimplify.

[Van Miert] First I'd like to remind you that we were not the source of the preceding crisis. The leader of the CVP (Flemish: Christian Social Party), in order to regain a two-thirds majority, brought about a new situation by stating his preference for a broader government. This was a strange request in view of our always loyal partnership in the previous coalition. After due reflection, while we said that we were ready to seek partial solutions for the community problem -- because things are far from being all settled -- we still remain aware that on the Flemish side it was our party which was taking the most risks in this operation.

[Gol] The Walloon liberals are taking risks too.

[Van Miert] I don't deny it. But we cooperated loyally in trying to find solutions while taking many more risks than the others.

[Gol] There is a feeling today that several positions are becoming polarized around the Flemish Socialists and the Walloon liberals: the reason for this feeling is that we are dealing with two parties which are in the process of redefining their identities. Each is engaged in a contest with a leading party: for us it's the French-speaking socialists, and for you it's the CVP. In addition we all have the same problems with the Christian Socialists: we are dealing with what Mr Tobback calls a "medusa", growing its tentacles in absolutely all directions.

We and the SP have both been criticized for being simultaneously inside and outside the government. Why? Because we insist on respect for those parts of the government's program for which we are directly responsible.

while the Christian-Social family participates in all antigovernment manifestations, it also holds a permanent place within the administration; therefore, if we are to be heard, each in our own voice, on the issues that concern our members, we are sometimes forced to speak louder than those who traditionally hold power and also practice dissimulation.

Working without a Net

[Van Miert] I prefer a moderate program, radically executed, rather than the converse. Besides, it's not true that we sacrifice action for the sake of ideology. We take positions on specific issues without fear. And here I agree with Jean when he says that "we do the same", within another frame of reference of course, and this is the opposite of vague positions.

[Question] Therein lies the paradox, since you do this at a time when you are in the largest coalition.

[Van Miert] Yes, it's true. There is a coincidence between this new approach and the fact that there comes a time when you need a large majority in order to accomplish a certain number of essential things. We are ready to try resolving this debate within the government. But first, a new frame of reference has to be defined. And I cannot say at this time if this framework will suit us or not. It remains to be seen.

[Gol] Yes, for now, we have exhausted most of the potential for precision contained in the government's declaration. But for people who can live with permanent, artistic approximation, the present situation is comfortable and doesn't bother them at all.

[Van Miert] It does not suit us.

[Gol] A major consensus will have to be found to invigorate the economy and apportion the solidarity effort. But I prefer to make concessions on the basis of very clear positions where I know what I'm getting and what I'm giving up. There are I am willing to sign a new lease based on precise clauses.

[Question] So you are ready to make concessions in this context. Have you already made any?

[Gol] We accepted increases in Social Security contributions, and the socialists have accepted some reforms.

[Question] What about you, Mr Van Miert?

[Van Miert] First, in community matters, where it was not to our advantage to make any concessions but where we felt it was necessary, in order to come out of the dead-end. Similarly, a solution was found for the Program-Law. The other points have remained vague. Now the question is to know how to solve the crisis, by revitalizing the Belgian economy and by sharing the efforts to reach this goal.

[Gol] Our methods are not fundamentally different, but we seem to go separate ways when it comes to concrete problems. For us, the government is not an end in itself. We are not ready to sacrifice our principles for the sake of a few seats on the sidelines, but we are determined to reach a certain number of objectives. The moment has come to broaden the government assent for the problems which we did not treat in detail at Lambermont and which are coming up very tangibly.

[Van Miert] Yes. Because as long as the agreement is clear, there is no problem. But as soon as you work without a net, and this is the case here, it becomes more difficult.

[Question] According to you, the time has come to negotiate an agreement on a number of urgent issues. Unemployment among them.

Advantages and Privileges

[Van Miert] Our unemployment has reached gigantic proportions. Traditional solutions are no longer adequate. What's needed is concrete action to revitalize the economy. This being so, the fact that our assistance program for the unemployed is very big is not objectionable in itself. To screen and turn away the unemployed from benefits will be useless and will not help solve the problem. Yes, there are abuses and they should be eliminated because they discredit the system itself. But let me add right here that there are other abuses, for example fiscal fraud. And that's much more serious.

Regarding the regulations, let's not change them. Let's simply say that there are anomalies to be corrected: for example, when two people on unemployment pay less taxes than two working people. That's not normal.

[Gol] The point is, it does not provide much motivation.

[Van Miert] That's a point which we have suggested for discussion. Similarly, without reopening the question of certain principles, let us act so that those who benefit from unemployment compensation do not derive excessive advantages from it. Thus, starting at a certain income level, a "fiscalization" of unemployment compensation seems acceptable to me. Therefore we don't accept a situation where advantages begin to look like real privileges. Summing up, I would say that basically the present compensation system has to be preserved. But I'm not ready to go along with those who want to eliminate 50,000 or 100,000 unemployed with one stroke!

[Gol] Unemployment is clearly one of our current blights. Unfortunately I fear that we may have to live with permanent built-in unemployment, which in fact implies the redefinition of a certain number of attitudes.

Now, any actual reduction in unemployment (and not just a statistical reduction) goes through stages of industrial reconversion and revitalization. This implies prior reestablishment of adequate profitability for both private and public enterprises. Incentive for those still employed also has to be maintained. If you want to accomplish all this, you must first of all take care not to burden either individuals or private and public enterprises with new fiscal or para-fiscal obligations. Yet the social security contribution increases are obligations with an unfavorable long-term effect on employment.

Today the Social Security budget is leaking -- the hole is a gaping one -- and it is the most disadvantaged who are threatened with potential bankruptcy. So there are only two ways: either you increase revenues and then you have the reverse of the desired economic recovery; or else you reduce existing benefits and you reduce expenses.

For my part I feel that this reduction must be achieved in various sectors in an extremely selective way, and by dealing with socially indefensible situations in view of the fact that growth revenues are no longer distributed. We have to distribute penury.

Youth Unemployment

Here is an example with respect to unemployment. Is it aberrant to believe that those under 18 years of age or graduating from school could start by receiving, for a limited period, not the unemployment benefits directly but the family allocation or the minimum wage. They would not become part of the unemployment system until they had demonstrated that they actually looked for work.

[Question] Mr Van Miert, does this suggestion strike you as aberrant?

[Van Miert] For me, those who don't try to find work are in the same class as profiteers. But I also know a lot of young people, nearly all, who want to work as soon as possible. If they don't find jobs, what else can you do but give them unemployment benefits?

[Gai] Of course it's not my intention to turn them into beggars. I would just like to see an incentive for job seeking. Another example: there are fairly great numbers of people who are not heads of families -- mainly women -- who worked just long enough to receive unemployment compensation and who then will remain it the rest of their life. Which is another way of giving them the domestic allocation which the CVP wants to give to homemakers.

[Van Miert] The present legislature has plans for measures capable of eliminating abuses.

[Gai] You know as well as I do that the system is managed by social partners. And here the bosses are not the least lax! I find you very conservative after all!

[Van Miert] No. I'm saying that you can eliminate these abuses if the spirit of the law is applied.

[Gol] Above a certain cumulative income level, it's no longer appropriate to grant social advantages. Thus I agree with you when you say that your family allocations are no longer justified in view of your level of comfort. On this point I think as you do.

[Van Miert] Careful! Our purpose is not to eliminate at the outset, certain people from certain social transactions. But we think the income level should be taken into account. Thus after a certain salary level, granting a 13th or 14th month seems to me unjustifiable.

[Gol] We're really seeing eye-to-eye.

Balancing Sacrifices

[Van Miert] It seems to me that all current discussions place too much emphasis on the social aspect of things and not enough on other problems. I think people understand that sacrifices have to be made, provided however that you explain that this will be done equitably, and that fiscal fraud, capital concealment, and large fortunes will also be dealt with.

[Question] Mr Gol? What is your position on these three problems?

[Gol] Like Mr Van Miert, I think that sacrifices must be asked of all categories of the population and that they must be equitable But there should not be any notion that some protect the little people and some protect the more powerful. Therefore this problem of solidarity should not be oversimplified but properly set in a larger context, notably including independent workers.

To come back to the three specific points. One: fiscal fraud. I feel perfectly at ease on that ground, because the first effective measures in years were taken by a government with liberal participation, and furthermore, by a liberal finance minister, Mr Henrion. In addition, projections for the 1981 budget include revenues of 15 billion thanks to this fight against fiscal fraud. This will be achieved, provided we don't engage in a witch-hunt but track down fraud where it takes place, beginning with the banking sector.

Two: capital tax and capital drain. What capital? The visible one, of course, in order words real-estate fortunes. So I'm asking this question: is it so appropriate to impose such a tax when the combined title and succession rights are already among the highest in Europe? When construction is in full crisis and stands to lose one third of its work force? How will you avoid discouraging people from investing in construction, when they can get 12, 13, maybe even 15 percent with a simple 3-month bank deposit?

[Van Miert] This is totally false reasoning. Mr Gol, we are not talking about those who own only one or two houses: we are specifically talking about a tax on large fortunes. This tax exists in Germany, in the Netherlands, and as far as I know, the economy in those two countries is none the worse for it.

We no longer accept the policy by which "you touch only what you see, and take care later of what you don't see." If you don't make a start after large fortunes at some point, you never will.

Fear of Unions

[Question] Are you afraid of trade unions? Would you support the government, if, for urgent budget considerations, it was to take measures which directly conflict with trade unions?

[Van Miert] I'm not afraid of the unions or of anyone else. The real question is to determine how sacrifices will be shared. But this has to be done with the social partners. As long as the government attempts to achieve it through brutal measures such as the "2 percent", I will be in disagreement.

[Gol] These past few years, unions have acted as some of the most conservative restraints against all sorts of reforms aimed at reestablishing the dynamism of the economy. Therefore I think that public opinion would be that a government which overruled unions -- which in any case will never reach agreement on any reform proposals -- that this government would reopen the question of existing mechanisms, and that this government would therefore be right.

[Van Miert] You have the same views as Mrs Thatcher: as long as you're against unions, your views are supposed to be sound. You give the impression that nothing positive has been done. That's not true. Also, one of the great challenges now facing us the Social Security reorganization. This is not just a question of government, Mr Gol. It's also a question of workers and bosses.

I'm not imitating union positions. But I admit that there are a number of things on which our attitudes and actions are alike. But at least let's respect concerted action: we have to see how far we can go with the social partners, what path we can take. Of course we must not get caught in their wake. And if serious consultation yields no results, it will be up to the government to take its responsibilities.

Conditional "Yes"

[Question] A moment ago Mr Gol said: "If we continue governing together, as is my personal wish..." What about you, Mr Van Miert, do you also want this tripartite situation to continue?

[Van Miert] Where the government is concerned, we are coming before our Congress next Sunday with this attitude: that we are attached to what we have loyally defended. A new period is probably beginning, we are ready to continue with the same formula provided that the frame of reference for it is specific and adhered to. So it's a conditional "yes."

[Question] Mr Gol, in your opinion, what are the positive contributions of Mr Van Miert's friends, the Flemish socialists, in this governmental coalition?

[Gol] I think -- and this is a positive factor -- that in Flanders it is essential for the CVP to be counterbalanced by an equivalent or nearly equivalent entity. Because on a host of issues, the "encroaching" approach of the CVP must in our view be compensated by the views of the Flemish parties which do not belong to that political family. This will moderate its overconfidence and guard against a lack of regard or interest for other points of view.

Secondly, I think that the Flemish socialists have some excellent ministers whom it would be rather difficult to dispense with at present. For example I have enormous respect for a man like Mr Claes, who is making considerable progress with economic affairs. I just regret that as determined as he is, Mr Claes, who in June was in favor of near-surgical reforms, was not even up to the task of administering aspirin to his party when it was supposed to endorse a certain number of measures he felt were essential in economic terms. I acknowledge the important contributions of the Flemish socialists.

[Question] Mr Van Miert?

[Van Miert] The liberal movement is an essential component of Belgian political life. If I'm a fanatic about anything, it's political pluralism because there is no democracy conceivable without it.

I also appreciate the clear positions of Mr Gol and his friends. I am for clarity, in political matters, and I accept the consequences. On the liberal side there are people who clearly spell out their positions, and this makes it possible for us to clarify our own and better see where we stand. This also makes it possible for people to judge our behavior.

I think that each of the parties has valuable members who under difficult circumstances can contribute to finding solutions. I regret the departure of Mr Henrion. I liked the way he approached numerous problems during the governmental negotiations. It's too bad that he was not able to continue his work.

Tomorrow: Mr Gol and Mr Van Miert reopen the controversy over Euromissiles.

11,023
CSO: 3100

MEASURES TO COPE WITH COOPERATIVES CRISIS PROPOSED

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 12 Oct 80 p 9

/Text/ Since the time it was introduced to our country the cooperative movement has met with adverse conditions and has been able to overcome them and to follow the road to success and to new sectors of activities for the benefit of its members and the country's economy.

Today the movement is experiencing one of the most difficult junctures in its history, firstly because its own leaders have led it to economic impasse for various reasons the investigation of which reveals scandals, irregularities, transgression of duty, and so forth, and secondly because some representatives of the economic oligarchy in exploiting this impasse are dealing it greater blows in an attempt to eliminate it completely so that they may reap all benefits at the people's expense.

As all of us know, the main reason for the crisis the cooperative movement is having today is the lack of democratic procedures and control from the grass-roots to the leadership. Therefore, along with the ongoing investigation for pinpointing responsibilities, the main and primary duty of the government is to introduce new laws which will govern the operation of the cooperatives and will guarantee democratic procedures. However, there is an unjustified delay which renders things difficult. This delay provides the economic oligarchy the opportunity to continue to exploit the scandals and irregularities with an ultimate objective at eliminating the movement or at least displacing it from certain sectors of the economy which this oligarchy wants to monopolize thus preventing it from becoming reactivated and able to overcome the difficulties albeit to a limited extent.

What Must Be Done

Regardless of the ongoing investigation it is imperative that the government promote as soon as possible through the legislative authority a new law which will clearly define the responsibilities and rights of the cooperative movement leadership and ensure democratic procedures.

We will not go into details as to why all the leaders of the movement should be elected by the member cooperatives, about their limited term of office, and so forth, but we would like to underline one thing: It is not right for the cooperative

movement to be transformed into a government department. It must remain in the hands of the cooperatives. Come to think of it, what has the government done during this period with regard to the democratization of the legislation? What are the conclusions reached by the committee investigating the matter? Is the committee by any chance prevented from continuing its work? If so, why and by whom?

Industries

There is also delay in the matter of clearing the [cooperative] industries. The mistakes and poor management of the cooperative industries are evident. Some industries cannot operate efficiently because they were set up without previous study, without a concrete program, without a study of the production costs and available markets. Others cannot function perhaps because even though the above steps were taken, no liquid capital was left for variable capital. The result is that millions in investments remain idle, unexploited. And the losses pile up. Decisions must be taken at long last. Perhaps some industrial units should be sold. Others could perhaps be operated on a limited schedule such as, for example, the olive oil industries and maybe the paper box industries. What is the government doing in this sector? What capital do these industries need for their operation? What are the conclusions of the report by Cooper and Laibradi [transliteration]?

The overall conclusion is that things are moving very slowly to the joy of the economic oligarchy which is lying in wait. Radical decisions are needed today. Tomorrow it may be too late!

7520
CSO:4908

AKEL PARTY DEPUTY DEMANDS RETURN OF NIKOS SAMPSON

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 10 Oct 80 pp 1, 7

/Text/ AKEL Deputy Secretary General and /House of Representatives/ Deputy Andreas Fandis raised once more in the house the question concerning coupist /Nikos/ Sampson who--as Fandis charged--"continues to enjoy himself in various European countries and to conspire against Cyprus." In a letter he read in the house, Fandis asked the presiding officer to investigate the matter and to report at the body's next meeting to what extent President Kyprianou can give assurance that "he will take effective and specific measures to bring back the coupist and 8-day President Sampson to serve the rest of the prison term the assize court imposed on him in August 1976."

Following Fandis' statement, acting president of the house E. Papaioannou, who is also the parliamentary representative of the Left and AKEL secretary general, said that Fandis is fully justified in making this demand which should be transmitted to the president of the House of Representatives for further action. The full text of the Fandis statement is as follows:

"Last May, upon my recommendation, the house discussed the question of the coupist 8-day President Sampson who, on the basis of a decree by President Kyprianou, was released from prison and went abroad for medical examination and treatment according to the decree.

"Following the discussion of the subject, the house unanimously approved a recommendation I made to ask the Executive Authority to take 'all proper measures for the return of Sampson to Cyprus to expiate the rest of the sentence the assize court imposed on him in August 1976.'

"Following approval of the above recommendation President Kyprianou made the following statement through the government spokesman on 30 June: 'Last Saturday the government asked Nikos Sampson, through his lawyers, to return to Cyprus to expiate the rest of his sentence on the basis of undertaken obligations. In the event of refusal on his part the government will take the necessary action.'

"More than 3 months have passed since the above statement was made without any developments in the Sampson case. The people justifiably are of the impression that the government spokesman's statement was made only for the purpose of dispelling the public's anxieties--a tactic unfortunately followed, as a rule, by President Kyprianou.

"In view of the preceding facts, Mr. President, I recommend that you investigate the matter and inform the house at its next session of the following:

"a. How Sampson lawyers responded to the government demand that he return to Cyprus 'on the basis of undertaken obligations' to expiate the rest of his sentence.

"b. What action the government took since, as the events prove, the Sampson lawyers did not respond to its demand for the return of condemned Sampson to Cyprus.

"c. Whether President Kyprianou can give assurances as to when and to what extent he will take specific and effective measures for bringing back Sampson who, according to latest information, continues to have a good time in various European cities and to conspire against Cyprus--in order to finish the prison term the assize court imposed in August 1980."

7520
CSO:4908

PHYSICIANS COMMENT ON NEW HEALTH PLAN

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 12 Oct 80 p 8

/Text/ The following observations and proposals are the outcome of successive meetings of the Private Doctors Association /SII/ administrative council and of its broad ranging membership meeting on 25 September 1980. They are included in the SII letter which accompanied the "Health Plan" and the Greek translation (we have the impression that some terms in the English text may be misinterpreted).

General Remarks

The whole plan aims at extending the services rendered by government doctors thus decreasing considerably or completely destroying private medical practice. This is unjust and unacceptable if one takes into consideration, moreover, the fact that the quality of medical practice has been improved mainly by the private medical sector.

We agree with the proposal to extend medical and medicinal relief to all people without discrimination. But implementation of such a plan must be based mainly on the Cypriot reality. In its present form the plan is unrealistic and inapplicable.

At its meeting of 10 April 1979, the Pan-Cyprian Medical Association /PIS/ defined the following five principles and prerequisites which must govern the implementation of such a Health Plan:

1. It should cover the whole population of Cyprus.

2. It should include all physicians who wish to participate.

3. It should guarantee the patient's right to choose his doctor.

4. It should use all investments already made by the private medical sector (machinery, instruments, clinics, and so forth).

5. It should not transform private doctors into government employees.

The last Health Plan violated almost all these five principles which PIS advanced and the Makarios government accepted. PIS rejects the proposed new Health Plan because it violates these five principles which must constitute indispensable prerequisites. In addition, the plan must conform to the condition of the Cypriot reality. Besides, doubts are expressed as to the possible implementation of the plan.

In 1978, it was estimated that "for 1979 the cost of implementing the plan would be on the order of 21 million pounds." Two years have since passed and the cost will reach at least 30 million pounds or even more--an amount which corresponds to about one fifth of the state budget. One should take into consideration, moreover, the country's size and weak economy. We should avoid, in other words, the establishment of an enormous and unbearable economic organization which instead of helping may contribute to the further downslide of the country's economy.

We are of the opinion that the economic aspect of the plan critically hurts the doctor both as a professional and as an individual, taking into consideration other factors also. With the new Proportional Plan the doctor is indiscriminately forced to pay 30 pounds per month besides the 20 pounds he pays to PIS (current and past dues)--a total, that is, of 50 pounds which has no relation to his other fixed financial obligations. Undoubtedly this amount will be increased by his participation in the plan. There are fellow doctors whose monthly allowance is only 60 pounds.

Violation of the Five Principles

1. First Principle: Coverage of the whole population. Despite the fact that all people are covered, still the plan has gaps:

a. (Subtitle: "Persons Entitled to Relief"; article 11, p 2). Medical relief will be given to dependents up to 21 years of age if they attend school or if they take vocational training. Usually their age limit is extended beyond 21 years. On the basis of this provision the plan excludes the great majority of our students. We recommend that students related to claimants be given relief until they reach 27.

b. Free services to permanent residents (Special Regulations, article 3, p 1). This article states that persons "who are not permanent residents of Cyprus and are not included among those entitled to relief will have the right to medical relief in government hospitals." Since they do not participate in the plan (no one pays for them) why should they get free medical relief? In addition this provision may provide the possibility for exploitation. Besides the aliens in Cyprus, it is possible for the Cypriots abroad to come here for operations, childbirths, and so forth, since they will get all services free. We also recommend that those entitled to this service should be free to go to the hospital or clinic of their choice and not to be forced to accept services only from government institutions.

2. Second and Fourth Principles: All doctors should participate in the plan and use should be made of the equipment and clinics maintained by private doctors.

(Subtitle: "Contractual Services"; pp 5-6, paragraphs 1, 3, 7). Paragraph 1 gives priority to government institutions. Why not on an equal footing with the private institutions as long as they meet the preconditions? Paragraph 3 provides for postponing the signing of a contract during the transition period "even if the applicant physician meets all required conditions." This provision is unjust and unfair to private institutions. It can be used as a means of wiping out certain such institutions. Paragraph 7 (p 6) states: "Anyone possessing the necessary criteria and preconditions can sign a contract. The number of X-ray services may limit the laboratory and other services connected with the patient's treatment

to government institutions only. This provision excludes private X-ray and laboratory technicians. The physicians' unions reject the monopolistic contracts provided by this Health Plan.

3. Third Principle: Free choice of doctor. Paragraph 1 (p 6) limits the free choice of a doctor by the patient. [Presently] the general practitioner sends the patient to the specialist.

The patient should have the right to go to a specialist of h's choice without approval by the general practitioner and should be able, if his health permits, to go directly to a specialist. Such freedom of choice by the patient should be extended also to the hospital for his treatment. The patient should have the freedom to go directly to a specialist without previous approval by the general doctor or through the latter to choose the specialist. In the event he wants to visit a second specialist he should have the approval of the general physician. This approval will not concern the patient's choice for any specialist but his choice for a second opinion or for changing the specialist.

The same paragraph makes it clear that a general practitioner (pathologist, cardiologist) may also be a specialist. In other words, the same physician can in his capacity as a "general physician" refer [words illegible] (in his capacity as specialist). In other words, a doctor can participate in the plan only as a general practitioner or as a specialist, but not under a double identity.

4. Fifth Principle: Private physicians should not be transformed into government employees. This principle is violated because all members of the Health Plan administrative council are appointed by the health minister. Besides, participation of doctors in the council is excluded (p 6). This provision is unacceptable. Provision should be made for the participation of PIS representatives as well as of representatives of private doctors in the Health Plan administrative council. One third of the council members should be doctors. The members of the council (article 3) should not be appointed by the government but should be directly elected by the insured.

Special Remarks on the Proposed Plan

1. Benefits (p 4, article 2, paragraph 3). "No service or prescription should cost more than necessary." Objective criteria should be defined or the background for determining such criteria should be given. The medical body must reach decisions on the basis of objective criteria.

2. Payment (pp 6-7). Paragraph 4 provides for an "agreed price list for services rendered by specialists to outpatients." The nature and kind of treatment should also be considered. Will payments be made on the basis of the number of the patients or on the quality of service? For example, a psychotherapeutic treatment lasts about 45 minutes while a usual clinical psychiatric examination (especially if it is the patient's second visit) is of much less duration. Such differences should be defined in a precise manner.

The paragraph provides also that "it is possible for the plan to provide, in certain cases, an average number of days for patients in the hospital and to pay smaller fees for extra recuperative days." This provision is unjust especially as concerns cases with complications whose treatment should be extended.

3. Compulsory Insurance (p 2, article 1). Those participating in the new Social Insurance Plan are compelled to participate also in the new Health Plan. This means that the new Social Insurance Plan participants (the whole population) will also pay /insurance fees/ to the new Health Plan.

Will a person be able to stay out of the Health Plan even if he participates in the Social Insurance Plan? We believe that the people should be given this right of choice. Just as the doctors have the right not to participate in the plan, so should the insured be given the same right.

This right is also connected with the rejection or acceptance of the proposal to establish private health insurance and private clinics or hospitals provided they meet certain criteria. Such a right (for private medical-medicinal insurance and private clinics) should be granted even after the establishment of the government plan for medical-medicinal insurance.

4. Questions and Omissions. The proposed Health Plan has omissions and raises questions. It does not make clear, for instance, whether all physicians will have the right to participate in the plan. The government should not apply this discriminating privilege and exclude certain physicians from the plan. All doctors should have the right to participate unless the physician prefers not to join it. Also, a time period should be fixed after which a doctor who originally decided not to join the plan will have the right to do so.

There is no provision for institutions of certain categories such as hospitals for retarded or maladjusted children. Under whose jurisdiction should they be? How is the qualitative and not only the quantitative service protected? How is the conscientious and good physician encouraged and rewarded? It seems that the new Health Plan will create three sectors: the government, the private, and the one for the new Health Plan. Their responsibilities and classification should be defined clearly and precisely. We recommend a more detailed study of the plan and postponement of its implementation so that it can be perfected to better conform to the Cypriot reality.

It is understood from the above that the implementation of the Health Plan as proposed is inapplicable and unacceptable to the private physicians.

7920
230:4908

HIGH QUANTITIES OF DDT FOUND IN HUMAN BODIES

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 12 Oct 80 pp 1, 2, 3

[Text] The carcinogenic and teratogenic pesticide DDT was found in large quantities in bodies of dead Cypriots, according to the Cypriot Union of Consumer Protection [KSPK] which charged that the people's health is endangered by the hormones and antibiotics in meats and warned that if an unjustified delay or obstruction is ascertained [in taking measures] it will call the consumers to aggressive action.

In an announcement yesterday, KSPK confirmed the reports TA NEA published and specifically:

1. Charges that the carcinogen hormone D&S as well as other stimulants and antibiotics are circulating freely and reveals that a KSPK representative was able to purchase them at pharmacies in Nicosia, from drug importers, and at the Athiainou general store.

2. Observes that the law on drugs permits livestock breeders to import drugs directly from abroad.

3. Notes that imported frozen or fresh meats are not subjected to responsible health and qualitative inspection for hormone or antibiotic residue content.

4. Points out that the poultry farms and slaughterhouses as well as fish and other foods are not undergoing proper health inspection.

5. It states that there is herbicide abuse in fruits and vegetables.

6. Finally, it responds to the Ministry of Health claims that "no problem exists as far as meat is concerned" and observes that Cyprus does not possess the proper equipment and the specialized personnel to carry out analyses for hormone detection.

Referring to the DDT question, KSPK notes that "samples of fat taken from flesh of dead Cypriots and sent to West Germany for analysis contained high quantities of DDT." As is known, DDT, which is a carcinogen and teratogen, was also found in Cypriot cheese (khaloumi) exported to the US and returned to us for exactly this reason.

KSPK further notes that there exists no machinery for inspecting imported children's foods and the government relies only on the assurances of the countries exporting

them that their products do not contain hormones. It is indicatively noted that the US, from where we import most of our children's foods, is using antibiotics and it is pointed out that the only way the government can reassure the public is to carry out sampling surveys and tests here in Cyprus.

Finally, KSPK, in response to announcements by swine, cattle, and poultry breeders, states that their representatives admitted to the Price Commission that they are using preventive antibiotics and other drugs. The KSPK announcement is as follows:

Following the "reassuring" announcement of the Ministry of Health and the relevant announcements by the organization of livestock and poultry raisers, KSPK considers it an obligation to enlighten the broad consumer public on the extremely serious problem concerning the imprudent use of antibiotics and hormones in livestock breeding and in fruits and vegetables.

1. The KSPK administrative council has been anxiously watching for a long time now the whole subject concerning the wholesome quality of foods and is fighting virogously in the administrative council and the subcommittees of the Standards and Quality Control Organization /OPEP/ as well as in all other organizations where similar work is carried out for the purpose of ensuring quality and wholesomeness in foods. Our union has repeatedly warned the public through memoranda, articles in its publication "The Consumer," the interview in newspapers about the great dangers threatening all of us. As concerns the use of stimulants, it is certain that this practice and the abuse in the use of antibiotics place in extremely serious danger the health of the people and particularly that of the infants, children, and all those who, for reasons of health, must consume large quantities of animal and dairy products.

2. Unfortunately, Law 6/1967 on drugs (quality control, procurement and prices) has many loopholes, important among which is that it permits the livestock breeders to import their drugs themselves from abroad. This makes difficult, if not impossible, an effective control since no one can be sure about the use of these drugs.

3. Unfortunately, the legislation on drugs is not observed in Cyprus because the machinery for their control is inadequate and inefficient with the result that the drugstores, and, worse still, the cooperative general stores in rural areas sell without prescriptions by veterinarians--absolutely freely, in other words--pesticides and herbicides as well as stimulant hormones to anyone. A member of our union's administrative council bought without prescription from a Nicosia pharmacy and from importers of pharmaceuticals antibiotics used in poultry, swine and other animals, as well as the dangerous hormones DES (diethylstilbestrol and stilboestrol) which are used for fattening animals and which, according to charges by consumer unions in EEC countries, are carcinogenic. Similar drugs were bought also without prescription by another member of our union at an Athiainou general store.

4. Unfortunately, there is no health or quality inspection on imported frozen or fresh meats. The law provides only for inspections whose purpose is to prevent importing to Cyprus animal diseases. Therefore we cannot be certain that the imported frozen and fresh meats do not contain hormones or antibiotic residues.

5. The Pan-Cyprian Veterinarian Association has charged that the meat of poultry slaughtered by small and large poultry breeders is not inspected at all. On the other hand, we all know that people in the cities buy live chickens from farms, slaughter them at their own homes and sell them without inspection of any kind.

6. As concerns the reassuring announcement the Health Ministry made on 9 October 80, we state the following: Unfortunately, much as we would like to, we do not agree that the situation is what the government announcement says. The announcement states that "the use of hormones and antibiotics for fattening animals is forbidden in Cyprus and their importation, sale and use is regulated by laws and regulations now in force."

Yet, we, without any difficulty and without prescription, were able to buy hormones and antibiotics in both Nicosia and Athiainou. What other proof is needed to show that the regulations and bans are not observed and that the government machinery for inspection and prevention is either nonexistent or inefficient? The ministry's announcement mentions further that the children's foods we import come from the United States and the United Kingdom--countries where the use of hormones is forbidden. The implication therefore is that we should not be concerned even if our own services do not carry out any sampling surveys and tests since these countries do not allow the use of hormones. However, the hormone scandal in EEC countries proved that, even though use of the synthetic hormone stilboestrol was officially forbidden, it was nonetheless widely used for fattening animals. The livestock breeders were able to find this dangerous hormone and other similarly dangerous preparations in the black market. This market came into being and flourished because the EEC governments were unwilling to stop the use of these dangerous preparations in order to avoid an increase in the production cost!!! The result was that the consumers boycotted the meat market and the governments of these countries were forced to end this unacceptable situation. What, then, our consumer public needs is to be reassured that the foods for children do not contain hormones or antibiotic residues. Above all, however, relevant analyses should be made in Cyprus to prove that such is the case. The fight in the US Congress on the excessive use of antibiotics for fattening animals is well known. Unfortunately, despite efforts by FDA, consumers and members of Congress to terminate the use of antibiotics for animal fattening, Congress failed to enact a law because of the reaction [lobbying] of large livestock breakers, pharmaceutical industries, and other groups whose interests would be hurt. Characteristically, a congressional survey showed that 40 percent of the antibiotics processed in the United States are destined for the livestock breeding industry. It is for this reason that our anxiety concerning such foods is very great and the only way to reassure the public is to carry out sampling surveys and analyses here in Cyprus.

The ministry's announcement refers also to the use of antibiotics in animals here in Cyprus and states that a recent sample survey by the Veterinarian Service has ascertained that the public's anxiety regarding this matter is unjustified. But the ministry's announcement does not tell us what this survey proved. Our information, which comes from many and reliable sources, is that during this survey residues of antibiotics were found in pork and chicken as well as in beef.

On the other hand, in an interview he gave to the newspaper APOGEVMATINI, the director of the medical services says that, in the case of antibiotics, an

unannounced survey was made which proved the existence of antibiotics in meats. How, then, did the Ministry of Health arrive at the conclusion that the public's anxiety is unjustified?

7. A KOFK survey revealed that Cyprus today does not have the technical equipment nor the specially trained personnel capable of carrying out analyses for detecting hormones in meats.

8. Besides the question of meats, another equally serious issue is the use of herbicides in fruits and vegetables as well as the use of dangerous dyes, nitric acid, nitrate salts, and other preservatives in goods sold in the Cypriot market. Tests show the presence of dangerous quantities of herbicide residues in fruits and vegetables, yet neither the public was enlightened, nor the proper machinery established to ensure that the time between spraying and harvesting was sufficient enough to neutralize the harmful substances in pesticides before the fruits and vegetables went to the market place. Moreover, in the case of other [harmful] substances the existing machinery is not operating in a satisfactory way.

In addition to the question of pesticides, it is our duty to reveal that, according to reliable information, samples of fat taken from the flesh of corpses and sent to West Germany for analysis contained large quantities of DDT which as is known is carcinogenic and teratogenic. As mentioned earlier DDT was also found in Cypriot khaloumi (cheese) exported to the United States and returned to this country for exactly this reason.

9. Finally, the same situation--total lack of health control machinery--exists in the case of fish whether imported or locally caught. The only inspection made in this case also is similar to the one for meats--preventing, that is, fish diseases.

10. With regard to the announcements by the associations of swine, cattle, and poultry breeders assuring us that no hormones are used for fattening animals, we can only say that announcements of organizations whose certain members derive large economic benefits cannot in any way reassure the public. The only way to reassure the consumer is to have such announcements made by an independent service.

At this point we would like to point out that the Cypriot swine, cattle and poultry breeders are using preventive antibiotics and other drugs as their representatives have testified before the Price Commission. Again the serious problem exists that there is no effective machinery guaranteeing that no abuse of such preventive drugs is made.

11. The overall conclusion from our union's aforementioned investigation is very disappointing and disturbing because it shows that unfortunately our health is in danger. The government's responsibility is tremendous. Health is one of the citizen's most precious and sacred gifts.

The question of healthy food becomes very difficult because it falls under the jurisdiction of many ministries, government departments, and local administrations among which unfortunately there exists great competition and conflict. It is for this reason that the government is urgently asked to consider this problem even at the Ministerial Council level. Our union's services are at the disposal of the

authorities for the successful solution of the problem. At the same time, we are warning it that if it is ascertained that there is delay or collusion, we shall call the consumers to aggressive action in order to protect their legal rights.

Our union will watch closely any developments in this area and will reiterate its position if necessary. In the meantime, our administrative council has requested an urgent meeting with appropriate ministers for expressing orally also our positions and for showing them the evidence we have.

7:20
CSO:4908

HEALTH MINISTER: HORMONE FEARS UNFOUNDED

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 30 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] THE MINISTER of Health Mr George Tombazos yesterday gave a solemn assurance that the fears expressed about the use of hormone injections for fattening of animals are unfounded.

Mr Tombazos, for several years Minister of Agriculture, appeared at a press conference to give a true picture of the position regarding meat hygiene.

«As a Minister of Health and one familiar with the problems of the Ministry of Agriculture too, I assure you there is no danger at all, and all the fuss and the phobia which have been created are unjustified», he said.

He assured the conference that in Cyprus no hormones for fattening are used, but only for veterinary purposes, and he regretted the fuss made which has caused a great fall in demand for cattle.

«We are doing a gross injustice to these men (farmers) because with the rumours about use of hormones we have caused many of them great harm in their sales», the Minister said.

He said suggestions for banning the importation of hormones were inapplicable. We cannot forbid the importation of hormones for medical purposes for human beings --insulin for diabetics or thyroxine for ailments of the thyroid gland and several others, he said.

The same could be said about the estrogenous hormones which are used for cattle.

But the Minister explained, their cost is such that it is uneconomical to use them for fattening purposes for animals.

The Minister said that there have been no cases of effects suggesting that such hormones were used.

Preservatives

Mr Tombazos also referred to the use of preservatives for foodstuffs and said that these were necessary in the required quantities and varieties. «It would be dangerous if we did not use preservatives for items that could be destroyed», he said.

He gave an assurance that proper control of the hygiene of foodstuffs was made with spot checks through laboratory tests.

One further example disproving the use of dangerous drugs was, he said, the fact that Cyprus meat preparations were being regularly exported abroad, to the British market, among other places, and so far nothing has been sent back, thus proving that no harmful material was found.

On the fears of antibiotics, the Minister explained that these are not lethal drugs but only kill the microbes they are intended to kill.

There might be some antibiotics for cattle which may result in some fattening, but they are quite harmless to man and no antibiotics are being administered to animals specially for fattening because that would raise the costs.

The Minister also referred to pesticides and agreed that these are sometimes deleterious (poisonous) but that is unavoidable. However, he explained they are harmless if the crop is not offered to the market immediately and if offered two or three days after spraying.

As to DDT which is retained by the human body, the Minister said that this had been used in the campaign against malaria but has not been used for years now.

Mr Tombazos said the Veterinary Services have set up a laboratory where extensive tests are made of any dangerous element in food or meat, and the law about meat hygiene will be put into effect immediately the regulations are drafted.

About the DES hormones, Mr Tombazos said that only 40 such units were imported through the Medical Services, and from prescriptions issued it is shown that 25 were used and the remainder are still undisposed of.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

WOMEN LIVE LONGER—Males outnumbered females in both births and deaths last year. Of the total number of births, 51.6% were males while out of a total of 5,130 deaths, 50.4% were men. In general, there is a female predominance among higher age groups after the 35th year, says the Demographic Report. This is due to the fact that while the male birth rate is higher, women have a longer life expectancy. [Text] [Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 17-23 Oct 80 p 4]

UPSURGE IN MARRIAGES--There were 6,355 marriages in Cyprus last year, a 27.8% increase over 1978, the Demographic Report says. It remarks: "This increase was mainly due to the fact that 1980 is a leap year and many marriages which could have occurred in 1980 took place one year earlier because of the superstition of the population against being married in a leap year." The most popular months for marriage were July to October. Nearly 60% of the total number of marriages were held during these months. The least popular month was March and this was due to Lent. [Text] [Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 17-23 Oct 80 p 4]

POPULATION OF AGED RISES--There are more old people now in the population of Cyprus than ever before. The continuous drop in the number of births has brought about significant changes in the age structure of the island's population. The 1979 Demographic Report published by the Statistics Department says: "Though on the whole the Cyprus population is still of intermediate age, the proportion of the old-aged people has been continuously increasing over the last 40 years, while the proportion of young has been decreasing." People over the age of 65 now represent 10.3% of the population (the proportion was 6.4% in 1960) while children under 15 represent 24.5% of the population (36.4% in 1960). The number of mothers who have given birth to three or more children has been diminishing. Since 1946 there has been a drop in the general fertility rate, "apparently due to the desire of people to have fewer children in order to be able to achieve a higher standard of living for themselves and their children." Other contributing factors may also have been a change in the attitude towards religion and towards the role women should play in the family and in society. The report says the general fertility rate reached its lowest in 1975, the year after the war. Yet there has been some increase in the birth rate in the last four years--"due to mainly the favourable age structure of women." There were 12,767 births recorded last year (11,871 in 1978). The report says the higher birth rate in recent years was the result of an increase in the number of women of reproductive age, particularly among the most fertile ages, and was not due to a real increase of fertility. Fertility rates during the last ten years indicate that "women tend to bear their children at younger ages and complete their family earlier." The highest fertility rates are still those among the 25-29

age group, but there is a continuous increase in the ages 20-24 and 15-19 years, while there is a drop at older ages. During the period 1952-76 the female population outnumbered the male population; but gradually a balance between the sexes has been achieved--and last year males outnumbered females. The total population of Cyprus last year was estimated at 624,000, recording an increase of one percent over 1978. The average annual rate of growth in the last four years has been 0.6%. The growth rate was particularly low and sometimes even negative during the years of high emigration. This was particularly true during the years 1960-62 and 1974-75 [Text] [Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 17-23 Oct 80 p 4]

CSO: 4920

PCF'S BALLANGER COMMENTS ON SENATE, 1981 ELECTIONS

Paris LE MONDE in French 10 Oct 80 pp 1,10

[Interview with Robert Ballanger, president of the Communist group in the National Assembly and member of the PCF's Central Committee by Patrick Jarreau: "I Shall Not Vote for an Atlantic Alliance Socialist"]

[Excerpts] [Question] What do you think of the fact that in a number of departments your party favored for the senatorial elections right wing candidates as opposed to socialist party candidates?

[Answer] We offered to the socialist party to draw up a joint ticket in some areas and to reach, with the first balloting, an agreement on conditions for desisting in the second round. We saw combinations according to which the socialist party was either relying on the right wing vote or was requesting our own votes in order to have the greatest possible number of elected candidates. This is a dangerous tactic remindful of the shenanigans all too well remembered under the Fourth Republic.

We have stated very clearly that we shall not be the complement of the socialist party. We shall not be the crowd which brings its votes while the socialist party becomes the dominant party bringing us the elite. It is thus that in Cotes-du Nord we had the possibility to elect one communist senator and two socialist senators. The socialists chose to solicit the right wing vote. We warned them that in such a case they should not count on us to help elect them here, against us, using the rightist vote and there, opposing the right, to be elected with the help of the communist paty. They had to choose.

[Question] Like the Communist party the Socialist party draws votes wherever it can find them.

[Answer] To us the desire to have the greatest possible number of votes is based on a clear political foundation. In order to have right wing votes I am not about to grant concessions to the right wing. Conversely, it may happen that the socialist party would be locally flirting with the right and, in order to gain votes, abandon, here and there, concepts it may be supporting elsewhere.

[Question] Because of your doing the opposition has gained only one out of three seats in Doubs, whereas it could have had at least two.

[Answer] Strange: It is as though the culprit is not the one who has made the error but the one who has pronounced it. Had the socialist party accepted our suggestions and played the game everywhere we would have had five more elected officials and the socialist party would have had 13 or 14 more. It preferred to make deals and it lost.

[Question] Your party's Central Committee had decided last May to suggest to the socialist party a joint ticket for the second rather than the first round.

[Answer] True, but the senatorial delegates are active members, they have been elected, and we know them. We can, therefore, project the results of the vote and should it become likely that in some departments lack of unity for the first round would let the right wing get ahead it would be perfectly normal that in such specific cases we would suggest an agreement for the first round.

[Question] How can you today offer to the socialist party, whatever elections there might be, a joint ticket while you are tirelessly reiterating that the conditions for unity have not been met?

[Answer] We favor the union, the union of the left. We favor it with all our strength.

When the Socialist Party Removed Its Mask....

[Question] Was the joint program not social democratic?

[Answer] It was not. Indeed, it called for changes. When the socialist party removed its mask or else when we were able to see more clearly and perhaps it was we who had given it a free rein in the past, when the socialists reneged on their pledges concerning the size and pace of nationalization, we realized that, basically, they had gone back to being social democrats. Mitterrand had needed the CERES [Center for [socialist] Studies, Research, and Education] in order to assume the leadership of the socialist party in Epinay and that is why he had delivered a "leftist" speech. Essentially, however, he had remained a social democrat.

[Question] For a number of years the question of the revolution has not been discussed by the communist party. They were talking only of "advanced democracy."

[Answer] Well, this was wrong.

[Question] Was the Champigny "Manifesto" an error?

[Answer] No, but, you know, the meanings of words change. Initially, the dictatorship of the proletariat was simply the dictatorship of the majority over the minority. However, dictatorships developed in such a way that the word no longer corresponds to its original meaning. For a long time the word "revolution" evoked the image of hordes of people, setting things afire, etc. So, for a while, the word was shunted aside. However, as Waldeck-Rochet has written, we are the "revolutionaries of our time."

[Question] In June 1974 Georges Marchais explained that socialism was no longer on the agenda. Today he says the opposite.

[Answer] We say: One must progress toward socialism by stages. One should also have the means to achieve it. Assume, as I explained this in my 1978 electoral campaign, that regardless of the breakup of the union the left had won and that we would have elected, shall we say, 120 communist deputies and 180 socialist deputies. Had we done what Rocard and Mitterrand are promoting today, I am convinced that we would have failed. Six months later we would have been in Barre's situation. The workers would have rejected us and we, the communists, would have been dishonored.

[Question] Do you think that 120 coomunist deputies would have had no say in guiding the affairs of state?

[Answer] Look at where we started in 1972 and where the socialists are today! Without an agreement with the socialist party we could not consider taking jointly the step which would be required, sooner or later, for switching from the current system to socialism.

Defeat the Majority, But For What Purpose?

[Question] Assuming that on 10 May 1981 you would find on your desk a socialist ballot and a right wing ballot, which one would you drop in the ballot box?

[Answer] I could answer you that the vote is secret.... I do not know. It would depend on the attitude of the socialist party. I would not vote for the right but should I be faced with a socialist candidate supporting the Atlantic Alliance who would be inclined to compromise with the right, I would not vote for him. I do not vote for a person but for a policy. Actually, I regret the personal element involved in the election of the president of the republic by universal sufferage. I believe in teams not in providential people.

[Question] Does such personalization affect your party?

[Answer] No one can escape it. We shall campaign for the candidate who will be nominated at the party's national conference. We must join the battle on the basis of the stipulations governing the presidential election.

[Question] Assuming that your candidate is behind the socialist party candidate in the first round of balloting, do you consider it possible that your party would ask its members and voters to insure in the second round the reelection of the current president?

[Answer] It seems to me that this question should be asked of the socialists. We have no preference for one or another candidate. Rocard, Mitterrand, or Tartempion is not the problem. We are voting for concepts. If the concepts supported by the socialist candidate seem to us to be able to advance our struggle we would vote for him. Conversely, if it seems to us that this would not advance anything or may cause a disappointment, we would not vote for him.

[Question] Do you consider that the socialist party is still a leftist party?

[Answer] Ah! Yes, yes. The socialist electorate clearly consists of people who desire progress. It is even perfectly possible to manage a municipality with socialist members. It is even quite simple, for the social structures are not disturbed. One could reach very good agreement on problems of housing, schools, and so on. However, the socialist party does not appear to us today to be resolved to oppose with all its strength the domination of multinationals and to switch our country to the other camp.

[Question] As far as you are concerned, is it a question in the presidential elections of supporting the establishment of a majority for the sake of defeating the current majority?

[Answer] It is a question of having the maximum possible number of votes for the communist candidate.

5157
CSO: 3100

[redacted] MAIRE INTERVIEWED, ACCUSES GISCARD

[redacted] LE POINT in French 6 Oct 80 pp 73-75

[Interview with Edmond Maire conducted by Claude Sales: "With the Help of the French Communist Party the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] Is Trying to Take Over All Conflicts"]

[Text] For the past 2 years Edmond Maire has been the Cassandra of the left. He is now turning into the indicter of Valery Giscard d'Estaing. As seen by the leader of the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] the president may be defeated.

[Question] Edmond Maire, the idea had been that the CFDT had given up politics. Actually, it has rarely engaged in such polemics as it is not with the CGT and the PCF. What a strange paradox....

[Answer] There is no paradox. The CFDT has always believed that social change is carried on as much by trade unions as political parties, even though, obviously, their functions may be different. This, therefore, bothers some people. To begin with, it bothers the CGT which, by virtue of the joint strategy it follows with the PCF lets the "fraternal party" handle political assignments. Occasionally, however, our political evaluation of the parties bothers the socialist party as well which sometimes thinks that we are prancing on flower beds and which would like to see us grow our social garden. This is not our idea. The CFDT has acquired total independence of thought and action. It has no intention whatever to give it up.

[Question] Let us begin with union matters. In your opening speech in Nantes you had very harsh words to say about the CGT. Does this mark a final break?

[Answer] This was required in order to put an end to the tireless attacks mounted against us. We could not accept for the CGT to put us in the camp of the imperialists and the bosses. The CGT appears to have lowered its tone of voice. Even if we have no illusions as to its willingness to pursue the argument, in our view, unity of action remains the first line of defense of the wage earners and we have not given this up.

[Question] Nevertheless, would it still be possible to have unity of action with a union which you claim to be dominated by the PCF and is not promoting trade unionism?

[Answer] Basic disagreements do not prevent joint answers to owners' actions. It is true, however, that today the CGT is more concerned with political than union activities. Look at this! Its favorite ground is outside the enterprise, involving demonstrations which it tries to make spectacular. Together with the PCF it tries to take over all conflicts. It cares little for the final solutions. In its view, the essential thing is to proclaim discontent, even though the majority of the workers remain uninvolved. Conversely, the CFDT would like to develop its action within the enterprises and their branches by mobilizing the maximum number of workers while seeking tangible results in specific areas such as low wages, length of the working day, rights...

[Question] These are quite irreconcilable strategies....

[Answer] Common action is possible. Do not forget that even in the worst moments of the cold war unity of action has always been one of our main directions.... Today, like yesterday, it would be absurd to deny the weight and influence of the PCF and the CGT in the labor movement. Furthermore, some events do awaken the consciousness. For example, how could a CGT member fail to question the fact that its leaders are supporting the official Polish trade unions as against the free trade unions and the mass of the workers? Our activities raise questions in the minds of communist and CGT members.

[Question] Are you so sure of this?

[Answer] We have noted that in the past few years the CGT and the PCF have re-adopted some of our topics, starting with self-management. It is true that they have most frequently distorted these topics. It is equally true, however, that they lead to internal contradictions. We have noted for quite some time that our activities result either in the CGT changing or losing its influence.

[Question] Therefore, you do not exclude the possibility of gaining the majority?

[Answer] Why not? However, we are not promoting a parochial spirit. What we are looking for, first of all, is the development of a large independent union movement.

[Question] Does this movement not go through reformism?

[Answer] The trade union front must not be exclusive. It must have no preliminary ideology, whatever its origin. The CFDT rejects any reformist plan involving a lasting break with the CGT and denying the reality of the class struggle. What we are looking for is the conversion among the different components of the trade union movement on specific items. That is why, for example, last year we suggested a meeting with FO [Workers Force]. The offer remains open. Should the FO accept it, we should not be misled as to the meaning of this contact. It would be a question of considering the steps we could take jointly rather than dropping our desire to act jointly with the CGT. Actually, I am grateful to Andre Bergeron for not cultivating this kind of utopia. The fundamental division between us and FO lies in the answer to the following question: Could we risk today to attack the foundations of capitalism in the hope of eliminating it? FO says no because of the threat which the weight of the CGT and the PCF would pose on freedoms. The CFDT

says yes, for it believes that action against capitalism and the struggle for freedoms could be waged jointly. It is even the only way to remain effective today and in the future.

[Question] Immediately after the 1978 legislative elections the CFDT undertook to "recenter" itself. Seven months before the presidential elections, what is the balance of your negotiations with the owners and the government?

[Answer] We have never believed in miracles. Yet, even if the balance is not as positive as we would like it to be, we do not regret the fact that we related negotiations with actions. On the national level we have achieved some results in matters of labor disputes, unemployment compensations, hygiene and safety, etc. However, the CFDT activities were the most rewarding in the professional sectors and in a number of enterprises. At Rhone-Poulenc, for example, a collective agreement on low wages stipulates that by next year the level will be raised to 3,000 francs monthly with a three percent increase in purchasing power this year and four percent next year. The most important result of our "reunionizing" is the fact that both labor and public opinion have become aware of the three priority claims as formulated in our Brest congress: low wages, length of work, and collective guarantees for workers with precarious jobs.

[Question] Nevertheless, these are somewhat meager results. How do you assess the 7 year residency of Valery Giscard d'Estaing?

[Answer] We consider it 7 years of increased unemployment. Furthermore, I note that the president of the republic and his prime minister have missed the deadline which would have allowed them to undertake significant reforms. Unless strong social pressure is exerted, could anyone believe that they would undertake them between now and the presidential elections?

[Question] Therefore, a generally negative balance....

[Answer] Yes, negative, to the extent to which the major promises made by the president in the social area has not been kept. Barre is continuing to reject any negotiation on the SMIC [Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage] or any time schedule leading to a substantial upward revision. Nor has anything of any significance been achieved on expanding the area of contracts. In terms of the length of the workweek the government is not budging. It is not in favor of a shortening which would create real job openings. Unemployment and inflation have worsened inequality. Such are the realities of the 7 years of presidency nearing its end.

[Question] Is this what leads you to say that the right may lose the elections whereas 6 months ago, in your view, the left had gone down the drain?...

[Answer] ...Down the drain unless it were to change. As far as the right is concerned, a government characterized by its refusal to act, the acceptance of unemployment and laissez-faire to the advantage of the big enterprises is necessarily spoiling its image. What is the major drama facing our country in the future other than unemployment? Well, facing this challenge, both the president and the prime minister tell us every day that nothing can be done. What is the purpose of politics if it refuses to consider the number one concern of the French? In the

some manner that in 1973 the left was to blame itself, above all, for its failure, it could well be that in 1981 the right could trigger its own defeat.

[Question] Will the CFDT take sides in the presidential campaign?

[Answer] Our national bureau will speak out on this subject at the beginning of October. I merely wish to say that the CFDT is not concerned with announcing its support for one or another candidate but to use this election for raising the questions which concern it as a trade union. This period should become the occasion for a greater public debate on the answers to the crisis. In our view, the political parties of the left and their candidates should provide more convincing answers than the answers given today by the government and the owners.

[Question] Assuming that the majority would be defeated, would the left be able to take over?

[Answer] The PCF has made a choice which it is obstinately repeating every day. Thus, in the senatorial elections it did not hesitate to threaten the defense of the joint interests of the left by deliberately promoting the defeat of the socialist candidates. Obviously, this encourages the socialists to tell the majority, "Come to us, there is a fire burning...."

[Question] Yet, could the socialist party avoid new alliances?

[Answer] You should ask the socialist party. In my view, any basic change in the political line of the socialist party would be suicidal. While the majority is pursuing such a cynical policy, should the socialist party yield to the siren song it would abandon its reason for becoming a great party. Naturally, the socialist party was forced by the PCF to develop an independent strategy within the left. It remains to be seen whether its attitude would lead to a break within the majority voters.

[Question] The socialist party remains your natural political ally. What kind of relations do you have with it?

[Answer] Our alliances are never exclusive. We consider a distinction between the functions of parties and trade unions as the basis of our reciprocal independence. Since the socialist party would like to assume political power, its internal debates are currently determined by the presidential elections. This is not our case. We refuse all participation in such internal debates. What we are interested in are the collective choices of the people's forces.

[Question] Have you recently met with Francois Mitterrand?

[Answer] Yes, just as I met, several months ago, Huguette Bouchardeau and Michel Crepeau and, under different circumstances, I would have met with Georges Marchais to review the situation with the representatives of the various groups.

[Question] This is not quite the same!

[Answer] Unquestionably, you are saying this because of the eminent presidential election. Rest assured, however, that I am no better informed than you are as to Francois Mitterrand's choice. Conversely, I am more familiar with the views of the socialist party on the economic and social situation and I shall report it at the next meeting of our national bureau.

5157
CSO: 3100

COMMUNIST DOUMENG MORE INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 4 Oct 80 pp 80-81

[Article by Christine Clerc "The Red Multimillionaire Organizes all the Coups"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] - B. Doumeng will once again be in Moscow this week to sign a contract. Having entered into capitalism through the communist party door, the red multimillionaire is also a particularly shrewd and well-listened to diplomat.

/"I, myself, will get even the Americans to go to Moscow. On Wednesday, my friend Bob Beasley, the head of the American farm cooperatives, and about one hundred delegates from 25 countries will be meeting at the Cosmos Hotel: French, Italians, Germans, Hungarians, Iraqi and Israeli, Congolese, Spanish and even Japanese..."/

Delighted with the impact his words had, Jean-Baptiste Doumeng, 60 years old, massive neck in his gentleman-farmer's jacket and complexion blotched by the thousands of inspections in his vineyards and cornfields, fills my glass with chateau-margaux. He turns the top of his large farm table around and grabs in passing two slices of Bayonne ham, throws a piece to his borzoi, a gift from Brezhnev, as are his thoroughbreds.

Then, with his rough voice that he renders totally incomprehensible when he wants to make his interlocutor feel uncomfortable, he gets back to the subject of international agricultural cooperation and the new /Coop/ tractors at an unbeatable price.

/It is a project that I started 2 years ago in New York, at our last congress under the chairmanship of the U.S. Minister of Agriculture. And next Wednesday, in Moscow, I will present the first Coops that have come off the assembly line to the two Soviet Vice-Ministers of Agriculture./

Irresistible Doumeng! Although I know his liking for bluffing, I cannot help but be stupefied once again. Without doubt, nothing stops this bull from Gascogne once he gets rolling. Iraq and Iran may well be at war, Brezhnev threaten the West, Carter decide to boycott the USSR, Ronald Reagan, Marie-France Garaud and several others call for a campaign against imperialism, he, Jean-Baptiste Doumeng, known as "the red multimillionaire", with his Rabelaisian laugh and his shrewd eye sparkling with delight, continues to do business. Defying the moralists on all sides, he continues, with the unacknowledged support of the government in both camps, to weave a network between the East and the West.

Not satisfied with shocking people by pretending to have remained a communist while becoming a multimillionaire, not satisfied with sowing discord within the European Community by selling millions of tons of excess butter to the Soviet Union at absurdly low prices, this self-taught person, who tended cows at the age of 15, is now pretending to defy the U.S. agro-alimentary multinationals by setting up against them the alliance of Soviet cooperatives... as well as U.S. cooperatives. He is pulling strings, more and more strings, behind the scenes in national and international politics. Was he not responsible for secretly organizing with Michel Poniatowski, the recent meeting between Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Leonid Brezhnev in Warsaw?

Surprising advanture, indeed, that of this Gascon farmer whose success brilliantly illustrates the "historical compromise" between Moscow and Washington.

This success story begins in December 1919 in a farmhouse with a mud floor, not far from the large California style house in Noe (Haute-Garonne), where I am presently meeting with Doumeng. /"We were so poor, he relates, that my umbilical cord was cut in the basin used for slaughtering pigs... When I was 15, my mother died, for lack of money to care for her. I then became a member of the communist party."/

To Become the Strongest

However, at the age of 20, the young rebel, having drawn attention during the farmer Resistance, had already understood that the best way to "break one's chains" was to become the strongest. With several friends, he organizes the first union of agricultural cooperatives in the South-West. Then, learning that Czechoslovakia was looking to procure potatoes and sell tractors - which the French desperately needed - he sets up, with the support of the Minister of Agriculture in power at the time, the Communist Tanguy Prigent, his first large-scale trading operation: a train load of potatoes for a train load of tractors. Within Europe where shortages were prevalent, it is the beginning of an incredible career as an international trader. After the Czechs, Doumeng won the confidence of the Hungarians, the Polish and the Soviets, and later that of the Algerians, Vietnamese and Congolese. He reinvents the triangular trade, buys lean calves in the East, fattens them up in Europe, re-sells them in the East, buys Algerian wine to dilute the wine from the South-west that he exports once again, builds silos in Africa, establishes industrial stock farming in Asia, and finally, last year, launches into banking and oil. At the same time, he becomes the leader of the agricultural trade unionism in his region. One day in 1963, due to an unfortunate matter of land reallocation, he has the town of Toulouse surrounded by 10,000 angry farmers and 4,000 tractors. The prefect must give in. Thus is started the legend of the Gascon carouser farmer with a great heart who is also a powerful businessman and a brutal agent of international communism. A legend which grows richer in new anecdotes with each passing day. One morning, in urgent need of an airplane, Doumeng establishes his own airline company: /Uni-Air/. On another occasion, because he finds him to be a likeable person, he buys back Jacques Esterel's fashion house. And he sends a check in the amount of 1 million francs to Jacques Tati to allow him to finish /Jour de Fete/. Invited to lunch at the Rothchilds, he orders a vegetable soup that he downs noisily. When leaving, he says to one of his associates, panic-stricken: /"I misbehaved, didn't I? But we gained 40 million francs!"/ (1).

(1) Le Milliardaire rouge, de J. Lamalle (latts)

This is how, 20 years later, we once again find the small herdsman from Noe, associated with the Rothschilds (within the Euragin Company and Stern Bank), owner of a 600 hectares family farm that his wife, Denise, manages, and a race-horse breeding operation that he has entrusted to his son Michel - and chairman and managing director of a multinational, Interagra, which makes a profit of approximately 10 billion francs from an inextricable network of companies. This is how the little communist rebel becomes the friend - protector - of Georges Marchais, entertains in his home all the heads of state of the Eastern and African countries, and dines in Moscow with Brezhnev, to whom he sends for his birthday several tons of strawberries from Mexico.

Business requires it. As soon as he leaves his property in Noe, the multimillionaire farmer dresses as a bourgeois in suits from the faubourg Saint-Honore, neck to tight in a Hermes tie. He travels in a Mercedes with chauffeur. He stays in deluxe hotels (he has a room permanently reserved at the /Pierre/ in New York, and at the /Plaza/ in Paris), and dines at /Ledoyen/ or at /Maxim's/, where he addresses the head waiters and often the guests as "tu" or "toi."

Ah, this liking for provocation! To have lunch at Maxim's with Doumeng is a small trial, but an unforgettable experience. Around us, an actual ballet of waiters, filled with respect. On the facing wall-sofa, an impressive row of chairmen and managing directors, all visibly impressed by the presence of this Communist businessman. Very much at ease, Doumeng props himself up on the red velvet sofa, spreads his napkin over his stomach, calls the head waiter: /"Hey, you, bring us some champagne,/ and he launches into a long monologue about his capitalist competitors. /All of them uneducated, have not even studied Hegel, know nothing of dialectics, "idots" that have only their own immediate interests at heart. I, for one, have set up at no cost silos in Benin, Congo, and tomorrow, I will have the monopoly of the grain market."/ He stops, his eyes suddenly lit up, and asks: /"Wouldn't you like to go to bed with me? All women want to go to bed with me!"/ or still: /"Look, if I wanted, I could make 100 million dollars by Friday on the Rotterdam oil market..."/

Is he bluffing? Of course he is. If he manages to cover up his failures - such as the cattle breeding operation started in partnership with an American from Colorado - Doumeng loves to juggle numbers and multiply the wrong tracks. Because he has learned that most important of all, one must make an impression. And he has succeeded so well in doing this that he has been given, in politics as in business, a hidden power, undoubtedly superior to that which he holds in reality. In any case, Jean-Francois Poncet does not hesitate to consult him on the topic of his connections with his friends, the African heads of state. Marie-France Garaud (whom he calls /"a small somewhat narrow minded provincial bourgeoise"/) dines with him twice a year. And Michel Poniatowski, who, when he was Minister of the Interior denounced Doumeng as the financier of the Communist Party and a Moscow agent, now travels to Noe for a foie gras breakfast with Doumeng. It is said that, in secret, the prince and the Gascon farmer prepared the Warsaw summit.

In short, the communist farmer is part of the "whole-State" and, of course, the "whole-Paris." There he was, the other Thursday, dining with the president of a large national firm. Among the guests, a high official from the Elysee, a former minister and two Parisian journalists. In the cafe, while Doumeng monopolizes the large sofa and lights up a fat Davidoff cigar, the others seat themselves in armchairs in a semi-circle and respectfully: /Tell us, Mr Doumeng."/ Thus begins, in a rough voice totally incongruent with this Parisian cafe, a surprising monologue, with alternating threats and appeasements, as is his custom. War? /"It's a hoax. The Soviets do

not want a war and American capitalism cannot afford it. But regional conflicts will multiply, since objectively, the two powers have agreed to make them last. It supports their armaments industry and it allows them to suppress internal resistances."/ Europe? /"I believe in the reunification of Germany, and in its integration into a central Europe comprising also Austria, Poland and Hungary."/ And France? /"Neutralized, of course. Carter, once reelected, will collaborate with Brezhnev to neutralize Western Europe."/ The declining influence of the Communist Party and the General Confederation of Labor in France? Doumeng laughs: /"I would need only 10 percent of convinced party members to paralyze the country."/ A silence. Doumeng is enjoying the cold shiver that he has caused to run down the back of these dignitaries from the Giscardian Republic, and openly glances at his Cartier watch. It is 11 o'clock. His chauffeur is waiting. He kisses the hand of the mistress of the house, to whom he sends a beautiful flower arrangement, and before leaving, once again throws out: /"We will leave him to you, your Giscard d'Estaing!"/

Tomorrow, at dawn, he will fly off to a distant country, and I would not be surprised if we learned, one of these days, that he had himself crowned emperor of an African country or appointed as revolutionary general in Brazil. In the meantime, he will remain communist and multimillionaire businessman. Unbelievable paradox? Only the naive believe so. Since in both cases, it is a matter of being the strongest. And today, the strongest are still in Moscow.

9592
CSO: 3100

ROCARD'S BACKGROUND, ASPIRATIONS, AMBITIONS DISCUSSED

Paris LE POINT in French 27 Oct 80 pp 60-63

[Article by Daniele Molho: "Politoscopy of Michel Rocard"]

[Text] Paradox becomes Michel Rocard. In the minority in his own party, according to the polls he is "first" in the hearts of socialist voters, the better to represent the left in the presidential election. From the SFIO [French Section of the Workers International] to the PS [Socialist Party] by way of the PSU [Unified Socialist Party], he was always a militant for the left, and today finds himself accused of weakness for the right. A cold economist in love with figures, he is becoming a eulogist of an ill-defined self-management. A politics fanatic, he arouses as much friendship as hostility, and his friends' loyalty is as unconditional as the criticism of his opponents. Finally, this man of meetings and conferences who has had his team for years, claims the solitude of the supreme magistracy. What, then, is the enigma of Michel Rocard? His politoscopy, by Daniele Molho, answers the question.

Roots

Parisian. Although he was born in Bourbevoie, it was by chance. Rocard is above all a Parisian in heart and mind. Raised in an area between the boulevard Saint-Michel and the faubourg Saint-Germain, he never left the banks of the Seine. His schooling takes him from the Alsatian School to Montaigne High School. His graduate trajectory leads him to the law school at ENA [National Administration School]. His race to become an elected representative plants him in the National Assembly. The countryside of his childhood is 10 km from Rambouillet, in Saint-Benoit. And Conflans-Sainte-Honorine (Yvelines), whose elected representative he is, is 32 km from Paris. It was only belatedly that he became a Breton at heart and by adoption. It is at Senne in Morbihan that he has chosen to pitch his tent and anchor his boat: "L'Epsilon," a 10-meter sailboat purchased 20 years ago, which he shares informally with a friend.

Bourgeois. His friend Claude Marti likes to say that Rocard was born wearing a necktie. That is to say, this son of the bourgeoisie, a Huguenot through his mother, has no popular roots. Brought up in the old way, in the shadow of a father who was a normal school alumnus and famous physicist (Yves Rocard is one of the fathers of the French A bomb), destined for the Polytechnic School, he was "programmed" from childhood to be a general rather than a soldier. He put his leadership weapons into practice with the Scouts. His totem was "Hamster-Scholar." He exercised his talents there for 30 years.

Anti-establishment. There is nothing more paradoxical than to see "children from good families" personifying the student revolt of May 1968. It is possible that the taste for insurrection came to him from his Protestant education. In any case, he did not hesitate, from the time he was in Inspection of Finances, to take as a pseudonym the name of Georges Servet: Georges in memory of an uncle; Servet in memory of a Protestant physician-theologian, Michel Servet, who was burned alive in Geneva in 1553.

Appearance

Nervous. With his 70 meters and his 65 kilos, he is constantly in motion. Whether he is smiling to seduce or pleading to convince, he struggles to control his spontaneity. For several years his advisers have been seeking to "fill him out" and make him seem "more reassuring." They are getting there, to be sure: the powder puff of hair has disappeared, the gestures have become more sober. But now Rocard has lost some of the warmth that was his charm.

Likable. The camera is generally his friend. He knows how to catch the lens and make use of the expression. Even so, the other Sunday he appeared strangely stiff, constrained and artificial. But as a rule few people resist his youthful smile, his loud laugh, the little wrinkles around his eyes that do not betray the fact that he has just cheerfully passed the half-century mark. Feverish as a devil who leaps out of his box, hurried as a runner of the 100-meter, cold as a St. Just, he keeps at his disposal a palette of attitudes that he modulates according to the circumstances.

Classical. He is always seen in a suit and always has been. Drab since the PSU days, he has taken on softness and stylishness since he began dreaming of the Elysee. When he is seen "in casual dress" (rarely), it is always with a silk scarf around his neck. "I don't like to play a prole," he says. "To me, to be well-dressed is a way of showing respect for others." Actually, he is only seen "not dressed" on his boat. And still, even there, his old seadog outfit is put together with care.

Way of Life

Familial. He is probably the only French politician to have admitted on television (December 1978) that he had canceled a political meeting to spend the evening with his wife and children. Sincerity, some will say; demagogy, others assert. In any case, when he speaks of "Micheleu," his second wife, a well-known sociologist (who practises under her maiden name, Michele Legendre), and his two young children--Olivier, 9 and Loic, 8--it is always tenderly. Compensation for an adolescence marked by familial dissensions? Revenge for his first marriage with Genevieve Pujol, who, in spite of him, put distance between him and his two eldest--Sylvie, 23, a cultural organizer in the Cevennes, and Francis, 22, a physicist? Perhaps.

Hurried. He never has any time. When he telephones his father to invite him to dinner, he makes an appointment three months ahead. He does not know how to unwind; idling is not his forte. When he happens to be in the country, rather than take a walk or dream, he seeks "to go and see what is going on," to have a drink at a bar, to have a discussion with the parish priest "to take the temperature," as he says.

Tastes

Sporting. He is a sailing fanatic and keen on skiing: the Gulf of Morbihan has no secrets from him, and he knows the runs of the Arcs as he knows the inside of his pocket. But he forces nature a little too much and charges along a little too fast for simple prudence. The result: in April 1979, while descending Mt Pourri, he collects a fractured femur. It is true that apart from vacations he does not practise any sport. Even though he used to go jogging, chiefly with Bernard Stasi when they were both at Sciences-Po. "That enabled me to acquire the resistance of a long-distance runner," he says. And he adds, "I have the good luck to have a slow heart which beats 52 pulsations a minute." A record for someone who smokes Gauloise upon Gauloise; he has really tried to stop smoking, but it was a fiasco.

Fish eating. Is it the taste for the sea or the intoxicating sea wind? In any case, he whom one pictures carelessly eating a dreary steak-and-salad is a keen gourmet who adores fish and crustaceans. The memory of a St. Pierre in white butter prepared by his wife in a corner of the boat makes him swoon with pleasure. And he always "salivates" when he sees a cheese souffle on a menu.

Gorist. Go, the Japanese game of Chinese origin, which demands exceptional skill for strategy, has rather dethroned checkers. But when Rocard is settled in front of a checkerboard, he closes up; his game is cold; he plays to win, not for amusement.

Entourage

Informal. He is the only leftist politician who years ago organized his team, the one that will carry on the presidential campaign. His associates are above all good friends whom he has dragged in his wake since the time of the Algerian War (Pierre-Yves Cosse), the time when student unionism still made sense (Christian Blanc) and the PSU's "good" period (Robert Chapuis and Michel de La Fourniere). Others, more recent, have come to gather around this nucleus rich in connivance. They have been admitted there, but not really integrated; imagine the face of an Edgard Pisani disembarking in the rue de l'Universite to face "comrades" who address him with the familiar "tu!" Gen de Gaulle's former minister has not yet recovered.

Efficient. His associates know how to build a barricade, protect it, lower it. To get an appointment with Michel Rocard you must hurdle several obstacles. And if Christian Blanc, his principal private secretary does not consider it advisable to grant such-and-such an interview or answer such-and-such a question, there is no point in insisting; the note prepared by his secretary, the very pleasant Scarlet Courvoisier, will go directly into the wastebasket. Rocard will not even have been aware of it.

Clumsy. Of course all of Rocard's associates are members of the Socialist Party. Of course they are all exemplary militants, and if they sometimes break with party discipline, it is done fairly and in a good cause: being a minority, they defend

themselves; being Rocardians, they seek to help their elected representative "get ahead." Rocard, aware of this fault, depends upon his friend and accomplice Pierre Mauroy to make up the lack.

Sensitivity

Democrat. His capacity for listening is remarkable; he is attentive to others. This is one of the reasons why the PSU under his aegis launched themes ahead of time that have become part of the routine of all the political parties: immigrants, decentralization, government in business.

Missionary. His determination to convince, indeed to convert, often transforms Rocard's speech into a sermon, if not a lecture. He has not been successful over the years in erasing either his pedagogical side or his didactic style. But this devotion to several themes against all comers is one of the most genuine of his personality traits.

Character

Joyful. He is an easy man to live with. And he is not usually subject to shooting off his mouth or to vague melancholy. But when he gets angry his anger is spectacular, completely inward and cold. His features harden, he speaks in a toneless voice and clenches his fists. Especially when he is accused of wanting to go to bed with the right--he who has spent 30 years of his militant life laboring for the left.

Stubborn. It took determination for the young Rocard to be recognized! First of all among his own people. When he decided to abandon preparation for the Polytechnic School to enter Sciences-Po, his father was in the United States and his mother on a trip to Rome. He knew there would be a fight, but that is different from imagining the dressing-down he would receive for having betrayed the family's scientific destiny! "You are too stupid to explain yourself with exact science! You will never be a creator. You are going to learn to natter and paralyze others," his father hurled at him, at the same time depriving him of pocket money and hiring him ("to teach you how to live") as an apprentice milling machine operator-turner in his physics laboratory in the rue d'Ulm. Rocard claims he stayed there two years. His father asserts that he only stayed a few weeks. Rocard assures us that it was there, in the company of a Trotskyite foreman, a former member of the International Brigades, that he learned about the class struggle. "That was probably a normal-school hoax," his father replies. In any case, Michel Rocard does not remember the exact name of the man who so marked him, and with whom he spent nearly 1,500 hours.

Methods

Collective. His secret is the team and his confidence in those who are on it. He knows how to get help from his associates as well as from his wife. Nevertheless: every morning he begins by scanning himself the day's newspapers before studying in depth the press review that is presented to him in four sections--political, economic, social and foreign affairs. He meets with his staff once a week (currently, on Wednesday). He often refers to his team, for it serves as his alibi. When he wants to hold back a reply, Rocard often entrenches himself behind the "I don't operate that way, no sir! I have to discuss it with the group."

Modern. Figures, for him, have more importance than letters. Even though Rocard has always regretted not being a writer like Francois Mitterrand. At the same time he often becomes a rewriter by means of a normal school alumnus with a facile pen, Jean-Francois Merle. His approach, with dossiers, is scientific. He adores curves and graphs. He dissects the polls with specialists. He practises futurology. And makes use of the video-tape recorder to practise before each of his big television broadcasts.

Intelligence

Pragmatic. When he has to, to attain his goal, he is capable of switching his allegiance. Thus, when in 1974 it was a matter of belonging to the PS, he did not hesitate to "violate" his own PSU friends in order to take them along with him. But barely a third of the PSU followed him. Similarly, he who was the prophet of self-management purposely abandoned the word in June 1980, believing that in the mouth of a potential president it inspired too much fear. Reactions in the PS were so violent that the term finally reappeared in his Conflans appeal.

Affirmed

There is no doubt of his worth, but his spreading himself too thin sometimes betrays him. His senior lecturer at Sciences-Po, Finance Inspector Pierre Besse, gave him 4 out of 20 in economics at the beginning of the year. Rocard, who is still head of a Scout group and who was formerly a militant in the student movement, is stung to the quick. In June he makes 13. Besse's explanation: "The terrain is good, but you needed to learn to work, Rocard." His passion for militantism will play other tricks on him: he will present himself three times at the door of the ENA before being admitted. Two defects that refute those who only see in him an egghead buried in his books.

Eloquence

Staccato. Naturally he has the delivery of a machine-gun volley. As if he always had more to say than time allowed. The many meetings he has frequented, the many campaigns in which he has exercised his talents, have caused him gradually to revise his conception of a political speech: speak clearly, to make yourself understood, even by "Mme Michu." He does not always achieve it.

Technocratic. There are neither embellishments nor lyricism in his speeches. His training as Finance Inspector, the time he spent on the Estimate Board, his training as secretary general of the nation's Commission on Accounts and Economic Budgets did not encourage him to develop an emphasis for which he is not suited, and which he considers "retro." A holder of high office under Pinay, Savary, Debre and Couve de Murville, he has always served the state by applying himself to a rigorous obligation to hold back, even though he put his technical ability and his competence at the service of his ideas. Clashing swords in order to bring the left out of an archaism he considers sclerosing, he bombards his hearer with figures. Which is modern, but does not always seduce the socialist crowds. In the real as well as the figurative sense of the word, Rocard has no "accent."

Culture

Good. He has a taste for Bach, Beethoven, Brahms and Bartok. He listens to Mozart, but does not stomach Schonberg. He likes Stendhal and recently discovered (thanks

to his [illegible] accident) Albert Cohen's "The Lord's Lady." But, though he appreciates Goya's frescoes, he lingers less in museums than in movie houses; he is a fan of Visconti and Dreyer. In fact, this National Administration School alumnus is more fascinated by biology and the natural sciences than by philosophy. During the time he was at Sciences-Po, in bed with an infection, he read and reread Marx and was fascinated by Jaurès. The materialism of one and the spiritualism of the other [illegible] him equally.

Third World. A forerunner if not a prophet on the subject, he has made aid to the Third World and an understanding of the developing countries one of his main themes. Lettres, and watchful for any new experiment connected with decolonization, with the fight against hunger, with eliminating illiteracy, he has not been afraid to be charged with marginalism in defense of his ideas. Today he is considered a specialist. At the Dakar conference on Under-development in January 1980, he made a truly great "hit."

[illegible]. Although many socialists criticize his ideas, none would dream of expressing (publicly) doubt about his competence. His knowledge and his memory for figures are genuine. His synthesizing mind dazzles more than one adversary. When Jacques Chirac was at Matignon, he often said in jest to his associates, "I don't understand a thing in these dossiers. Ah! If Rocard were only here, he at least could explain them."

Ambition

[illegible]. If one day he is president of the Republic, it will not be by chance. Like Giscard, he is prepared for it. Did he not confide in 1972, "When I am the boss of the Socialist Party and when I am president..."? A pleasantry? In any case, a revealing bit of outspokenness.

[illegible]. It is years since this brilliant subject was able to be one of the best children of the government. Of all the governments, say his opponents. But, having chosen to fight in the opposition, he bears with his 30 years of socialist militantism [illegible] driven to his detractors. The fact that he is opposing François Mitterrand bothers him not at all; everything separates these two men. However, Rocard had once hoped to become the dear child of the first secretary and he suffered [illegible] being treated "like the others."

[illegible]. In spite of everything, Michel Rocard is a man of several languages. He has a way of saying to his interlocutors what they want to hear. Does he act this way out of cleverness or cunning? In any case, his opponents denounce "his successive impulses." More simply, it might be said that all his life Rocard has tried to reconcile the irreconcilable: in his youth, the Christians of the left and the laymen of the SFIO; in the PSU, the passion of an anti-authoritarian youth and the [illegible] of a faltering new left. "Without me, there would have been Red Brigades in France in 1968," he likes to repeat. Today at last his concern is to see to it that [illegible] plagues the left. A delicate task; iconoclasts are easily called renegades. And the accusations are stronger when the smasher of images is working first of all for himself.

[illegible]
[illegible] Time

CNPF'S CEYRAC INTERVIEWED ON BUSINESS STRATEGY, AIMS

Paris L'EXPANSION NOUVELLE in French 2 Oct 80 pp 99-106

[Interview with Francois Ceyrac of the CNPF (National Council of French Employers) by Jean Paul Le Gall and Dominique Boudet: "Buying Power, CGT, Devaluation--The Employers Put a Stand"; date and place not given]

[Text] Since the CGT made its position known a long time ago, the only possible uncertainties about the climate of the new work year after vacation concerned two key persons in capital [the] Edmond Maire and Francois Ceyrac.

For Edmond Maire, it is by way of social progress, and especially through concerta- [illegible] between trade unions and officials of enterprises, that the economic challenges of the hour can be dealt with--on condition that imagination is shown in the organization of these relations (cf his proposal for interenterprise delegates for the [illegible] and Medium-Size Businesses).

Francois Ceyrac, for his part, seems to assign priority to economics. Whence his [illegible] the real challenge for the enterprises is that of competitiveness. His solution? Not the easy-way solution, which consists in using the ploy of devalua- [illegible] to dope our exports artificially (the tone is a new one and should be emphasized, but it is rare to see the boss of the bosses set himself up also as the defender of the franc). On the contrary: the solution of stringency (for the wage earner [illegible] but also for the enterprises, which are urged to make a strong effort at innovation--that is, first of all, a searching look at their operating methods).

But such an effort can succeed only if the participation, the adherence, of the personnel are obtained.

How can the employers be spurred to commit themselves to it? This is the key question, the problem that returns constantly, in various forms, throughout this interview. It is not a unique or miracle solution, nor even less is it a solution imposed by the public authorities. It is in the enterprises that the appropriate answers must be found, whether they involve wages, information, expression of employees' [illegible] or participation.

Ceyrac is certain, though, such adherence will not be obtained by power-sharing--an idea that tradition forces rejects. What he urges is cohesion--a notion that he counterposes to the more conventional but more strongly disputed one of social compromise, and which he explains as a double commitment: that of the trade unions not to oppose the adaptation of our economic structures to international competition,

and that of the enterprises not to ignore the aspirations of the wage-earners and not to impose unilaterally what seems necessary to them.

The negotiations on the work week seem to him a good test of the national cohesion that he believes he sees emerging. Some of the distance has already been traveled.

There is no question--or any right either--of abandoning such an effort so long as the least chance exists for reaching such an agreement. The strong desire for this agreement will doubtlessly be limited by comparison with those aroused by the Giraudet report? Too bad. But after all, so much the worse! For it is just as important to demonstrate--to oneself and to the trade unions--that something can be done in common.

As for the content of an eventual agreement, as well as on the specific cases that could subsequently contribute to contract policy, Francois Ceyrac says no more. Absence of design? Of course not; rather, tactical sense. To rush his troops or the trade unions at the moment when informal discussions are resuming would be to run the risk of causing the failure of the negotiations. And therefore--let us not forget that it was the CNPF [National Council of French Employers] that wanted discussions opened on modification of the work week--the failure of the employers' organization also.

[Question] As the new work year begins, what is your main concern?

[Answer] My big concern, since the end of last year, has been the weakening of French competitiveness.

And even more disturbing is the fact that this weakening is manifest especially in relation to the big industrial countries. Our exchanges with the FRG, Japan, the United States, clearly deteriorated during the first half of 1980. We are making progress in the markets of the developing countries, but we are losing points in the big industrial markets.

[Question] How is this sudden deterioration to be explained?

[Answer] Last year, our competitiveness was able to hold up thanks to a very strong increase (about 5.9 percent) in the productivity of the enterprises.

Furthermore, this rate, which is a really exceptional one, concealed even more considerable progress in certain sectors and in certain enterprises. This year, we have not been able to expect such results: the progress achieved in productivity is no longer compensating for the increase in expenses that burden our selling prices. We have had to incorporate into our prices a strong increase in wages and social contributions (already more than 15 percent between July 1979 and July 1980), as well as an increase in our tax expenses, due mainly to the rise in the occupational tax (an figure exemplifies this: today, the obligatory levies (taxes and social contributions) represent more than 40 percent of gross domestic product; the amounts levied from French enterprises represent by themselves more than 16 percent of GNP, as against 11 percent in Belgium and in The Netherlands, 9.2 percent in the FRG and about 8 percent in the United States and Japan. It is urgent to halt the increase in this levy. It is vital for the enterprises that in the coming years, this levy not evolve faster than the increase in national product.

On these points, we have some concerns: on the one hand, no fundamental reform of the occupational tax has been initiated, and on the other hand, Social Security expenditures are again tending to accelerate (especially hospitalization expenditures, the annual rate of increase in which is over 20 percent). But there are no miracles in this world. Except for miracles of productivity--and they are not repetitive!

[Question] While the enterprises cannot do much in the face of the growth of social and tax charges, they have more freedom of maneuver as regards wage expenses. Now you seem to indicate that their growth has become excessive.

[Answer] Indeed, the per-hour wage rate is increasing faster than the price index: in 1 year, it has risen by 15 percent, while prices have gone up 13.6 percent. Let us note in passing that contrary to what some are trumpeting, buying power is not only being maintained in France, it is even increasing slightly.

Unfortunately, I do not believe we should be happy about this apparent social progress. I believe one should be disturbed at this tendency of the French to want to maintain a lifestyle above the nation's capacities.

The real dilemma, raised by the crisis since 8 years ago, is the choice between buying power and unemployment. For a year, the increase in unemployment in France has been the lowest in Europe. But the French have to understand that if we are not capable of maintaining a reasonable rate of increase of wage costs, if our prices get too high, and therefore if our competitiveness weakens, we are condemning ourselves to a deterioration in the employment situation.

[Question] But what happens, then, to the upgrading of low wages? Is it no longer a priority?

[Answer] In this area, efforts have been made. The figures prove it: the SMIC [Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage] has indisputably risen faster than wages as a whole.

But the SMIC is a mechanism of extraordinary heaviness: it is a real steamroller, which at its scale (to rise faster than the cost of living (and this is what now seems to be promised for December), it pulls the whole wage mass upward. If the SMIC [illegible] tomorrow, the public authorities will recommend "holding" wages, this will mean compressing the hierarchy; it will mean again exercising a discrimination policy against the cadres. This we will not accept!

[Question] You do not want to penalize the cadres. They have, however, experienced [illegible] individualization of their salaries as a penalization.

[Answer] No, I do not believe so. We think that salaried staff have to be paid in proportion of their real participation in the running of the enterprise. Salary policy would therefore take account of level of responsibility, qualifications, role in [illegible], etc.

[Question] Let us go back to the low wages and their upgrading.

[Answer] It is in the difficult periods that an effort of solidarity is more necessary. It is for this reason that we continue to consider upgrading of the lowest wages a social priority. But to do it, techniques neater than the SMIC must be used.

[Question] Which ones?

[Answer] We have urged in the past, and we continue to urge, the technique of agreements by occupational branch. The SMIC is indexed to the cost of living, this in itself is an important guarantee. But what can and should be done beyond the cost of living can only be the affair of the professional groups and the enterprises.

The enterprises must be allowed the freedom to evaluate and decide what is possible. We are against a wage policy controlled from above. The enterprise's decision is the least inflationary one by nature, for only the enterprise can evaluate its room for maneuver in the area of pay increases, and only the enterprise knows its selling prices, its margins and its markets.

Even at the level of the collective agreements, extreme prudence should be exercised. The enterprise, with its price freedom regained, must be given the possibility of conducting a pay policy suited to the competition.

[Question] There remains productivity. Why is it dropping?

[Answer] I think that the very strong increase in French productivity in 1979 had to do with two facts: on the one hand, the impact of the productivity investments that were made previously and the effects of which were felt during 1979, and on the other hand, price freedom, which enabled the enterprises to establish real commercial strategies. Today, the situation has changed: the productivity investments have developed further, but in the matter of productivity, advances are being made by steps; secondly, in the international markets we have run up against American and Japanese competition that is "doped" by undervalued currencies.

[Question] How is our competitive capacity to be restored?

[Answer] There are two ways of doing it, the good way and the bad way. The bad way is monetary manipulation. There has been some plotting here and there, it has been suggested that the franc be adapted to this new situation; clearly, it would be a matter of devaluating the franc. Personally, I think that this formula, that has been used often in the past, is dangerous for France today, probably more dangerous than for our big competitors: in effect, we are affected more by oil price increases than are the Americans, who have considerable energy resources; we put less added value into our exports than does Japan or the FRG. A devaluation would give France a respite, a feeling of false security, but would very quickly present it with some painful slowdowns as regards our supplies from foreign markets.

It is therefore a formula to be avoided with all our might. In addition, it must not be forgotten that the French situation has to be evaluated within the European monetary system, and not with France considered in isolation.

[Question] And the good way?

[Answer] It is to be more competitive by greater commitment in the battle for innovation and for investment. It also means continuation of the effort initiated by the enterprises in this direction.

[Question] Let us go back to Japan. You said that it has got better control over [illegible] now?

[Answer] In exchange for a ton of imported oil, the Japanese export more added value than we do. They invest oil that costs them dearly in products whose added value is higher, on the average, than ours.

[Question] Why not do the same thing?

[Answer] Because we are not Japan! Because we do not have the means for conducting a "Japanese-style" policy!

The missions that we have sent to Japan have shown that country's capacity to abandon entire sections of its economy and redeploy, concentrating its forces in new, more promising areas. And this effort is accepted by everyone. Do you believe that such an effort would be accepted in France?

[Question] What have the Japanese done that we cannot do?

[Answer] We do not have the financial, commercial, industrial structures that enable Japan to carry out this rapid and overall mobilization, to concentrate its effort on one sector or another with an effectiveness that no other country in the world experiences. We do not have the social structures that enable that country to cope with the constraints with such discipline. This is one of the keys to Japanese productivity.

It must be recognized that we are different (and "different" does not mean less capable). We have trump cards that are different from Japan's. We are in the process of successfully carrying out a formidable effort to limit our energy dependence--the nuclear effort. On this point, we are far more effective than the Japanese (I have had the opportunity in Japan to see the road blocks that nuclear policy runs up against).

There is also innovation, the development of new techniques and new products--an area in which the realistic and individualistic character of the French can work wonders. This is the reason why, since more than a year ago, we have considered that innovation is our response to the massive mobilizations of the Japanese. It is for this reason that our Strasbourg meetings, this coming 24 and 25 October, will be devoted to innovation, a policy of omnidirectional innovation. These are our weapons. At stake is the survival of our enterprises, but at stake also are the authority and independence of our country. I feel that my priority duty is to alert the leaders of the enterprises to this imperative of innovation.

There are other facts that give me confidence in the future: we have finally had the courage to free the French enterprises from the shackles and chains that impede their dynamism. In a few years, some essential measures have been taken: price freedom, a policy of investment support. In brief, France is going through a profound reinvigoration of its economic tissue and a renovation of economic policy.

[Question] What could be the CNPF's role in this innovation effort?

[Answer] Mobilizing initiatives and will. We do not believe in planning of innovation. This seems to us a contradiction in terms.

At our Strasbourg meetings, we are not going to come out with the perfect innovator's guide; rather, we will rally the enterprise heads, we will set out the problems

lems, we will present to them persons who have carried out important innovations; we will try to initiate a movement that will develop with its own dynamic, as we have done at each of our sessions. It is in this way that we set up training in 1970; it is in this way that in 1972 we created a dynamic of social innovation in the enterprises. And remember our 1974 meetings: there were many who smiled at that desire (the desire of the enterprise heads) to increase their exports so as to close the gap opened in our balance of trade by the first oil crisis. Yet 4 years later, that is what has been done!

At Strasbourg, we want to show that a considerable innovation effort is imperative, vital, urgent for the enterprises as well as for the nation. We want to show that it is the business of all the enterprises, no matter what their size or their sector of activity. We also want to show that innovation can, and should, transform all the aspects of the enterprise's life: its products, its methods of production, of management, of trade, but also its organization and its social relations. For technological and social innovations go in step with one another, they nourish one another.

[Question] It will soon be 20 years that the theme of innovation has been coming up periodically. If you activate it again today, is it because you have not been understood in the past? And why?

[Answer] The opening-up of frontiers, the influence of international competition, have been extraordinary schools that have transformed the attitudes of the heads of enterprises in the course of the last 10 years. But change upsets one! Changing frightens one! It has often been said that if the French are revolutionaries, it is mainly on the level of ideas, and far less on the level of deeds. It takes a lot of boldness to choose a new product, to abandon a still apparently profitable line or to go looking for new customers. In the face of change, we find blockages at all levels, even in the enterprises.

We often have difficulty in getting some trade-union organizations to understand us. I do not say that the trade-union organizations refuse to see the international realities, that they are indifferent to or ignorant of the changes that have come about, but I believe that they are led to give priority to defense of the advantages won. The existing situations often appear more reassuring to them than does change. And this is to the detriment of the necessary and inevitable evolution.

Moreover, the trade unions evolve all the less easily in that each has its own clientele to defend and extend. Their rivalries constitute an obstacle to adaptation. Finally, without feeling I am putting the CGT on trial unfairly, I will say that its political commitment to the points of view of the PCF has led it (paradoxically) to be one of the most conservative of all the French trade-union organizations. This is a heavy weight on our adaptation capacities. We have to deal with an organization that wields simultaneously and with great talent and effectiveness--revolution in word, and conservatism in deed--, agitation on the one side and blockage on the other.

[Question] The fact remains that in order to win this bet on innovation, you need people's adherence. How do you envision obtaining it?

[Answer] People's adherence comes first of all by way of the informing of public opinion. One of today's priorities is to inform French public opinion about what is happening in France and in the world, to show it what is changing, and to explain to it that we cannot isolate ourselves, set ourselves apart.

It is also necessary for the French enterprises to set up for the next decade systems of communication and expression that enable all wage-earners (from the cadre to the trade-unionist) to judge the value of what they are told, the importance of what is happening, to decide in function of their own judgment, and thus to free themselves to some extent from the tyranny of the ideologies and the pressures from outside the enterprises.

This is a very profound change in the traditional conditions of management. It sometimes forces the heads of enterprises to revise their methods of command; it imposes on the cadres and on the foremen adaptations, changes, communication efforts for which they are not always prepared. Information and communication are priorities for social innovation in the enterprise, without which there is no really effective technological or economic innovation.

This also requires training and preparation for new tasks and jobs. Indeed, all the mechanisms of the enterprise have to be sensitized to innovation if it is desired to avoid delays and blockages.

[illegible] In these times when the enterprises are experiencing very heavy wage expenses, can the adhesion of the wage-earners, and also their motivation, result from developments (that have been talked about and will be talked about again) such as profit-sharing and representation of the cadres, first of all, or of all the personnel, on company boards of directors?

[illegible] When reform is involved, one must try to distinguish objectively what is important from what is less so. I consider important what changes the daily life of the wage-earners who spend 8 hours a day in the enterprise.

Wage-earners today want the 8 hours of work that they do in the enterprise each day to be not only the means of earning their living; they want to find some interest in it, they want in it an opportunity for human relations, the feeling of belonging to a community. And these aspirations are not uniform for all: the aspirations of a chief engineer are not necessarily the same as those of an assembly-line worker. It is by concrete analysis of these multiple and diverse aspirations that working life can really be improved. It is to this end that direct expression by wage-earners on the subject of their working conditions must be organized.

Management of working time thus constitutes an important source of improvement, for I believe that for a wage earner, organization of work time counts for as much as length of work time. Our problem today is to know whether work time can be arranged in a way that is more effective for the machines and more pleasant for the people [illegible] for the machines, it is simple: it is a matter of achieving the maximum profitability of the investment. When the Japanese or American automobile firms run their machines 6,000 hours per year while we do scarcely more than 4,000 hours, it is quite certain that we are penalized. But on the whole, the Japanese or American workers do not work longer hours than the French workers. Solutions must therefore be found at the level of organization, of the utilization of equipment. Things must be arranged in such a way that the legislation of working time is no longer an obstacle to the profitability of the machinery.

Furthermore still, we are convinced that a far better response can be given than is the case with the present legislation to the aspirations of wage-earners to greater

flexibility of their working hours, and therefore to greater freedom. An example? The 4-day week, which created a scandal 4 years ago, has become widespread. It enables wage-earners to have a 3-day weekend by agreeing to work 10 hours per day for 4 days under conditions that are less painful than the 8 hours of 10 or 20 years ago, not to mention 1936. And there are hundreds of other possible formulas. The lengthening of weekends is not always the right solution: it may be of less interest in a rural milieu than in the big urban concentrations; in certain enterprises that I know in the "country," the employees prefer to get off earlier in the afternoon so as to be able to do certain agricultural tasks, in return for working 6 days a week. Why should one want to adopt the same scheme in Aubervilliers as in Bretagne?

We need a system that permits great flexibility in arrangement of work time. This is precisely what we are discussing with the trade unions.

We believe it is necessary to "disconnect" the working time of the equipment from that of the people. We will thus manage to get the machines to work more and reduce the work time of people. That is true progress.

As for the other points that we have mentioned, they also have to be examined with accounts and objectivity, being careful not to take too ideological an approach.

[Question] Profit-sharing?

[Answer] The CNPF has always declared that it is favorable to the spreading of ownership in this country. For ownership is affirmation of individual liberty; for the individual, it represents a certain protective autonomy.

Therefore we are naturally favorable to the distribution of stockholdings among wage-earners. But beyond the principles, there are technical problems. The government's proposal for distribution of 3 percent of capital among the wage-earners seems, moreover, to have solved them correctly.

Furthermore, there are only advantages to the diffusion of an enterprise's shares to the wage-earners: it is not completely without risk to the wage-earners themselves, however, indeed, experience disagreeable surprises if the firms of which they are owners to a degree find themselves in difficulty. In periods as troubled as ours, bankruptcy petitions and disappearances of firms are a sad reality. A drawback that does not exist with formulas such as the SICAV's [Variable-Capital Investment Companies], for example. On the other hand, they cut the link between the share and the enterprise's results.

The essential thing, I think, is to permit the wage-earners broad freedom of evaluation. In this area, progress means multiplying their possibilities of choice.

For the cadres, the CNPF considers that it would be useful to revive the idea of stock options, the formula for which has failed in France because of an unforeseeing law. Stock options, stock distributions--all these are good solutions that avoid inflationary wage policies and develop a sense of responsibilities in the enterprise.

Finally, a word about participation on the boards of directors. One has to look at what is involved. If one simply wants to give the illusion of participation, it is

perfect. But if it is a question of really changing life in the enterprise by the entry of two cadres onto the board of directors, you're hitting closer to home! All the more so in that there are already some cadres on boards of directors; I myself sit on some boards with cadres who, because of their knowledge of the firm, their technical competence and their willing commitment, play a considerable role.

[Question] But these cadres do not really represent the other cadres...

[Answer] How do you expect that two cadres can really claim to validly represent all the cadres of an enterprise? How can they represent the commercial cadres, the design engineers, the technical officials, the plant manager, the beginning cadres as well as the higher-level cadres?

In the bill under discussion in Parliament, it is already provided that two employees are involved, including one cadre. The logic, the dynamic, of such a system is, very quickly, to establish numerical equality between representatives of the employees and of the stockholders. Thus there is joint management. But look: we are not the FRG! We do not have the FRG's trade-union structures. The German trade union (the DGB) declared in 1962: "We accept the market economy." And before talking about joint management in France, let us pose the essential question: "Which are the trade unions that are willing to declare: 'We accept the market economy'?"

Everything that has been done in this area is only improvisation and false pretence. These proposals involve ideologies and politics; they do not constitute a suitable response to the French problem. Our position is simple: we are in favor of participation of cadres on boards of directors, we are in favor of increasing the number of directors from 12 to 16 so as to make room for the cadres. Because we know the role they play in the running of the enterprise. But we want them to have the same rights and the same duties as the other directors: we want them to be full-fledged directors.

[Question] Yet can one think that power-sharing would perhaps make it possible to solve certain problems of the moment?

[Answer] The crucial problem today is that of cohesion in the enterprise. The countries that are emerging from the crisis are those that have managed to establish both national cohesion and cohesion in the enterprises. This is the case with Japan and the United States but also with the FRG.

Here is the real problem posed to the French (to the political officials, to the heads of the enterprises, to the trade-unionists and to all the French): how to achieve better national cohesion?

[Question] Do you have an answer to that question?

[Answer] I think that cohesion depends first of all on recognition of the common interest of the nation. And the interest of France is to succeed in the economic battle. That is to develop investment, commercial aggressiveness. It is to have strong enterprises. Furthermore, when I look at the trials our economy has gone through and the efforts that the French have made for the last 8 years, I really believe that the feeling of a French community exists. But the French are extremely reticent to talk about what unites them. I also believe that the French have understood that national independence is inseparable from our economic success.

[Question] Can one really believe in national cohesion so long as there are still so many divisive forces? Take employment: there are those who have work and those who do not; there are women, the young, and the old persons. And what about the great many statuses, certain of which (specific period, temporary work) are very precarious? Isn't unemployment an area in which the CNPF could make some innovative proposals that would bring hope to those "excluded" from the world of work?

[Answer] We have not always considered that unemployment was a scourge. But we think that the means exist for overcoming it. And we have proved that the heads of enterprises agreed to mobilize in the fight against unemployment. If you look at the efforts made in the matter of job placement, mainly through the DEPE's (Delegates of the Enterprises for Employment), if you look at the efforts made in the matter of benefit payments, which make it possible for unemployment no longer to be today, as it was in the past, synonymous with material distress, and finally, if you consider the policy of ongoing training, you will see that a considerable national effort is being made.

Among those whom you call the "excluded," you mention youth. But has it already been forgotten that it is we, it is the CNPF, who in 1975 called for the setting-up of specific means for combating unemployment among the young? Has it already been forgotten that in 4 years, through the various measures of the agreements on employment, we found positions in enterprises for nearly 1.5 million young people?

And this is true also for women and for the older wage-earners. In the face of such a serious problem, I would not want to give any impression of self-satisfaction. But you seem to forget everything that has been done in recent years, and very recently, to improve unemployment benefit payments and the placement systems: for example, the agreements signed this very summer to extend our unemployment benefits system to the overseas departments. In the same way, the duration of benefit payments increases with age. And a year ago, we experimented in six regions with specific formulas for placement of older cadres--formulas which would deserve to become widespread.

[Question] Another factor of cohesion is contract policy. Today it rests above all (at least on the national level--on negotiation, on the work week. Does this justify doing everything possible to reach an agreement?

[Answer] Contract policy is not reducible to a negotiation. Since the beginning of the year, for example, in one quarter we registered a little more than 190 pay agreements in the various branches. They are forgotten rather quickly. Yet these agreements are only the tip of the iceberg. Unfortunately, in France one always prefers to talk about the spectacular!

This being the case, the spectacular thing is precisely this long discussion on the arrangement of the work week. One has to understand, though, that it is not just a matter of the work week but of a real problem of society. The question is whether we can, together (representatives of the wage-earners and of the enterprises), imagine an organization of labor (and its corollary, organization of leisure time) that is more flexible, more effective than what presently exists.

Obviously, there is a great deal of reluctance. For example, there is the reluctance of many heads of enterprises who are unenthusiastic because they have already conceived and applied on the job a number of flexible formulas--illegal but tolerated

by the labor inspectorate because they meet the aspirations of the wage-earners. They have already gone considerably beyond the 1936 legislation! While they recognize the legitimacy of our ambition, they fear that new changes could jeopardize what they themselves have done.

And then there is the reluctance of the trade unions, who are very attached to the heritage of 1936 and who fear that their power of control over working hours could be weakened.

As for ourselves, we consider that laws should confirm mores. Now at present, it is indisputable that the wage-earners want work-time arrangements. What is today the appanage of the employees of a minority of firms must be extended to the majority. I remind you of our objective: for the heads of enterprises to be able to run their machines in as profitable a manner as possible, and in counterpart, for the wage-earners to have more flexibility and freedom. All of this gradually, to be sure. But the time has come to go from experimentation to law, a law that will not have the rigidity of the 1936 law: the shackles must be broken.

[Question] But certain trade unions say they are ready to accept a reconsideration of certain of the advantages they have acquired.

[Answer] Only the CGT is opposed to this in principle. And this is not surprising: it is opposed to everything that proves that social progress is possible without a radical change of society. If its reasoning is negative, it is at least coherent.

[Question] There is nothing abnormal about the other trade unions' wanting to make sure that the change will come about in the interest of the wage-earners too. Under these conditions, why don't we get on with it?

[Answer] At a time when there is agreement on making progress in common (a time when the trade unions recognize that they do not have the right to oppose the adaptation of our economic structures to the international competition and when the heads of enterprises grant that they do not have the right to ignore the aspirations of the wage-earners and impose unilaterally what seems good to them), I believe that the two ends of the chain are being held onto tightly. The problem of bringing the two ends together is now only a question of patience. One cannot move this matter ahead as if it were a pay negotiation. I repeat: it is a far more ambitious initiative, one in which both parties need to feel secure, with the heads of enterprises wanting to be certain that what is going to be done will be good for their firms and the trade unions wanting to be assured that it will also be good for the wage-earners.

[illegible] when a problem is posed properly, a solution is always found. And I believe that we have not posed the problem too badly. Perhaps, though, at the last negotiation session on 2 July, did we want to go too fast?

[illegible] essential thing today is not to let oneself be locked into either formulas or [illegible]. There has already been a lot of progress. The Giraudet report was an important element in this progression. It has made matters advance, but it should not [illegible] a people of good will once and for all.

[Question] Does this mean that the CNPF is prepared to go beyond the Giraudet report, or that you are disposed to propose the resumption of discussions on other

bases? In other words, if you attach such great importance to the concluding of this agreement, it is doubtlessly because of the objective importance of working hours, but is it also because of the evolution of attitudes that the agreement would denote?

[Answer] Every negotiation is important. But this one is significant besides. It is what will enable us to know whether France has arrived at a certain level of social maturity. This is the reason why I am personally so attached to the success of this negotiation. I do not know what the future will be made of, but I think we do not have the right to give up such an effort so long as we are not sure that there will be no outcome other than failure.

[Question] Can this effort be pursued in the climate of discord presently stirred up by the CGT?

[Answer] The hubbub may be harmful, but a people proves its vigor when it is capable of dominating disorder and not letting itself be diverted from its effort by sound and fury.

[Question] In case of success, would other fields of negotiation open up?

[Answer] Success would mean that between us--employers and trade unions--something has changed. But we would also have to have the modesty to say that not everything has changed and that a good many changes are still necessary. A society such as ours is ceaselessly building itslef, and we would still have a long road to travel.

11267
CSO: 3100

REPRESENTATIVES DISTRESSED BY SLOW EQUIPPING OF ARMY

Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Oct 80 p 18

[Article: "Members of Parliament Express 'Real Worry' Over Slow Army Equipment Procurement Process"]

[Text] The National Assembly's Finance Committee has drawn the attention of the defense minister to what its reporting official, Mr Jacques Cressard, RPR [Rally for the Republic] deputy from Ille-et-Vilaine, called the "excessively slow pace" of army equipment procurement which has caused "real worry" among the members of parliament.

According to this analysis, the equipment of the ground forces will have been modernized only to the extent of one-half in 1982. "The general weakness of forces in the support area" and "the intrinsic weakness of the infantry divisions" do not guarantee France "a defense devoid of any and all uncertainty" in an international situation where already "the balance of conventional forces is unfavorable to the Atlantic Alliance."

The reserve divisions, to be organized upon mobilization, would be the only units that would have almost all of their equipment in 1982, if we are to believe the reporting official. But, as the committee itself found, this most often involves old equipment from a sometimes obsolete generation, coming from the equipment of the active divisions.

Oddly enough, the first member of parliament to have called the administration's attention to that subject was Mr Joel Le Theule, today defense minister, starting in 1976, during the preparation of the 6-year 1977-1982 military planning law; at that time he was the reporting official for the Finance Committee.

"In 1985," writes the successor to the current defense minister on the Assembly's Finance Committee, "our French armored divisions--an essential tool in our ground forces--would have neither new equipment, nor all of their tanks, nor all of their troop carrier vehicles, nor all of their mortars, and their artillery would be equipped only to the extent of one-third with fast-firing 155 [-mm] cannon."

"The infantry divisions," Mr Cressard adds, "will get all of their AT guns only in 1986 and they will get all of their armored cars [illegible] of APCs, and their APCs equipped with the HOT AT missiles only in 1985. By that time, their artillery will consist only to the extent of one half of 155-mm prime-mover-drawn guns."

The commission's RPR reporting official completed his demonstration with a series of charts comparing the objectives to current reality, according to the deliveries made to the army year by year until 1985.

We thus see that, by that date, the armored divisions--and there are eight of them in France and in the FRG--will have received 95 percent of their AMX-30 tanks (totaling 1,124 units), 85 percent of their light AMX-10 P infantry combat vehicles, 83 percent of their 120-mm mortars, 46 percent of their APCs, and 37 percent of their rapid-firing 155-mm guns.

Inferiority

The infantry divisions on the other hand--and there are seven of them in France, including the 11th Parachute Division, the 9th Marine Division, and the 27th Alpine Division--in 1985 will have received all of their armored cars, all of their APCs, and their tactical trucks, but only 65 percent of their AMX-10 RC VBRs [armored reconnaissance vehicles], and 67 percent of their 155-mm drawn guns.

The general staff has tried very hard between 1976 and 1980 to put together the new organizational chart for the ground forces which calls for three army corps, consisting of eight armored divisions and seven infantry divisions, made up of regular personnel and draftees. To this active-duty structure one must add 14 reserve infantry divisions, to be organized upon mobilization with the help of reservists or personnel coming out of military schools.

But at the same time the equipment did not keep up in spite of a ground forces budget--both operating and equipment--which represents 30.4 percent of all of the military allocations for 1981, as underscored by Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen Claude Vanbremeersch in addressing the deputies who are members of the Defense Committee.

"The trouble is not so much that the funds allocated were not translated into facts through large-volume shipments," Mr Cressard observed, for his part, and then added: "This distortion between objectives and realities is bound to worry us since it is part of a conventional balance of forces which in overall terms is unfavorable to the Atlantic Alliance of which France is a part."

In its report, the committee prepared a comparison of the equipment and personnel of the armored and infantry divisions of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, the FRG, and France.

"Compared to the Soviet armored divisions," the reporting official noted, "our French inferiority in tanks is quite certain (a ratio of 1:2). It is considerable regarding ground-to-ground artillery (ratio 1:4). It is likewise quite definite regarding AT rocket units (ratio 1:2,5), whereas we are placing our hopes in this type of equipment."

After having remarked that the AA artillery of the French divisions is practically nonexistent, Mr Cressard observed furthermore: "This inferiority is even more obvious in our infantry divisions which are poorly equipped when it comes to artillery, which have no armored vehicles, and whose only superiority resides in AT missiles."

According to the RPR reporting official, the military situation in the central part of Europe, as in the case of France likewise, is constantly suffering from the same "serious imbalance."

"The two alliances which face each other are capable of lining up, in the case of one of them (the Warsaw Pact) 40 armored divisions, 46 motorized divisions, four parachute divisions, while the other one (NATO) can muster 18 armored divisions, 10 mechanized divisions, 11 infantry divisions, and two airborne divisions, including the British and French divisions, which are numerically smaller. More than 25,000 tanks, not including the forces of the second echelon, are facing less than 8,000, mostly West German (4,000), American (1,800), and French (1,000), and there would be 8,500 artillery pieces facing less than 3,500," Mr Cressard reported.

In the committee's name, the reporting official wondered about the fact as to whether the French system, based on excessively sophisticated armament, in other words, excessively expensive equipment, was not worked out without taking into account the financial restrictions which always prevail in the end.

"In having visualized excessively expensive units and equipment items," the RPR deputy concluded, "did we not confront ourselves with a dilemma: either to keep increasing military fund allocations, an option which has not been selected by the administration, or to spread the equipment out in terms of time, which would mean that we would never be ready?"

[illegible]
[illegible]

COMMERCIAL, CULTURAL TIES WITH NIGERIA BECOMING STRONGER

Paris LE MONDE in French 12-13 Oct 80 p 6

[Article by J.-P. L.: "The Second Trade Partment of France in Africa"]

[Text] The volume of trade between France and Nigeria and the possibilities opened through cultural, scientific and technical cooperation match the size of the leading country in black Africa. Following a halt caused by measures to restrict imports, taken in 1978 by the Lagos Government, the Franco-Nigerian trade is, once again, in full swing. Nigeria is the 11th biggest supplier to France and its 13th biggest client. After Algeria it is its second most import trading partner in Africa. This remarkable performance is essentially due to petroleum. After Saudi Arabia and Iraq Nigeria is the third biggest supplier of crude oil to France (9.7 million tons in 1979 or about 10 percent of French purchases). Petroleum accounts for 96 percent of Nigeria's sales.

The continuing escalation of crude oil prices is raising France's trade deficit. Last year French exports covered approximately 52 percent of its imports; the automobile sector accounts for 44 percent of French sales to Nigeria. In its Kaduna plant Peugeot assembled 35,000 vehicles of the 504 model in 1979; this year it is planning to assemble 45,000 (or 40 percent of the local market). This is followed by sugar exports (10.8 percent of sales), mechanical materials and apparatus (8.8 percent), and petroleum products and fuel oils (6.6 percent). The Total Company is the leading distributor of refined products.

French investments in Nigeria are increasing rapidly. In addition to long-established big distribution companies (SCOA, CFAO and Brossette), a growing number of companies have been established in key economic sectors. A dozen public works enterprises (Dumez, Fougerolle, SPIE-Batignolles) are participating in the development of infrastructures. In association with the BNP, the United Bank of Africa has become the leading bank in the country. The Michelin plant in Port-Harcourt is locally producing 30 percent of the tires used in Nigeria. Many more such examples could be cited. French enterprises are present and, frequently, hold very good positions in the development of major projects such as the building of the future capital, the Abeokuta Steel Plant, or the improvement of the railroad network. The liberalization of imports and the increased federal budget indicate a very substantial short term increase in Franco-Nigerian trade and in the role played by French companies.

French-Nigerian cooperation is trying to surmount two basic handicaps: weak historical links and the language barrier. Theoretically, the teaching of French plays an important role. Mandatory in the south but superceded by Arabic in the north, French is the second foreign language. It is mandatorily taught on the secondary educational level.

Massive and Elitist Education Activities

In the linguistic area French cooperation emphasizes the "training of teachers" and uses a maximum of local facilities: the organization of the Association of French Language Teachers in Nigeria, systematic use of radio and television, showing of motion pictures in schools and universities, and establishment of French language centers. Such centers, more than 90 percent of whose financing is Nigerian, are aimed at a highly motivated public. This pedagogical activity, both massive and elitist, is bearing fruit.

In terms of scientific and technical cooperation, the Lagos authorities prefer training abroad. Currently some 250 young people are completing their studies in France. Every year France organizes for high level Nigerian cadres a series of meetings on enterprise management. Such training, conducted in English, lasts [illegible] weeks. Public and semipublic company managers are thus given the opportunity to find out about French management methods and, more generally, to increase their knowledge of our country.

Agricultural cooperation was started in 1978. The ministry of agriculture is training this year about a dozen Nigerian specialists. In this area France is also trying to promote trade between Nigeria and the countries of French-speaking Africa, the Ivory Coast in particular. There is cooperation in a number of other sectors such as medicine, nuclear physics, and hotel management. France is trying to involve with its activities the private sector in Nigeria within the framework of a "triangular cooperation." National volunteers, most frequently engineers, will be placed at the disposal of a French company. However, at the same time, they will be asked to teach in Nigerian technical schools. This double "sponsorship" of French volunteer workers could only improve their position in the eyes of the Lagos authorities. The latter have been favorably inclined to accept this plan.

Bearing in mind the extent of Nigeria's needs, France's personnel facilities may appear modest: no more than some 50 volunteers, half of them teachers. However, everything leads us to believe that in this area as well French presence in Nigeria will be strengthened in the years to come.

[illegible]
[illegible]

LEGAL LAW EXPERTS OPPOSE LIFE SENTENCE ABOLISHMENT

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 22 Oct 80 p 7

/Text/ Almost all the Greek legal experts and professors who participated in the public discussion organized by the German Institute "Goethe" on the usefulness of life imprisonment, expressed reservations on the abolition of this penalty. The Greek experts did not agree with the opinion of the famous German penologist Gurgen Baumann that life imprisonment should be abolished because it is inhumane.

Greek law deals with a person convicted to life imprisonment in a way which differs from that in Germany. When the Germans impose a life sentence they mean that the convict is going to spend the rest of his life in prison. The German criminal code does not allow the release of the prisoner under any conditions, as the case is in Greece. In Germany, the only hope for the convict is to be granted pardon (if ever) by the government. Otherwise, he is condemned to a "death day by day" as a life sentence is appropriately called.

In Greece, according to the Greek experts, seldom does a life convict remain in prison for more than 20 or 25 years. Usually, once he has served a major portion of his sentence he is paroled or he is pardoned. Consequently, Greeks sentenced to life always live with the hope of being released. In this manner the reeducation of the convict can be achieved and the sense of justice served.

Baumann, who initiated this discussion, sought to inform his Greek colleagues on the results of the effort recently launched by German penologists and legal experts for the abolition of life imprisonment in the Federal Republic of Germany. As a matter of fact, he asked for the support of the Greeks in this effort for the abolition of the "inhumane penalty" of life imprisonment, as he called it. The discussion panel included former President of the Republic K. Tsatsos and Professors Nik. Androulakis, Sp. Plaskovitis, G. A. Mangakis, and K. Despotopoulos. The meeting was attended also by public prosecutors, judges, lawyers, university professors, and university students. The only point on which all the experts agreed was that in the German legal system life imprisonment is "death day by day" since the convict is deprived of any hope of returning to human society.

The German penologist said specifically that the only reason no one has moved so far to press for the abolition of life imprisonment is the fear that this may bring back the death penalty. The position of many Germans during the last 10 years is clear: "Let us change anything on life imprisonment because we may face a new clamor by those who disagree with the clause of the German Constitution against the death penalty."

Those who oppose the abolition of the death penalty are many. Every time a particularly gruesome crime occurred causing an uproar in public opinion, there was a pressing demand for a return to the death penalty. These demands came not only from the "ordinary people" but also from prominent politicians and experts. Even theologians called for a return to the death penalty. Polls conducted at various times showed that a large percentage (60 to 70 percent) called for a return to the death penalty every time a savage crime was committed.

But life imprisonment, as Baumann said, is inhumane and serves no corrective purpose. Life imprisonment is a slow death for the criminal, "a death day by day." During the great penal reform which took place in Federal Germany in 195? the first reservations concerning the usefulness of life imprisonment were voiced. Life imprisonment, he said, cannot serve an educational, preventive or social readjustment objective. In other words, we do not need to reform someone who is not to be freed ever. Much more, the specific person must be protected so that he will not be totally alienated and desocialized during his life imprisonment.

In 197?, there was an effort to introduce parole for those convicted to life imprisonment but the effort failed. In 1976, a decision of the Ministerial Commission of the Council of Europe recommended to the member-states to study the feasibility of paroling those sentenced to life imprisonment after 8 to 14 years of incarceration. Since then new legislative initiatives have appeared from time to time for the abolition of life imprisonment. Those initiatives have become the subject of discussions by law experts throughout the world.

In practice only the judge can avert the sentencing of a criminal to life imprisonment. In other words, the judge can avert life imprisonment either by imposing a time limited prison sentence or by denying the imposition of a life sentence. The judge therefore has a choice of penalties he may impose.

The damage inherent in the threat of a life sentence--without any options--in the case of murder is generally recognized according to the German penologist. Yet we do have this penal threat. Is there a fear that this may reopen the discussion on the death penalty? No other reason could be advanced for retaining [life imprisonment]. Moreover, it must be taken into account that precisely in the case of homicide do we always have a totally negative prognosis about the culprit. Many killers are pushed or led to a specific criminal act by special circumstances or under the influence of passion. Of course, this is no excuse but we should not forget that such culprits do not present a serious threat. Statistics show that seldom does a killer repeat his crime. Therefore there is no justification for life imprisonment using as an excuse the fear that it may be repeated. The percentage of second offenders in the case of murder is considerably lower compared to other crimes. But this [low percentage] is relatively unknown.

The German professor concluded: "I believe that it is not enough to seek in the long run a suspension of the life sentence. It is also necessary to demand that the judge will not impose a penalty which the purpose of punishment cannot justify since it is not logical and leaves no hope for the convict. Only above the Gates of Hell (as Dante wrote) may be the inscription that those who enter should abandon all hope. In human life every penalty must leave some hope."

Professor G. A. Manyakis who spoke later said that every convict, even one sentenced to life imprisonment, is entitled to some hope for freedom even if such hope is realized in the distant future. Those who have experienced prison life know that those sentenced to life imprisonment are the most calm and methodical convicts because, having some hope to get out someday, they are trying, biologically and psychologically, to avoid their collapse. When they lose all hope they fall apart as persons and reject society and every principle.

What is needed is to give the lifer some hope, and to make legal provisions so that it will be possible to release him on parole even after a number of years, provided of course that the court will determine that his personality has developed in such a way that if he is set free he will comply with the law. This is in keeping with the objective of punishment in a democratic, humanistic society.

Plaskovitis expressed some reservations. He said that the laws should not be formulated by penologists and judges alone. The only appropriate ones who should formulate laws are the public opinion and the people who with their political forces express their views and work to build their future. Respect for the value of man is identical with the respect for justice in the context of European civilization, as expressed more specifically by the people. I do not think, he concluded, that the Greek people consider life imprisonment as an unjust and excessive penalty--at least at the moment it is being imposed by the court for gruesome crimes.

Andreoulakis who spoke next said that in Greece the death penalty has been virtually abolished while life imprisonment is imposed only in exceptional cases (homicide, treason, and so forth). The lifer, he added, may ask for pardon or he may be paroled. Such cases have already occurred in our country. The life imprisonment as imposed in Greece is in line with the principles of human dignity.

Despotopoulos said the penalty is not imposed because a crime is committed but to prevent crime in the future, and that the convict must have a specific and realistic opportunity to regain his freedom some day. This is required not only under the principles of justice but primarily for the protection of human dignity.

The discussion was closed by the former President of the Republic Konst. Tsatsos who emphasized that he is not a follower of the retaliatory theory of punishment. The penalty serves a specific objective: to have an educational function either to improve society or to reform the criminal. The life sentence is not imposed to frighten the criminal but to educate. By imposing this sentence the people are taught that certain goods have a certain importance and are protected by the law. In this way each person can decide what his role is in society.

7520
CSO:4908

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOUNDATION SERVICES CRITICIZED

Athens TA NEA in Greek 7 Oct 80 p 9

[Interview with Medical Association President Spyros Giannopoulos by N. Dacunkakis and K. Khardavellas]

[Text] In a revealing interview with TA NEA, the [Athens] Medical Association [ISA] president said that the Social Insurance Foundation [IKA] doctors are "forced to neglect their duties because of the conditions they work under" and that "these conditions are miserable and dangerous to the lives of the insured and degrade the human dignity of both doctors and insured [patients]." The full text of the interview is as follows:

TA NEA: Every insured knows of the low [quality] medical relief IKA offers. What is the role of the doctors in this unacceptable situation and what is their responsibility?

GIANNOPOULOS: Before answering any question let me put the whole thing in perspective. Our association has ascertained and has brought to the attention of the public that IKA offers a low quality service and in some sectors totally negligible considering the possibilities extant at this moment.

We have said and charged many times that this situation is the result of the anti-people policy pursued by governments for a long time and that the IKA administration is equally guilty. This policy--which in this case means curtailment of health services--is in force because tens of billions of drachmas, instead of being applied toward the medical relief of the insured, are given free to monopolies and other large enterprises in various ways (exemption from or reduction in the payment of contributions, cancelling debts, burdening the IKA insured with state obligations, and so forth).

TA NEA: Can you give us specific examples?

GIANNOPOULOS: Of course. Let us consider the insured sick persons in need of hospitalization. To be able to offer such service to the 430,000 cases annually, IKA must have 25,000 (its own or state) well-equipped beds and for proper professional care these hospitals should be staffed with sufficient specialized medical and nursing personnel as well as with modern, technical equipment. Instead,

350,000 patients are being treated in private clinics which cannot offer even elementary, acceptable treatment. The remaining 60,000 are being treated in hallways or in rooms of 20 to 30 beds in state or private law hospitals. IKA has very few available beds (1,500) which it owns or leases under peculiar agreements.

Since 1975 IKA has repeatedly announced that it will build new hospitals (at Aigaleo, for instance). Nothing has been done to this day. As is known, in 1978 the government pressed IKA to cut down its expenditures within the austerity framework. The result was that it saved 5 billion drachmas at a time when the conditions for hospital and outpatient treatment were terrible.

The IKA Scientific and Medical Personnel Association /SEIPIKA/ has brought these conditions to the attention of the public and has charged also that the IKA polyclinics in the Athens-Piraeus area can serve only half the number of the insured persons and that the need to double the number of clinics, personnel, and so forth, is urgent. The ratio of IKA doctors to nurses is 3 to 1 instead of 1 to 1. This means that the doctors are forced to do nonmedical work and thus neglect their medical duties. But the existing nursing personnel also is performing non-nursing duties which of course should be done by others.

The conditions of the buildings degrade the dignity of the patients and the professional and nonprofessional staff. The lighting and heating are poor, the equipment does not function properly, there are shortcomings everywhere. In order to overcome all these shortcomings IKA should be using the billions of drachmas now being channeled into the large enterprises. In other words, the policy presently followed and which favors the capital at the expense of the medical relief needs of 4 million workers, employees and pensioners should be changed.

Under such conditions as, for instance, when a doctor works in a clinic which lacks proper equipment, does not have the necessary auxiliary personnel and the proportionate number of physicians--under such conditions it is natural that mistakes, sometimes tragic ones, will be made. Such mistakes are always blamed on the doctor without prior investigation of the conditions under which he performed his duties.

TA NEA: All these things are a reality. But the accusations concerning the behavior of some IKA doctors toward the patients--doctors, for instance, who want special fees for visits, who insult or talk rudely to patients, who refuse to give information to the patients concerning the progress of their treatment, who refuse to write a prescription recommended by a specialist or a hospital, who in a very impersonal manner reveal the serious nature of a patient's illness--all these charges are also a reality. What do you have to say about this?

GIANNOPOULOS: Unfortunately, these things do happen also. I believe, however, that the number of doctors who are thinking about personal benefits and who neglect their duties are indeed minimal. But these exceptions, too, exist because of other parameters. An example: It is possible for a doctor who sees 40 patients during his shift under tense, anxious conditions to lose his temper at some moment. As concerns the "small envelopes" /with money/ which are handed to doctors, rarely can I say that a seriously ill patient, seeing the pressures the doctor undergoes and the difficult conditions under which he works may feel the necessity to give him a bonus. There are many doctors who succumb and accept it. Let us not forget

that the salaries the doctors get are small. They start at 14,000 drachmas [per month] and after 30 years of service reach a maximum of 36,000 drachmas. The only solution is to create conditions facilitating the task of the doctor and then if there are still some who neglect their duty they should accept the consequences. But under the present conditions the doctors are bound to neglect their duty.

TA NEA: Is there a monitoring body for such cases, albeit few?

GIANNOPOULOS: [illegible]IKA does not have such a body. Only the medical associations and the Panhellenic Medical Society have their Supreme Disciplinary Councils [ANS]. But up until now these ANS's were not operating effectively for lack of a relevant law which was enacted only recently.

TA NEA: One of the demands you made in your previous strike [last spring] was that medical relief should be improved. When the strike was over you said that you would renew this demand. The impression exists that the promises given to you were only on salary and promotion related matters and that the question of improved medical relief is now forgotten.

GIANNOPOULOS: Our demands were not related only to the salary question but also to institutional matters: participation in the administrative council, albeit without a vote, as well as in the disciplinary and the Supreme Medical Board. Our role in health matters is consultative but we consider even this role important. A draft law on health is to be introduced these days in the Chamber of Deputies. The Ministry of Social Services is trying to develop a situation at the expense of the doctors--they are to blame, they are privileged and so forth--who are opposing this draft law. In this confrontation the public opinion shall be the judge.

TA NEA: What autonomy does the IKA medical service enjoy compared to the institution's administration?

GIANNOPOULOS: Indeed, none. Under the pretext that many facets of the medical services have economic and administrative responsibilities, the IKA administrative establishment impedes the proper operations in rendering such services and the results are thus unpleasant. Example: For the selection and appointment of doctors the following criteria are used: submission, servility, whether he is "one of us," and, consequently, incompetency. During our strike the IKA administration hired incompetent or very old doctors under the excuse that they needed work, doctors with disciplinary infractions, without certification by medical societies, as the law provides. A characteristic case is the one where IKA rehired a doctor whom it dismissed as [word illegible] addict. It even hired doctors who had just received their diplomas and who had no experience at all. It hired an excessive number of dentists and gynecologists most of whom now remain idle. At the Zografou Hospital, of the 11 dentists only 3 are kept busy. It is estimated that 100 of these doctors have not been occupied for 3 months now because of an excessive number in their specialties, while specialists such as surgeons, orthopedists, laryngologists, dieticians, and so forth, are in short supply.

\ Deplorable Situation

IKA, the largest insurance organization in our country, has about 4 million insured people. For these people who have paid with [salary and wage] withholdings all their lives so that they could have pensions and medical relief, IKA:

a. Treats 97 percent of them in third-class hospital rooms, that is, in rooms with 10, 20, or 30 beds, and in hallways. It provides, in other words, third-class treatment which should have been abolished.

b. It has privately owned, well-equipped beds for only 8.5 percent of its insured; 62 percent of its beds are in private clinics where the conditions are as miserable; the rest of the beds are in state or private law hospitals where, again, conditions are bad.

c. It does not have even one children's hospital for the nearly 850,000 children of its insured.

d. It has 24 polyclinics in Athens and Piraeus for 1.8 million insured while in 1962 it had 23 such clinics for only 800,000 insured.

e. For its 20 large hospitals, 89 branches, 100 local and 9 Panhellenic clinics, it employs 4,800 doctors, 1,000 more on a contractual basis, 3,000 nurses and orderlies, 3,200 administrative employees, and 705 female cleaners. The number of staff positions has remained the same since 1963 as has its organizational setup since 1950.

Many years ago--in 1951--the IKA administration prepared a program for the construction of hospitals with a total capacity of 3,650 beds and also for the construction of a number of branch clinics. The money was available for such a project--550 million drachmas was needed at that time. But the then government--apparently for reasons of austerity--forced IKA to deposit the money in the Bank of Greece--something similar, that is, to what is being done today with the reserve funds of the [insurance] funds.

For years now the situation has remained unchanged--the construction of a hospital in Aigaleo was announced in 1977 but it still remains a project on paper. The medical societies have repeatedly denounced the unacceptable operating conditions in the IKA health centers, the lack of human potential and equipment, the lack of hospital beds, and the waste of the IKA income at the expense of the relief it offers.

Since Monday the IKA doctors have begun their strike movements because the promises given them by the Ministry of Social Services and the IKA administration were not kept. Nor was the relevant draft law enacted. Among the SEIPIKA demands was the improvement of medical relief while other demands also referred indirectly to such IKA provided relief. It was also recognized that the existing bad conditions under which the IKA doctors perform their duties are affecting the medical relief the insured receive. This was exactly the reason why in their majority the IKA insured supported the doctors during their 2-month strike last spring. However, there were also charges about the rude behavior of some doctors toward patients. The doctors themselves--mainly members of the SEIPIKA administration with whom we talked--believe that such cases [of rude behavior] are exceptions magnified by the government and the IKA administration for the purpose of slandering the doctors and turning public opinion against them.

"Dear Insured:"--said a leaflet the doctors distributed during the days of their strike--"we wish once more to assure you that our struggle has a dual purpose. In addition to our demands as professionals, the improvement of the medical relief you are given, and which for us means conditions for dignified performance, is a basic objective of all our struggles and will continue to remain an objective until it is realized."

7520
CSO: 4908

NEW CDA CHAIRMAN BUKMAN INTERVIEWED ON POLITICAL VIEWS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 11 Oct 80 pp 177-183

/Report on Interview with CDA /Christian Democratic Appeal/ chairman, doctoral candidate Pieter Bukman, by correspondent Alice Oppenheim: "I May Well Make Mistakes"; date and place of interview not given/

> /Text/ "I am going to begin the whole show with a stiff dose of stupidity. I think that I have a right to that. You have to do dumb things in a new job. You can demand that for yourself. If a party says: we want an outsider, then they also must accept mistakes. I do not come in with the idea: fellows, are there perhaps still a few mistakes to make?... But I must be able to warm up. Not too long, perhaps a half a year until the elections come." Doctoral Candidate Pieter Bukman, the new chairman of the new CDA, is speaking. He cries out surprisedly: "Angry? At whom...? I do not know the word; I have never been angry, certainly not at other people."

Piet Bukman has just been to church with one of his daughters. He enters his livingroom in a draft of fresh air without inhibitions and suspicions. Overgrown blonde children appear from all corners of a not too large house. They all look like Piet Bukman, have the same attractive curly hair and the same animated appearance. Even the mother smiles a lot. Parents and children are in harmony with each other and life, which you do not see so often among leaders. Because there are many children downstairs, and Bukman has no study, the interview takes place at his desk in the bedroom.

"When I was 26 I joined the CBTB /Christian Farmers and Market Gardeners Association/ and in so doing entered politics. They were all politically active there and I found it pleasant and useful to participate. It was absorbing being busy with questions on which the country's future depends, interesting things for the Netherlands. My first political meeting: pushing up my chair with unusual timidity at the

table of great men. Yes, I even sat at the table and not in the room. They were always looking among the antirevolutionaries for someone from the CBTB to keep up that relationship satisfactorily. They looked at me somewhat like: Who are you? And I looked back and thought: I know damn well who you are, how important you are and what a great background you have behind you, full of awe. But that was soon over, the fact is I am rather shy."

He blushes with the word "shy" and that is surprising for he apparently is not very uncomfortable with himself. "No, I say, reformed and cheerful. Formerly there was not so much judgment and condemnation among us at home. My father hated exploitation and abuse of people. And that led him more than once to oppose things in the committees which he was on or as deacon, if he did not think decisions were in the interest of the powerless, little man. Among us at home, the name of Buskes was mentioned with respect, although with a bit of a shudder, because he tried to live his christian principles in the PvdA and that was taboo in those post war years. I still remember well that Zuidema and his kind went about the country pronouncing judgment on those who did not choose the ARP [Antirevolutionary Party]. I myself have never toyed with that idea, although I have always felt more attracted to the PvdA [Labor Party] than to the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy]. That came somewhat from my father. He was a very socially active man. He had a market-gardeners business in Delft. He always kept workers very long, even 20 years sometimes. There was often a great deal of mobility in the market gardening business. I do not know if I am like him, but I hate it and detest it, if decisions are taken where little people are hurt. You can yourself never be a shield for the weak, it sounds bombastic, but as a member of a Christian democratic party, you must certainly try to fill that role.

Bakman, the youngest of six, delivered illegal newspapers during the war, listened to the Holland-Belgian reports on Sunday, played volleyball and took a bath on Saturday: a little kettle of warm water, some additional cold water, big toe in it to test it and then we went one after the other...Luckily the taboo atmosphere which was very substantial in the reformed group did not prevail among us. I have also never felt any frustrations myself, although..you cannot compare. In another way I have greeted the developments in the church regarding rules for living with a great deal of joy, the freedom about what you may think and do. We had the package theory. It was that you, as a member of the reformed church also must be a member of the CNV [National Federation of Christian Workers in the Netherlands] or the CBTB and at all times a member of the ARP. As a child you must go to the boys' club, afterwards to the youth club and finally to the men's club. That included: a Christian school, a Christian newspaper and membership in the NCRV [Netherlands Christian Broadcasting Association]. Luckily that sort of taking things for granted has disappeared."

He had to smile. His children attend a Christian school; up till a short time ago, he was a member of the ARP, besides LE MONDE and the NRC HANDELSBLAD, he reads TROUW; and is he a member of NCRV. "Yes, but it is no longer necessary, it may be. There are no difficulties in my family. The children go to church, not all the time, but fairly regularly. I always wait to see who wants to and who does not. After an earlier period when we always went together we relaxed and thought: Let us see just once how it will turn out. In the course of time, we noticed that their interest returned, that they themselves again said: Are you going tomorrow? There is no personal embarrassment here. Each one does what he finds best. I think that emancipation process should not go too far. There is a reaction of: I will decide everything myself, a certain independence in people in our circle. It is not easy to walk the middle way. We are not such bad parents, my wife and I; it is hard for us to take a relative view of things. When you see how things have changed in 20, 25 years, then you become a bit hesitant, then you no longer say so quickly: that is the way it is and that is the way it must be. Perhaps," he says with questioning eyes, "something of the frustration of the past comes up," and he blushes like a young lad.

Piet Bukman is taking over the assignment of Piet Steenkamp this week. Two red Peters who are not similar to each other at all. Piet the driven idealist makes way for Piet, the practical doer. The CDA must now seek form as well as content and therefore "has called Bukman in from the sidelines," as he himself says. Bukman, who up till 1 January was still chairman of the CBTB, led an ordinary life until recently, in an ordinary row house among ordinary people. He does not yet sit in the back of a big black limousine, protected against ordinary people, on the way to unusual matters of an important nature. He does not yet move among mere politicians who think in terms of elections and anticipate and consequently sometimes are so cautious and vague. Everyone now knows that Bukman prefers a coalition with the PvdA to cooperation with the VVD, for he says what he thinks without any ulterior motives.

"That was perhaps a little too simple. It is sometimes true that if you do not explain well your reason for an opinion, the currant is picked out of the cake. Then you get those reactions, especially from my farmer's world: you are delivering us to the PvdA. And that consequently is a case where everything has gone somewhat awry. But I have not heard anything from the party leadership, so... When they asked me, they were thinking first of a half-time position. I said: I cannot cry out in the morning anywhere in the country to a hall full of farmers and market-gardeners: 'Braks is nothing' and then defend the CDA in the afternoon. You must make it a full-time job for the time being. In conversations with leaders--I have visited all of them in their dens--I have already noticed that they sometimes feel a bit deserted, that they are not supported completely

from a political standpoint by the party. In the coming days, the CDA must rearm itself politically. We must not only complain about the uncoupling of minimum income--social benefits, but especially concern ourselves as a party with the question: what do we now want with our social security system in general, and how is that related to personal responsibility? What do we think as Christian democrats about armament and defense? Those problems can no longer be shoved aside or left to parliamentary groups alone. It is a bit boring to say so, but those things must be approached, as always happened in the ARP. The scientific office is busy with everything; there is an abundance of excellent ideas, but nothing is accomplished."

He boldly sums things up and is hardly cautious in so doing: "We have been busy here in recent years in the Netherlands in overplaying our hand by anticipating a prosperity which has never arrived and we have deemphasized the main principle, one's own responsibility. I do not represent the point of view that everyone is obligated to work himself to death and be on tip-toes all his life, but it is now very easy to do the opposite in our society. One does not need to make any effort, for a definite minimum is legally reserved for everyone. Where should we now have to make restrictions? Now, in my opinion, you could discuss the minimum wage for youth. It sounds awfully liberal and I hesitate to say it, but things are often done in the field of the minimum youth wage whose effects on the whole society's cost development are too detrimental. At the same time, I think that those who are getting an education should also have to help finance it themselves. We must be careful not to create any discriminations. The people who can enjoy an academic education and afterwards lead a comfortable life, must not all get it in the name of society on a silver platter, without any further ado. I would want to let something of the profit principle be involved here. The two subjects certainly are connected with each other; otherwise you are going to undermine the position of working youth and you protect the students. Perhaps you should also support a businessman who is starting out. I sometimes thought: I do not need to worry about my children who want to study. The government will take care of what I cannot finance. But now I have a son who wants to be a farmer. I do not know approximately how I would go about financing that. Why should you as a government invest no money in such a young person? Why should you not help someone to be an independent businessman? It would be best to relate the children's allowance somewhat more to the income level. I now have nine children for the Children's Allowance Law, instead of five... Listen I pocket that amount each time with great joy. It is part of our system, consequently why not? But it could be less. A WW [Unemployment Law] benefit for a youth who would not mind working, but cannot get a job is fair. I can accept that emotionally and support it fairly well. But if it becomes a question of really not wanting to work.. My objection is also that the association is made with what one could earn under normal circumstances.

If a college student who has just graduated gets a benefit which is related to what he would have earned otherwise, then I say that we are going over the limit. Society is based entirely on security, no one wants to take a risk anymore. This is true not only about the employees, but also about the employers. We have enterprises in the Netherlands which can say: lads! if it goes wrong, we will go to Van Aardenne to get money; then we will say that employment is threatened. Meanwhile, greater effort to get order X consequently disappears.

Up till now, Bukman has not taken any big risks in his own career. Five different positions in 20 years, all in the CBTB. A nice steady rise to the top. Each personnel manager would say stable; a manager who has grown slowly in his profession. The CDA chairmanship is Bukman's first real gamble and he knows that.

"The risk is in it becoming a big failure. Consequently, it can be that the unity which must come in the CDA hardly appears achievable. At the moment, when opinions are still finally far apart, the chairman of such a club is affected by the results of that to a high degree. If at a certain time, one would steer a course according to the former blueprint of Hoscam Abbing, who thought that a progressive and a conservative christian party would have to arise, then I do not need that anymore. Let one club join the PvdA and the other the VVD. I am not going into the CDA with the idea that I will not be able to succeed with my ARP method of operation, not at all. I am not going to condemn if people disagree. You must make good working agreements earlier."

Bukman intends to attend parliamentary group meetings, the first time. "In practice, I never let myself be convinced by others, unless I can follow their thinking process. I want to know hov someone reaches an opinion. Afterwards, I am more willing to accept the result. I never let anything be foisted on me like that.

When asked, he says: "I cannot always follow Lubbers, but I must get to know him better. I really always understand Albeda well; I have known him longer. Van Agt also again insufficiently; he is very unpredictable, especially in his relationship with the parliamentary group. It will be necessary to make genuinely good agreements with him."

The sun shines in the bedroom and glitters on Piet Bukman's intense white walls. But all that glitters is not gold. He continually rubs his right eye, which is all red. Bukman always appears as if he had just walked an hour along the beach. "I would still like to go to the seashore," he will say at the end of the conversation.

He remains pleasant, and only becomes irritated when we move on to Aantjes. "As far as I am concerned, it sounds harsh, but William Aantjes would be wise not to return to politics. But he probably is going to do that. I do not know what he now intends in so doing.

He has been very busy recently. From a human standpoint I can understand, I can imagine that; he was punished too much, I also wrote that to him. But he is still busy letting his party run great risks. That is a mistake which he is making. He can serve the party in another way than through membership in the chamber. For example, he did excellent work on the platform committee.

Aantjes' name hovered around a bit uncomfortably. Bukman himself squirmed a bit nervously in the chair "where his father sat earlier." The question came up of the individual behavior of group members and politicians through the bond of publicity: "I think that vanity plays a big part in it; I am honestly convinced of that. I myself am not...well probably a bit vain, I have always found it pleasant to operate in public and semipublic roles. Why, would you ask. I am not concerned about it. Really I do not think self-analysis is so necessary. As far as that is involved, I perhaps live a bit for my country. I detest those people who are so dreadfully preoccupied with themselves, analyze themselves all the time and consequently have little understanding of what others want and need. You must realize that you are not going to find yourself interesting, that is deadly. I never could have been a party philosopher or the director of the scientific institute. My background is not there, I am not suited for that. I prefer to attack things but not blindly. I have never abandoned my principles. And if there were difficulties, then it was never a question that I had to maintain myself, always the cause which I supported. It was never a case of myself having to face the ax.

He waits and smiles, his eyelids open and close like parentheses around his eyes. "But I realize that it can well happen to me in politics. One can play with the man. That happens everywhere in politics; consequently why would that not happen to me."

The new CDA chairman is not quick tempered. He does not get angry very readily. "And if I am, then I do not say much at first. I never keep that up long. My first inclination is: act reserved, be cautious. I was raised by five mothers, my mother and four sisters. I did not suffer under it, I became very adroit about it."

He smiles, looks like a cherub in an Italian painting, young for his 46 years, cheerful and steadfast. "Listen," he says while he almost visibly returns from the corner where he felt driven by the "you well know where you begin" questions: "I approach it from a quite different direction. Not of: where do I see the most problems and where do I see the contrary. I have great confidence in proceeding from a very practical line of thinking. It is not a question of playing it safe, but an expectation which I want to make come true. You must not think: where are the pitfalls and traps? You must think: where are the opportunities? I never lose any sleep about that. I have been sick perhaps a week in 20 years. Piet Steenkamp

lay awake in the night of 26 and 27 September out of anxiety whether that ARP now would prevail, while I had said previously: follow it will be more than 90 percent. 'It will still not be true?' Piet cried out in despair: 'it will still not be true?' Now I slept very well. I have a great deal of confidence in the new chairmanship: that worked out so amazingly well, no afternoon was necessary for that. I am an optimist by nature. I have not really gone to pieces.. up till now." The happy laughter of children sounds below. A son calls up: "Are you still there? Do you want anything to drink?"

"Gladly" says Bukman and he indicates in an inimitably friendly and diplomatic manner that he has had enough for Sunday afternoon. "We will see how that goes and whether the ship runs aground. We always have a half pay regulation."

8490
CSO: 3105

CDA's POSITION IN DUTCH POLITICAL LIFE DISCUSSED

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 11 Oct 80 pp 170-175

[Article by Dieudonnée ten Berge: "Goodbye Polarization; Here Is the CDA"

[Text] Thirteen years of talk about party renewal produced on Saturday 11 October precisely what the contrivers of the discussion so deeply desired: the single Christian democratic center party. A party that can govern in a coalition with right or left as required. Den Uyl, Van Mierlo, Gruyters, Jurgens, and De Gaay Fortman will have a bad day. Dieudonnée ten Berge takes a look at the undeniable reality in Dutch politics: the Christian Democratic Appeal.

For 13 years it has been unclear whether the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] would become a reality. The continual wrangling about commas and periods did not generate any great love for each other and was often quite impossible for outsiders to follow. "The CDA is the umpteenth proof of God," Prof Steenkamp is accustomed to say of his brain child. For years the man who was once called "Red Piet" ran his legs off selling his new political product. It is essentially a miracle that the CDA can now count on about a third of the voters, for the top of the party has done nearly everything to alienate the common man. But the strength of the CDA is at the grassroots. It was there that the leaders were forced to go further. It was from the grassroots that the movement "We Belong Together" came when the chairmen had again run aground in the umpteenth un-Christian squabble. The grassroots demanded and got unification.

For a long time outsiders did not believe the CDA would actually come about. Especially in socialist circles they are still rubbing their eyes. For in 1973 they succeeded nicely in splitting the three Christian parties apart. At that time the KVP [Catholic People's Party] and the ARP [Antirevolutionary Party] supported the Den Uyl cabinet and the CHU [Christian Historical Union] went into the opposition. The socialists counted on it that the disintegration of the Christian parties would be permanent. But the contrary proved to be the case. For the CDA parties unity was more important than collaborating with anybody at all, and the PvdA [Labor Party] had to take its losses when the CDA came forward in 1977 as a single bloc.

The socialists landed ingloriously in the opposition. "The formation of the Den Uyl cabinet in particular pushed us into a single bunch," according to Steenkamp's

theory. "It also left us with big wounds. The socialists did not understand that." After the gain of 10 seats in the May 1977 elections, Den Uyl arrogantly began the formation of the second Den Uyl cabinet. "That was done with a mentality of: We are the biggest, we will furnish the prime minister and most of the ministers, we do not need your standard-bearer. And all that after the blow they had given us in 1973. That was bound to go wrong. Den Uyl's 10 seats were of decisive significance for bringing about the CDA," says a current top man of the CDA.

Each of the three christian parties reacted differently to a possible merger when the CDA actually began to take shape. The KVP, by far the biggest of the three, started on that adventure at a time when the Catholic part of the population were really beginning to lose their bearings. With the same recklessness with which the Catholics dismantled their church and their liturgy, they did the same to their political party. At the same time the bonds with the NKV [Netherlands Catholic Workers Federation], the Catholic trade union movement, were loosened. That same NKV threw itself into the arms of the socialist NVV [Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions], so that there is practically nothing left of Catholic trade union thinking. In the KVP little attention was paid to the oncoming generation. "You can recognize the KVP youths by their balding heads," people said in political circles of The Hague. The KVP lost tens of thousands of members and half of its voters in 15 years' time. "There was practically nothing left of the party organization. It was only under the chairmanship of Piet van Zeil that a little flow came back," says one of the former directors. The lack of direction and determination in the KVP had the result that an important element of security disappeared from the center of Dutch politics. The KVP, which furnished six prime ministers and was represented in all the cabinets since the war, was responsible for a great degree of continuity. Slowly but surely, the bottom dropped out of that.

The ARP reacted quite differently to the approaching union with KVP and CHU.

Among the Antirevolutionaries it released a sort of euphoria about their own nobility. To put it in Biblical terms: the KVP played the rôle of publican, and the ARP seemed to have assigned itself the rôle of Pharisee. Under the leadership of Bob Goudzwaard, many Antirevolutionaries gave the impression of regarding themselves as a sort of exclusive group of "latterday saints." The feeling of being the essential backbone of the coming CDA made the Antirevolutionaries look down from on high upon the KVP'ers and CHU'ers. Ten years ago Barend Biesheuvel said, "An insult to the KVP means an insult to the ARP." There is little of that feeling left in the ARP.

The smallest CDA participant, the CHU, had the least difficulty with the conversion to the CDA. The CHU had little future, and that was realized within its own circle. Even the rôle of opposition in the time of the Den Uyl cabinet did not pay off in increased favor among the voters. The showings in opinion polls remained poor. In recent years the CHU has not been overindulged with chairmen of political, intellectual, or charismatic stature. The members are for the most part elderly. The increasingly clear outlines of the CDA coincided nicely with what seemed ideal to the CHU, so that they had few problems with the fusion. The CHU members bravely swallowed their last anti-Roman feelings and smiled at their scarcely beloved Calvinist brothers of the ARP. The most liberal Christian party in the Netherlands tolerantly crossed the line.

The polarization in which both left and right have overindulged for several decades broke down definitively with the birth of the CDA. In the 1960's the PvdA and the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] hoped by lashing out hard at the denominational parties to make the Christians' position of power crumble away. Then at election time the choice would be between socialists and liberals. The KVP, ARP, and CHU veiled such a choice. The CDA, the Christian-democratic center party, can now govern at will with the left bloc or with the conservative forces in Dutch society. That the CDA in fact can make or break any coalition is favored by the irreconcilability with which the PvdA and VVD confront each other. For a coalition between those two would be the only way to put the CDA really out of the game. But even though there are lines of contact between the PvdA and VVD when it comes to immaterial matters in politics--abortion, emancipation, homosexualism--that has not proved sufficient to bring about mutual assistance between socialists and liberals.

Because of that impotence the PvdA and the VVD will have to gnash their teeth and accept the power of the CDA.

How reliably will the CDA conduct itself in the future? "Look, party platforms are waste paper the day after they are written," says one of the framers of the new CDA campaign platform. "It's all a matter of the performance and the people." And with that we are back to the old dilemma in Christian politics: witness, or accomplish something?

Hitherto the ARP has had "witness politics" high on its banner, while the KVP and the CHU usually looked first at political feasibility and adjusted their programs accordingly. Then the opponents always shouted "opportunists" or "Christian turnabouts." It is no accident that former KVP leader and ex-minister of foreign affairs Norbert Schmelzer has now become chairman of the CDA foreign affairs committee. The Christian-inspired, but sober and realistic Schmelzer must lay out a line in the field where Christian confusion has hurt worst in recent years. NATO, nuclear weapons, and South Africa are the issues that have sharply divided the CDA. Decisions on these issues have been repeatedly put off to the future, so that a new cabinet will be encumbered with heavy mortgages in advance.

Schmelzer must bring realism back into foreign policy. No simple matter with the hotheads that await him, the most problematic of which is Jan Nico Scholten. By political blackmail Scholten has managed to be the CDA spokesman in all foreign policy debates in the Second Chamber. A big majority of the CDA delegation would prefer not to have him in that position any longer, since he tried to blow up the cabinet--and with it the CDA--in the debate over the oil boycott of South Africa. But Scholten's trump card was: If I am turned out that will be another manifestation of the notorious KVP power thinking, in which there is no room for difference of opinion. Many Antirevolutionaries will not accept that and will support me at the first opportunity that arises to force a cabinet crisis. The delegation can do nothing but capitulate in the face of these threats, but that has taken four meetings.

Since the withdrawal of Goudzwaard the CDA's social policy has been under the chairmanship of VU [Free University] professor Arend Vermaat. "A breathing space," says one participant in the talks surrounding the campaign platform.

Goudzwaard was, economically and otherwise, the man of the most radical ideas. Everybody down about 5 percent [in real income], give the extra natural gas income to the developing countries, and follow a more or less managed wage policy for the next few years.

With Vermaat the CDA is now on a more realistic course. About halfway between liberals and socialists. A little state intervention, but not too much.

The CDA's problem is that it must satisfy both the center and both ends. A CDA member of the Second Chamber says, "In the KVP delegation the employers, the middle class, and the farmers have finally won out. The Catholic trade union has lost all influence by cutting loose. In the ARP the Christian labor union still has a big finger in the pie. The CHU furnished VNO [Federation of Netherlands Enterprises] chairman Chris van Veen. To put it simply, our problem is that we must champion the interests both of the minimum incomes and of the boys with 700,000 guilders a year. And at the same time we have to maintain the ties with the CNV, for it would be a disaster for our club if we did not succeed in that."

A VVD Second Chamber member says, "People always think we are the party where the money is, but the really big money is in the CDA." It is and will remain a remarkable structure: union members and employers are constantly at each other's throats, but they vote for the same party. ARP, KVP, and CHU recognized that problem earlier, but then there was an annual growth to distribute, and that makes it all go somewhat more smoothly. Now that there is no growth and choices have to be made, there is no way to prevent some groups from being hit where it hurts. The CDA needs economic growth badly for its own harmony. Especially as Vermaat, in the campaign platform, conjures up 2.5 percent growth out of nothing. To the great indignation of, for example, Prime Minister Andries van Agt, who probably will have to sell the platform as standard-bearer and knows good and well that the economy will hardly grow at all. "They have never consulted me about the platform. And so far I have had no word about it," he says. "Anybody that says he can halve unemployment in 4 years is pulling the wool over the people's eyes."

But although a platform committee announces the theory, the practice will be determined in the Second Chamber. The CDA delegation is beginning to be more and more alive to the seriousness of the situation. Drop by drop the realization that Frans Andriessen is right is filtering in.

"Hello Zijlstra prime minister!" Not a few within the CDA are going around with this thought and talking about it in private. "The 1980's will resemble the depression period around 1930, but personal oppositions stand in the way of a forceful policy. Everybody has got to put his shoulder to the wheel; now is no time for dawdling and long drawn-out cabinet formations. Den Uyl and Van Agt would both belong in such a Zijlstra cabinet. The CDA must now recognize its responsibility and purposefully put affairs in order in this country." This is the reasoning that is based on a single foundation: *The CDA stands solid as a wall in the center of power in Dutch politics.*

8815
CSO: 3105

POLITICAL REACTION TO EANES' SECOND PRESS CONFERENCE

Summary of Press Conference

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Oct 80 pp 3, 4

[Text] "I shall not cease to defend, through democratic means, my convictions which are clearly different from those seeking to find the answers to Portugal's problems in radicalization and bipolarization." It was with this remark that the president of the republic concluded the introductory address at the press conference which he granted yesterday. Nevertheless, Ramalho Eanes said: "To enable Portugal to withstand, economically and politically, not only the internal crises, but also the international crises which directly affect Europe, it is essential to insure conditions marked by understanding, tolerance and political consensus."

Ramalho Eanes appeared before the several score native and foreign newsmen who went to Belem Palace in his capacity as president of the republic, not as a candidate for reelection. He explained, at the outset, that "The existence of a parliamentary majority backing the government has, among other even more important virtues, that of allowing me closer and more regular contact with professionals from the news media."

He explained: "Actually, the reasons of state which often during these 4 years forced me to remain silent to the slander, misrepresentation and insults, have ceased to be so pressing. In fact, my comments in open conversation with newsmen could have interfered with the efforts to resolve crises or to maintain the stability of the institutions."

The government's refusal to submit its resignation to the president of the republic after the election of 5 October, "thus avoiding a waste of time with a parliamentary debate of its program," was the first of the three fundamental topics discussed by Ramalho Eanes.

"In my opinion, and in a strictly constitutional context," he said, "the government cannot fail to submit its program at the proper time. Furthermore, the program which was discussed and approved in January of this year, was expressly a program relating only to the period that would last until the end of the legislature."

When asked the question, the president remarked:

"It is acceptable for the government to have sought to express its lack of political confidence in the president of the republic; if this is so, it is a strange reversal

of the rules, but devoid of any useful significance." Ramalho Eanes said that, since it has obtained a "clear political majority in Parliament, it would obviously invite its legitimate representative immediately to form a government, and thus there would be no detriment to the government's continuity."

However, in the president's opinion, there is still a problem regarding the Assembly of the Republic," whose legitimacy is as valid as that of the president of the republic."

Although he thinks that the results of the parliamentary debate will be predictable in numerical terms, Eanes is of the opinion that, "one cannot presume that the people's representatives will not contribute anything toward making that debate positive and constructive."

Ramalho Eanes declared: "It might be thought that the government is attempting to engage in a kind of exercise of the majority which would concentrate all the powers in the executive branch; however, such a position would not fail to be dangerous to democracy." He added, nevertheless, that he considered it "only an incident along the way," and thought that "the political officials will not abandon good sense, equanimity and respect for the representatives elected by the people."

Democracy Is Not a Dictatorship of the Majority

The election results of 5 October were no surprise to the president.

He said: "On the contrary, I think that they represent the trends detected as early as 1978, and reflect the hopes and expectations that the Portuguese people have been showing during this period."

Hence, in Eanes' opinion, the majority that has now been reinforced represents "another major responsibility for the government."

He said: "It has now become easier to govern; it will be easier to fulfill the hopes and to meet the expectations."

Ramalho Eanes thinks that, "Anyone who has the majority and who exercises it in a responsible way, with a democratic conviction, will always be primarily concerned with preventing radicalizing positions; otherwise, he can hardly expect to govern in peace and security."

He noted: "This is the only explanation for the fact that the Western pluralistic democracies are not considered synonymous with dictatorships of the majority."

Then the president of the republic discussed a third topic: the "serious crisis situation that is developing internationally."

He said: "The situation in the Middle East will not have consequences in the area of energy alone. Its effects will be considerably more far-reaching than those we experienced after the crisis of 1973, possibly causing extremely serious situations."

These consequences will assume particular importance in a small country like Portugal, not only because of the meagerness of our economic resources, but also because

our geographical position makes us "essentially vulnerable, in the event of an exacerbation in the conflicts."

The president continued: "With this disturbing situation, I cannot fail to stress the contribution made to the hope for the maintenance of peace and to Europe's capacity for affirmation by the reelection of Chancellor Schmidt in the Federal Republic of Germany."

In Eanes' opinion, only understanding, tolerance and political consensus will enable Portugal "to respond to the economic and political crisis, and to spare us violent situations which exist in many European countries."

'In 1977 and 1978 I Refused To Head a Rightwing Bloc'

Constantly stressing the need for consensus and an attempt at rapprochement among the central forces of Portuguese society, Ramalho Eanes revealed that, in 1977 and 1978, he had refused "the offer made to me to head a political bloc comprised of forces located in the rightwing;" just as, in 1978 and 1979, "I did not nurture the desires of those who wanted to launch a presidentialist movement."

The president of the republic said: "I did not do so because I doubted the electoral success of those initiatives," and then cited the reasons for his position:

"I refused, with the certainty of giving up, deliberately, and out of conviction, an opportunity to win political power. I refused because, in my view, such a situation would limit the conditions for the defense, development and progress of my country. I refused because those attempts would evade any truly democratic control."

In concluding, the president said: "Consistent with what I have always upheld, I cannot agree with the political objective of those who seek a total concentration of powers, eliminating the indispensable independence among the various organs of sovereignty."

A Central Bloc Without PCP

In Ramalho Eanes' opinion, the establishment of a central political bloc is the best way of consolidating democracy and of meeting the expectations for the country's development.

He claimed that such a bloc is "fundamental in a time of crisis" and, as he had said before, "we shall undergo a time of crisis." Without specifying the political forces that should comprise this bloc, the president of the republic excluded from it only the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] as an intervening element, because its doctrine is not aligned with the basic principles of a solution that would include, among other things, an incentive for private enterprise, Portugal's entry into EEC and the payment of indemnification for assets that are nationalized or expropriated.

Eanes noted: "The PC would not fit into this central bloc, but it must be treated as a force which represents a part of the Portuguese people."

Declaring that he, of course, has "nothing to do with the PC, whether it be Eurocommunist, Stalinist or Leninist," Ramalho Eanes repudiated the criticism that has been directed at him because of the fact that he made remarks allegedly praising the Communist Party, and for having included communists in governments of presidential initiative.

"I do not have a file enabling me to find out who the Portuguese Communists are (nor do I want one); but I would like them to tell, for the enlightenment of the Portuguese people, who those elements are in the governments of presidential initiative."

Ramalho Eanes also rejected the connections with the FRS [Republican Socialist Front] and the Socialist party, giving a reminder that, if he were "the president of the PS [Socialist Party]" he would never have dismissed Mario Soares, nor would he have refused to form a PS-ASDI [Independent Social Democratic Association] government in 1979.

Furthermore, he considered the use of his name in the last election campaign to have been abusive to some extent, disclosing that he had even requested the chief of his civil household to contact the political force in question, repudiating the identification that was being made.

When asked to reveal whether he intended to dismiss the present government, in view of its refusal to submit a resignation, the president of the republic declared that he would not do so, despite the fact that he was shocked by the attitude of the executive branch. Nevertheless, this does not represent "a backing down from the government," as the reporter hinted.

He declared: "The relations between the PR [president of the republic] and the government are not marked by confrontation."

As president of the republic, and not a candidate for reelection, Ramalho Eanes did not attempt to evade answering questions related to the presidential elections in some degree. With regard to the support, although concealed, that his second candidacy appears to be receiving from the MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/ Democratic Electoral Commission], Eanes stated:

"When I accepted the backing of political personages and parties, I established as a condition that they be associated with the principle of political democracy, and that they accept the terms of the program that I consider essential. Therefore, I was in a position to refuse the support of partisan groups."

The president nevertheless added that, in the presidential elections, "the citizens are called upon to cast a personal vote, not one in a party."

Eanes remarked: "When the campaign begins, the electorate is comprised of Portuguese people, and not members of political parties." He also said that he was not interested in backing from the PC, but that he did not consider the Portuguese people to be "divided into two categories."

With respect to the constitutional revision, Eanes said that, if the proposals for revision took the regime into consideration, it would be possible to reach a consensus of the democratic parties. On the other hand, he rejected the charges that

he had systematically used the "pocket veto," disclosing that he had in his possession only six bills for promulgation, and that three of them would be promulgated shortly, and, as he understands it, the rest must be assessed by the Assembly of the Republic, because they relate to critical matters such as those of national defense.

The president also announced that there is a report on Timor, which he deemed it preferable not to publicize, because it might cause problems in the Armed Forces; but that it is at the disposal of the government, and if the Assembly of the Republic agrees, its future publication will not be opposed.

Excerpts of Controversial Statements

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 17-23 Oct 80 p 4

[Text] "Unlike many political commentators, I do not find any cause for surprise in these results; on the contrary, I think that they relate to the trends that were detected as early as 1978, and reflect the hopes and expectations that the Portuguese people have been showing during this period."

"I think that these results, provided their social origins and political implications are understood, could have an effect of stabilization and clarification of positions."

"In my view, the relations between the government and the president are not relations marked by confrontation."

"As for the offer that was made to me to head a political bloc comprised of forces located in the right wing in 1978 and 1979, when I did not nurture the desires of whose who wanted to launch a presidentialist movement, I did not do so because I doubted the electoral success of those initiatives. I refused, with the certainty of giving up, deliberately, and out of conviction, an opportunity to win political power."

"As for the relations between me and the Communist Party, the matter seems to me to be sufficiently clarified: since I have always said that I have no connection with the concepts, methods or objectives of the Communist Party."

"Hence, there is absolutely nothing between the Communist Party and me personally; I uphold models, plans and objectives which run counter to those upheld by the Communist Party."

"Also with regard to the Communist Party, I would like to say that I was never attracted by the Communist Party, I was never a member of the Communist Party, and my dissociation is complete, whether it be Eurocommunist, Leninist or Stalinist; therefore, I am not interested in support from the Communist Party."

"The president of the republic has a particular action: I do not believe that my program is geared to the programs of the opposition to even a minimal extent."

"I do not believe that my actions throughout these past 4 years show that there is an identification in my program with the opposition or any part of the opposition."

"As for my actions, I must say that, as you will recall, in 1978 I dismissed the secretary general of the Socialist Party from the position of head of the government, and that in 1979 I did not allow the PS and ASDI to establish a government. This shows that there has not actually been any identification between my actions and the opposition's programs."

"The using of the president in an obvious manner by certain forces prompted me, at the time, to immediately request the chief of the civil household to contact those forces and tell them that I had a very bad opinion of that use which was being made."

"I am not ashamed to say that the dismissal of Dr Mario Soares was marked by inflexibility, what I would call a reflection of military harshness, which should not really exist in politics. Therefore, I take the blame for, and acknowledge that mistake."

"I can say that there is not and never has been an identification of program between the president of the Republic and FRS, and there has never been any coincidence between the actions of the president of the republic and the Front; therefore, the election results cannot be interpreted as a defeat for the president."

"Dr Mario Soares is correct: I actually allowed those right wing forces to really come to power (because other forces were not entitled to)."

"I would like to begin by saying the following: Are there between the president of the republic and the majority irremediable contradictions and differences in the realm of principles? I say that there are not; there are not because the political concepts and the model of society are quite similar. I would say that they are identical."

"And there are no differences even on fundamental issues that I have already mentioned. Hence, there are no differences in the realm of principles."

"I believe that 25 November will be exhumed; and I say that it will be exhumed, and should be as quickly and exhaustively as possible, so that people will know what it was, and what it was intended to be. I hope that there will soon be an opportunity for this matter to be finally explained."

"The document of the 'nine' was an instrument for tactical action which all the democratic forces perceived at the time, and which had this twofold purpose: first, to demarcate an area; and second, to prevent spurious alliances between forces located in the democratic area and forces which upheld vanguard-type theories for the conquest of power."

"I actually received word that there were some changes among the heads of the nationalized news media. But I do not wish to think that those individuals were replaced only because they were inclined in one direction or another; it is not a concept of society, but a position assumed to solve the problems confronting the society, and hence the development plan."

"I know that the issue of the referendum has been brought up here. After all, that issue is an important one, which I expect to return to soon, under different circumstances, when I shall speak quite clearly about my views concerning it."

AD, UDP Reaction

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 17-23 Oct 80 p 4

[Statements by Julio Castro Caldas (AD deputy and parliamentary group leader) and Jose Aicobia (UDP) on Eanes' press conference; date not specified]

[Text] The press conference granted by Gen Ramalho Eanes to Portuguese and foreign newsmen evoked the widest variety of reactions among the leading political and partisan forces. O JORNAL attempted to obtain statements from personages representing those same forces, but this proved impossible for us in the case of the PS, probably because the Socialists may not want to express any critical views before the joint meeting of the Secretariat and the Directors Commission and, therefore, before the issuance of the communique that will summarize their conclusions. The PCP's position, also, was conveyed to us only in the form of a communique issued by the respective news services, to which we shall refer elsewhere. Herewith, we record the statements made by Julio Castro Caldas, deputy elected by AD [Democratic Alliance] and head of the PSD's [Social Democratic Party] parliamentary group, and by Jose Aicobia, of UDP [Popular Democratic Union].

Julio Castro Caldas (AD): A Clearly Defensive Leaning

The press conference held by Gen Ramalho Eanes lacked "punch," that is, a minimally positive impact. It seemed to be an initiative with a clearly defensive leaning, and, with this aspect, an address by a losing candidate, something which of course is not in his plans.

I also consider the meeting with the news media and, by extension, with the audience to which it was addressed, to be improper. It confused the president of the republic with the candidate for the presidential elections. In everything that he said, he did not explain his position on the political chessboard, and he did not succeed in conveying an image other than one marked by ambiguity and contradiction. Ramalho Eanes is suffering the consequences of the blatant tactical error of having assumed his candidacy before the legislative elections, allowing himself to be a willing tool of the Republican Socialist Front. If he had postponed his availability for the candidacy until now, his chances for success would have been different.

Gen Ramalho Eanes made another no less serious political mistake in analysis, by underestimating the fact that, under democracy, it will be the political parties which lead the election campaigns, even when it is a matter of electing a president of the republic by direct suffrage. It is a serious error to think that democratic electoral dynamics can exist in default of the political parties. When he insists on such reasoning, he is not only making an incorrect diagnosis of the correlation of political forces, but also deliberately dissociating himself from one of the essential bases of political democracy. I think that therein lies one of the main reasons for the lack of success of his candidacy. As for the image that he certainly would like to have conveyed, it too was limited and really compromised when he held a press conference such as the one that took place, inside the walls of Belem, denying with an obvious defect of abuse of authority the request for television transmission of the entire interview, under the protection of a presidential prerogative for transmitting messages.

Gen Ramalho Eanes ended up objectively incompatible with the Republican Socialist Front itself, his only declared backer.

Politics is the art of potential compatibility. After this press conference, Gen Ramalho Eanes was politically incompatible with all the political forces.

At the end, when I left the television, I had the image of a child playing checkers with his father who, when he realizes that he is going to lose the game, tries to play with his adversary's checkers.

In short, there have been accumulated mistakes attesting to the ineptitude of the one who has ended up assuming hegemony of the political council at Belem Palace....

Jose Alcobia (UDP): It Does Not Serve the Workers

The remarks made by General Eanes at the press conference confirm entirely the views that UDP has expressed concerning his political personality. It was learned, from the mouth of the general himself, that he was the one heading the reactionary coup of 25 November, and the one who opened the door for the right in Portugal. It was also learned, as UDP has constantly stated, that General Eanes upholds a policy plan which is quite similar to, if not identical to that of AD.

This being the case, General Eanes' candidacy in the forthcoming elections is not a democratic alternative to the candidacy of Soares Carneiro; and, therefore, it is the proper time to run an authentic 25 April candidate, who will express the democratic sentiments of the Portuguese people. UDP considers as extremely negative the support from certain areas identified with the opposition to AD, especially the leaderships of PS and PCP, a support which, whether overtly or covertly, they are granting to that candidacy. After the comments made by General Eanes, this candidacy does not serve the workers nor the democratic forces.

Communist Criticism

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 17-23 Oct 80 p 48

[Text] The conditions, already difficult per se, surrounding the establishment of the position of the APU [United People's Alliance] parties toward the "presidential elections" were considerably worsened by the statements made by Gen Ramalho Eanes at his press conference. Up until then, there was every indication of a tendency to back the second candidacy of the current president, under conditions and at a time to be decided upon.

According to our sources, the holding of the meeting of the National Secretariat on the part of MDP/CDE (see article on page 9) acted primarily as a "warning" to the PCP that it should not proceed with a markedly partisan candidacy. But, according to the information that we have, the PCP itself began, in many parts of the country, a campaign of meetings held to sound out its members, which were already geared to planning a possible backing for Eanes. The current president is still evoking serious doubts among some of the Communist rank and file, for example, in the district of Beja.

The PCP's Three Options

The three options available to the PCP, which will be analyzed on 25 October, at a national conference to be held for that purpose (see page 9), are the following: 1. to back a candidate of its own, who may or may not give up on the eve of the primary election; 2. not to run any candidate; 3. to back a candidate who would transcend parties, as MDP-CDE advocates.

Meanwhile, a PCP source described the debate currently being held by the PCP to us as being "savage." But it seems evident that the Communists can hardly progress with a very definite candidacy of the type in the 1976 elections. The possibility of Octavio Pato has been excluded, and it is unlikely that another member of the Central Committee will run. In addition to the factors related to the overall political situation, the source adds that such a candidacy would have the effect of discord within APU and a decline in the percentage of the vote in comparison with the legislative elections. Other possibilities, such as Vasco Goncalves or Costa Gomes would not be proposed, simply because the PCP at present appears to be not at all interested in "reviving" 25 November.

The possibility of not assuming a position with regard to the presidential elections also seems highly unlikely, because there is the conviction that a party with the influence of the PCP could not fail to give voting instructions to its members.

The possibility of support, even if reduced, to Eanes brings up the problems stemming not only from the fact of a possible "sticking process" detrimental to the second candidacy of the current president, but also the aforementioned internal difficulties, exacerbated by Eanes' press conference.

Moderate Reaction to Eanes' Statements

It was difficult for the PCP to make a comment on the statements of the president of the republic. A position finally appeared in a communique from the Information and Propaganda Section. It should be noted that, in addition to the usual comment that "the statements of the president of the republic to the effect that there is a need for the democratic framework to be guaranteed and for upholding democratic legality naturally acquire a positive significance," there is a critical tone elsewhere which cannot be overlooked. For example, the PCP, in addition to stating that the assessment of the situation is poorly adapted "to the real seriousness and the grave threats to democracy emerging from the consolidation of the AD parties in the Assembly of the Republic and the government," includes a comment which must be interpreted as critical, although it was made in a circumspect, moderate tone: "On the other hand, the statements of the president of the republic attest to clear, already well-known differences of opinion and divergence between his positions and those of the PCP, specifically, in areas as important as the evaluation of the various political forces and their objectives, and of the political and social forces whose combination is essential to the defense of the system of liberty conquered on 25 April, and the solution to the nation's problems; as well as on the type of society that can best meet the national interests and the aspirations for liberty, social progress, equality and national independence which are shared by the majority of the Portuguese people."

Socialist Reaction

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 17-23 Oct 80 p 48

[Text] The relations between the Socialist Party and Gen Ramalho Eanes, which have commanded the exclusive attention of the Socialist membership and leadership, will certainly be the key topic on the agenda for the meeting of the National Commission (the supreme organ between congresses), which will take place next Saturday. As we closed this edition, another high-level meeting, this one held by the Directors Commission, was under way at the Largo do Rato facilities.

Since Tuesday night (when the press conference of the president of the republic was aired on television) the attention of the Socialist members has been polarized completely on Ramalho Eanes' message, and specifically on the party's position regarding his second candidacy. This is because the speech by the president of the republic caused great displeasure among the PS ranks, a fact which O JORNAL discovered in contacts with representatives of the most varied movements within the party. Socialist circles do not question the need for the candidate for a new term in Belem to be demarcated from the FRS, but they do question the way in which he did it.

We were told by a qualified Socialist leader: "This has already been the subject of talks between ourselves and Belem." Totally unanticipated, however, was Ramalho Eanes' identification with the model of society advocated by the Democratic Alliance. "We were willing to swallow everything else, but that transcended all limits," remarked the same Socialist leader, who described that assertion by Eanes as "unbelievable," while at the same time criticizing Belem for not having notified the PS previously of the content of the statements made by the president of the republic.

Ramalho Eanes' statements fell like a bucket of cold water on the PS, particularly among those who had fought most actively for the party's backing for his second candidacy. This was evident at the meeting of the national secretariat, held on Wednesday afternoon, at which the problem was the subject of a first discussion. In the evening, at the Vasco Santana Theater, there was visible apprehension among the rank and file and the leaders who gathered to hear Vitor Constancio, Lopes Cardoso and Antonio Rebelo de Sousa (who replaced Sousa Franco) discuss the FRS plan, as opposed to that of AD. The disillusionment was so great that one deputy from Lisbon, a sincere advocate of the Eanes solution, admitted to O JORNAL that he was "more dejected by this 'blow' than by the results of the legislative elections themselves."

Additional Explanations

According to what O JORNAL managed to learn, the PS secretariat decided to ask the candidate Ramalho Eanes for "additional public explanations" of the content of his statements at the press conference. The party's final position on the president's speech and on the elections for Belem will be made at the meeting of the National Commission, based on the aforementioned explanations, which were surely discussed at the luncheon yesterday attended by Ramalho Eanes and Mario Soares, at Belem Palace. Last night, the Directors Commission must have discussed the same subject.

The PS will not assume any position regarding Eanes' remarks until Saturday, which explains the party's silence in the supplement aired by the televised news program on Wednesay night, and the way in which Vitor Constancio skillfully evaded the subject at the aforementioned session at the Vasco Santana Threater (in response to a question from Rosa Rainho, head of the Socialist Women's organization, and associated with the "historicals").

Hence, the attention is directed toward the meeting of the National Commission. Whereas, before the Eanes press conference, a calm meeting was anticipated ("we are all needed in a situation as difficult for democracy as this one that we are experiencing," we were told on Monday by a prominent leader affiliated with the "historicals"), the same thing does not hold true now. It is true that the "additional explanations", if they are given, will certainly have a decisive effect on the course of the meeting. But this does not preclude the willingness that appears to exist among the sectors most critical of the backing for Eanes' second candidacy to adopt any proposal, the success of which would be to some extent facilitated in view of the disillusionment that exists among those who fought hardest for that solution ("I shall not raise my voice again on Eanes' behalf," blurted a member of the secretariat who was among those most prominent in the defense of his candidacy, to O JORNAL).

A member of the Directors Commission, known as an "Eanist," when speaking to O JORNAL, in turn even upheld the view that, "we cannot preclude the possibility of selecting another candidate for the presidential elections." The secretariat itself admitted this possibility, even as a mere theoretical hypothesis, in which case everything would indicate a civilian personage from the socialist area, but one capable of gathering support from other political sectors. Even if backing is not withdrawn from Eanes (a more likely hypothesis), the party's mobilization for the tasks of the election campaign appears difficult.

Formal Resignation of the Secretariat?

Hence, the presidential elections have relegated to secondary status the analysis of the election results of 5 October. In this regard, the discussion, at best, may be concentrated on the current secretariat, inasmuch as it does not appear equipped to dispute the organization of the campaign (wherein there is virtually unanimity on the quality of the work accomplished, especially in comparison with the interim elections), much less the establishment of the Republican Socialist Front, whose coordinating commission is still meeting regularly, attempting to channel the dynamics created by the campaign. Confirming the news published first by O JORNAL, the secretariat will put its premises at the disposal of the National Commission; and well informed Socialist sources admit that it will be automatically reinstated at least until December, without any substitutions.

UEDS Meets Saturday

The presidential elections are also the main topic at the meeting of the UEDS [Leftist Union for Socialist Democracy] board of directors. Sources close to that party admit that the possibility of UEDS' backing Ramalho Eanes' candidacy is quite likely. However, that prospect has been changed by statements recently made by the president

of the republic which, in the view expressed by Lopes Cardoso at the meeting in the Vasco Santana Theater, "are contradictory to the statements made about 2 months ago."

According to Lopes Cardoso, "We must ascertain the extent to which Eanes' statements at the press conference reflect his true thinking."

Analysis of Eanes' Comments

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 17-23 Oct 80 p 8

[Article by Jose Ribeiro e Castro, CDS vice president and assistant secretary of state to the vice prime minister: "Eanes Is Defeated"]

[Text] The recent press conference of the president of the republic and candidate, Ramalho Eanes, is an obvious sign that he has lost, and it could be described as a disastrous address, although it may possibly have produced some fleeting illusions which time will destroy. Essentially, Eanes attempted to win votes from AD, in which he will obviously not win them. And he certainly lost votes from FRS and other leftist votes that he might have had. In other words, on 5 October Eanes had 28 percent; now, he doesn't even have that.

A speech replete with contradictions, ambiguity, frightening admissions, overdue demarcations and unclear assertions, it was a speech which, in fact, can only bring Eanes two certainties: that he won nothing by it, and second, that he will lose a great deal because of it.

I. Some Strange Aspects

1. Eanes stated that now that there was a parliamentary majority, he could speak freely, because previously his remarks "could have interfered with the efforts to resolve crises or to maintain the stability of the institutions." This is the most frightening of all possible admissions of failure: the admission that his very remarks alone could be upsetting and cause instability; the admission that Eanes was incapable of a moderating speech; the admission that the presidential majority did not serve any purpose, and that the country must wait for the AD majority to resolve the crisis and find stability; the admission that AD is the solution and Eanes is the interfering factor.

2. Eanes also said that he rejected certain proposals, not because he doubted their success, but "because of the certainty of giving up, deliberately and with a conviction of an opportunity to win political power." A strange statement. What can be thought of a man who has been president of the republic for the past 4 years, elected by a 62 percent majority, and who thinks that he does not have political power? What conviction has a candidate (theoretically for winning political power) who thinks that he himself has the conviction that political power is for giving up?

3. Eanes was pleased to stress that he "was for several years the only political official on the national level who could claim a majority." It is true! And therein lies the reason for his failure. With a majority, and the only one who had it, the country did not benefit at all from that: it must wait, as Eanes admits, for the AD majority. It is for that very reason that the AD majority is critical and the Eanes majority is useless.

4. The Gospel claims that Peter denied the Lord three times. Eanes denied, not three times, but four, Mario Soares and the PS/ASDI government. After all that the country has witnessed, morally and politically it is a position that cannot be commented on.

5. Eanes said that he had no identification of program with FRS, and that he has no connection with the opposition's programs. Eanes ran a second time as a candidate "at the request of a group of personages," and responding affirmatively to a speech by Prof Henrique de Barros. Isn't Henrique de Barros a member of the opposition? And are not Mario Soares, Sousa Franco and Pintasilgo, who were also there, members of FRS? Aren't they in the opposition? What logic and what truth does Eanes have in running again as a candidate at the request of the opposition, saying yes to the opposition, and now claiming that he has no connection with it?

6. Eanes said that he was identified with the AD plan and with its model of society. Only he failed to say that the government governed well and that, on 5 October, it voted for AD. Only he failed to explain that Mario Soares, Sousa Franco, Henrique de Barros, Salgado Zenha, Tengarrinha and Pireira Santos, who back (or did back) Eanes also voted for AD on 5 October. Only he failed also to guarantee that the sure vote on 7 December will be for Soares Carneiro. But who has forgotten that, at the time when AD was formed, in 1979, the president of the republic, clearly assuming the opposition to AD, publicly declared that what he had always wanted, what was always his heart's desire, was a PS/PSD accord? And who has forgotten, also, the constant guerrilla war against the government of the Democratic Alliance?

7. Someone asked Eanes what he thought of the referendum and Article 290 of the Constitution, which perpetually attempts to bind us to a Marxist constraint. And, although this may be the most important national issue in the future, because it involves the constitutional revision, Eanes did not answer, either yes or no. This was the true image of himself, the image of ambiguity, the image of lack of decision.

2. What APU Is Doing

Eanes' political statement, marked by what the PC would term "assimilation of the logic of discrimination and persecution of Communists," in the summary in DIARIO DE LISBOA entitled "Much November and Little April," was understandably unacceptable to the PC, at least on the official level.

But, strangely enough, Eanes may have given an outlet to APU, with the unfortunate habit that has typified his term in office, of opening doors to the Communists even though he may not have meant to.

In fact, after the elections of 5 October, APU was out of the question insofar as the government was concerned, and was the first to realize it. For APU, the really important question for itself is that of the leadership of the left. APU knows that AD is the government, and that what matters to it primarily is to assert its leadership in the opposition to the AD government.

Defeated on 5 October, APU found its desire for leadership seriously threatened. Moreover, if the left should mobilize behind Eanes' second candidacy, APU could not reorganize itself nor recover the debilitated leadership.

But, the day before yesterday, Eanes may have reversed the facts of the matter. Eanes' speech was especially distasteful to Mario Soares and FRS. FRS was in serious difficulty backing Eanes actively, and is also in difficulty now, withdrawing support from him. In other words, FRS is embarrassed and in a bind, and APU is the first to notice it.

Therefore, the PC, which has not chosen a candidate yet, obtained an opportunity the day before yesterday that it did not have: that of going ahead, in view of the inevitable embarrassment of FRS, and selecting a civilian candidate with a "profile of leftist unity," and hence with a capacity to win all the votes of APU, the votes of UEDS and the other votes of FRS which, after the day before yesterday, will be mixed and will no longer go to Eanes.

It is important to the PC to recover the leadership of the left. And it is obvious that, if the candidate who was to run at the initiative of APU receives more votes in December than the APU won in October, PC will retrieve that leadership, and pull itself together again after the awkwardness in October.

With his remarks the day before yesterday,Eanes afforded that opportunity precisely.

3. What FRS Is Doing

FRS must be embarrassed, embarrassed. It was the charge of improper utilization of Eanes' image. It was the rejection of identification in the program. It was the offense, repeated four times, against Dr Mario Soares, recalling four times that he dismissed him. It was also the repetition, four times, of the rejection of a PS/ASDI government. It was the shocking statement that, insofar as a model of society is concerned, AD is what it is. It was the total demarcation from, and even hostility toward FRS.

Sousa Franco must have been annoyed (this was not the first trick that Ramalho Eanes has played on him). Mario Soares must be perplexed (this is the second time that he has been "dismissed" by Ramalho Eanes). The theoreticians of Eanism within PS must be dumbfounded and worried about justifying themselves. Lopes Cardoso can only repeat to all of them: "Didn't I tell you? Didn't I warn you?"

A minimal amount of dignity would undoubtedly have prompted FRS to respond, to reconsider its position and to retort; and possibly to act ahead of APU, submitting a civilian candidate of the left.

If Eanes does not like Mario Soares, FRS, the opposition's plans or PS/ASDI, how can they back him?

Continuing to support Eanes is an indignity, a contradiction; it means choosing the AD's model of society which Eanes claims to prefer. But, on the other hand, withdrawing support from him now, and launching another candidate (Mario Soares himself, perhaps), is difficult and complicated.

In its embarrassment, it is quite understandable that FRS would hesitate. But hesitating also means giving APU too much time to progress with a proposal and to drain FRS from below.

What will FRS do: "dismiss" Eanes, as Eanes "dismissed" it, or impassively accept him, without a minimum of dignity? What will FRS prefer: to discharge Mario Soares and the Front itself, or to humiliate the Front and Mario Soares with Eanes?

This is unquestionably the main question now, after the speech the day before yesterday. And whatever the final position is, there is no doubt that the torment among those who launched Eanes' second candidacy and who now do not know whether they will continue to support him will be intense.

4. What AD Is Doing

Of all the leading political forces, AD is the only calm one, the only one that is acknowledged to be victorious, and the only one that knows exactly what it is going to do: continue its term in office and vote for Soares Carneiro; and now with even more assurance and confidence.

First of all, because Eanes (for a long time the main backer of the opposition in the country) acknowledged AD's victory the day before yesterday. And he acknowledged it in total terms. He admitted that the AD majority (and not Eanes' majority) was critical for resolving the crisis and stabilizing the institutions. He admitted that the AD's plan of society was the best. And he admitted that AD is a basic force in Portuguese society, relating to the "trends detected as early as 1978."

Secondly, because Eanes, although he likes AD now, knows for certain that AD does not like him. Eanes is doomed to be a "convergence of desertions." The day before yesterday, FRS and APU deserted; and, as for AD, it was AD which left him a long time ago.

Essentially, Ramalho Eanes, although seeking votes and sympathy in AD areas, actually illustrated all the reasons that AD will not vote for Eanes, and why it has always claimed it necessary to replace the president of the republic.

First: the chronic ambiguity. And that trait was obvious, both in the lack of response to the question about the referendum and Article 290 of the Constitution, and in the ridiculous circumstance of being backed by FRS, while having no connection with the latter.

Second: the lack of sincerity and dignity in the political contracts. What Eanes did to Mario Soares and FRS the day before yesterday he has done throughout his term to all those who backed him in 1976: PSD, CDS and PS. PSD and CDS learned the first time; **this** is why AD does not want to repeat the mistake. PS still wants to try again, but it is likely that it has learned the second time...

Third: the disregard for his own power. This was reflected in the frightening admission of the political uselessness of his majority, and in the strange view that, after having been elected, he was still engaged in winning political power, but that he "would give up out of conviction." To AD, a president of the republic is supposed to be such himself, knowing that he is, and not fail to be such.

Fourth: the concept of the president as a "counterpower." Hence the erroneous and dangerous conviction that the head of state should not be a factor for consistency,

cohesiveness and efficiency in the institutions, but, on the contrary, a detrimental proliferator of the contradictions, and hence an upsetting element and an inevitable producer of instability.

Fifth: the undemocratic theory of the anonymous vote, the vote without an owner; the theory which, in the end, allowed Eanes to abandon, one by one, all those who backed him and had hope in him... the theory whereby the votes belong to the one who is elected, and are not a commitment to the desires of the one who elected; the theory which is the negation of the democratic mandate; the theory which enabled him, even the day before yesterday, to abandon those who launched his second candidacy; the theory which, just as in the past, prompted him to disregard the desire of those who voted for him, with an air of abandonment.

For all these reasons, Ramalho Eanes is useless. And for all these reasons, AD, a victorious force, an essential force in Portuguese society, with a proper plan of society according to Ramalho Eanes himself, will fulfill its goal to replace the president of the republic.

The state, particularly the democratic state, demands clearness, visibility and sincerity in the political contract which is its foundation. It also demands cohesiveness, solidarity and efficiency. The country has all these things with AD and Soares Carneiro; everything that it does not have with Ramalho Eanes, as he himself showed and admitted to some extent, and FRS itself will have to meditate on today with a certain amount of bitterness.

In fact, Ramalho Eanes defeated himself at his press conference. He lost what he could have had, and he failed to win what he wanted to win.

To some extent, he confined himself, rather naively, to appealing to AD to abandon Soares Carneiro. But Eanes cannot forget that the logic which prompts AD members to challenge Eanes for abandoning those who back him and to choose another candidate is the same logic which prompts all AD members never to abandon their candidate: Soares Carneiro. And that logic is, after all, very simple: the logic of sincerity, clearness, and uprightness in the democratic political contract.

Analysis of Eanes' Strategy

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 17-23 Oct 80 p 3

[Article by Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos: "A Speech Which Missed the Targets"]

[Text]

When, over 4 years after occupying the position of president of the republic, Gen Ramalho Eanes held the second press conference of his term in office, and when he did so just a few days after the AD's electoral victory, and the dividends that the government coalition attempted to accrue from it for purposes of the presidential election, the least that could have been expected was that Eanes would be quite clear, incisive or even cutting, if not forcible, regarding the essential issues.

It was also to be expected that Eanes would lend the "tone" of what his campaign would be like, without ever abandoning the trappings of president, and that his

direct, clearcut remarks would be part of a well delineated and defined strategy for it.

In the end, none of this happened. Prominent in his remarks were only his two natural objectives, which were also assured and fundamental: that of a vehement reaffirmation of his opposition to the PC, and its plan; and that of his definite demarcation with respect to the FRS. However, Eanes attempted to attain them in the worst, most unfortunate, not to mention disastrous way. And, with a fear of dying from the disease, he risks dying from (an excess of) the remedy....

7.

Let us go back.

Eanes should have been clearcut, with an address, and subsequent responses, that were carefully prepared, with an individualized definition of his own position with regard to AD, the government and the other political forces, so that no doubts of any kind would be left; and, instead of this, he was ambiguous, if not contradictory, in several respects.

Eanes should have been direct, though moderate and calm; and, instead of this, he was little more than allusive, not answering certain questions, or attacking them merely in an oblique manner, if not confining himself to dodging them.

Eanes should have been affirmative, speaking from a position of strength more moral than institutional, which is, or should be his, and which could only bring him advantages, albeit electoral advantages; and he was, rather, only explaining and justifying.

In certain respects, Eanes should have retorted to his adversaries (or enemies), counterattacking without offending (and at all times retaining loftiness in his remarks and method, thus distinguishing himself from them), and he should have been firm, without being harsh; but, instead of this, he was almost completely defensive.

Eanes should have played with his own rules, specifically, making an objective assessment of the real services that he has rendered to democracy and the country, which are of themselves alone the most eloquent retort to certain accusations made of him; and, instead of this, he allowed himself to be brought down on certain points that his adversaries (or enemies) are attempting to foist on him, thereby demonstrating a lack of organized strategy with clearly determined goals and targets; something which may also mean a lack of a capable political commission for his candidacy.

8.

This is as surprising as it is true that, on this occasion, the message from the president of the republic showed him to be far below his real capacity and the best of his thinking, as expressed, for example, at his conference held at the Journalists Union Press Club.

We might say that, with this speech of his, Ramalho Eanes repeated, at a more serious time, with greater responsibilities and hence perhaps with worse consequences, his first big political mistake as president of the republic, which was the speech of

25 April 1977, one which, if I may be allowed the immodesty of recalling, I was the first but not the only one among all those who backed him and held a rather prominent place in his 1976 candidacy to criticize.

As on that occasion, Ramalho Eanes has now made some very correct statements; hence many who are not politicized view his speech, overall, as being positive. However, he made some assertions which were per se unfortunate, if not disastrous, or which were such because of the emphasis with which he repeated them, and they were based on an erroneous approach to the situation.

It was more or less public knowledge that, in his address of 25 April 1977 (with which many associated the beginning of the end of the Socialist government), Eanes had as advisers personages who were to be among the most enthusiastic promoters of Soares Carneiro's candidacy, and who now serve on his political commission (rather, with one exception, and we do not know whether it contributed to his new mishap). In the end, the president has not yet learned certain things as mistakes made previously, nor gained a better understanding of individuals and politicians which we thought he had finally been taught.

4.

Returning to the matter of strategy, or merely tactics, for what is most directly related to the forthcoming presidential elections, Eanes' speech seems to have been based on just one notion: to win new votes from the right among the AD electorate; surely based on the principle that the present head of state needs those votes in order to remain in Belem. Now this seems completely erroneous to me, in its simplistic, crude features, mainly (and excluding matters of consistency and even political loyalty which cannot be overlooked) because:

a. The problem posed is not so much, or not only, that of winning new voters from among those who voted for AD in the legislative elections, but rather that of not losing votes among those who did not vote for AD, opposing it and Soares Carneiro even more;

b. This problem is very serious, not so much because it could lead to a transfer of votes to the general of the commands, which is clearly out of the question, or a transfer of them to other possible candidates (especially someone whom APU has now gained leeway to run); but chiefly because of a vast and perhaps irremediable increase in abstentions in the runoff elections;

c. We might add that Eanes cannot forget, although it may not be criticial, which are the only sectors wherein his candidacy can find militancy and organization, throughout the entire country, to carry out his campaign;

d. Essentially, Eanes is already assured (unless this campaign is a total failure and he now loses what he gained in 4 years) part of the AD electorate; and it is not with comments such as those made at his press conference, in the part that we criticized, that Eanes will win new backing from those sectors. It would be because of his unquestionable political and ideological stance that has been constant, especially since 25 November and throughout his term in office, and because of the balanced, sensible and farsighted way in which he has done his job in several respects:

e. In addition to this, Eanes' image of sincerity and intregity (which are indisputable), distinguishing him from the vast majority of politicians, as well as his proven independence from the parties, are decisive factors for popularity and prestige that he has among the most variegated sectors, including the conservatives;

f. The image, profile and past of Soares Carneiro obviously favor a vote for Ramalho Eanes among those who clearly want decmoracy and reject extremism or radicalism which, regardless of how much the AD candidate claims the contrary, appear to be associated with his image;

g. Finally, and this is essential, if the AD victory was largely a victory for the government, as we wrote in an editorial, in the presidential elections the government is Eanes, and that is a big trump for him.

).

Space does not allow us to analyze in detail the entire press conference on which we have been reporting. Thus, to add to what was said previously, we need only now emphasize that what was particularly negative were the answers in which Ramalho Eanes appeared to be identifying himself to some extent with the "model of society" upheld by AD; the harsh manner in which he not only demarcated himself from FRS, as may have been necessary, but also exceeded that sole objective to some degree; and the excessive stress placed and time spent on the reaffirmation of what is obvious: Eanes has no connection with PCP and its plan, and is and was opposed to them, as few or no others have been, when it was necessary, on 25 November 1975.

It may be said, as it is in law, that "quod abundat non nocet" [what is abundant does no harm]. But that is not so. Apart from other basic reasons, when one insists too much on denying what is obviously false, one can even give the impression that there is, after all, some amount of truth in the lies and slander that are being spread.

Moreover, on this point it is very easy to demonstrate how this type of method is exactly the same as what fascism and its criminal political police used to attack the democrats in all areas; as they attacked their candidates for the presidency, despite the fact that they, too, obviously had no connection with the PC, from Norton de Matos to Humberto Delgado, because they had the backing or votes of Communists.

Returning to an important point: Eanes appeared (and in politics, what appears to be is, Salazar was not deceived about that) to be trying to stick to those who attack him, and to antagonize those who support him, or who at least are not opposed to him. Thus, Eanes apparently appeared as a candidate of the right, although with backing from the left, instead of showing himself clearly and entirely to be the guarantor (and future candidate) of the democratic regime who, with that status, should have the backing and receive the votes of whose who uphold that regime.

This manner of speaking on the part of Eanes, in addition to evoking the criticism that I made previously, may even afford AD, contrary to what its potential strategists may have thought, a kind of dismantling of his remarks and attacks such as those found in the Ribeiro e Castro article that we have published on another page

of this same edition which, although I obviously do not in any way agree with their content, should be recognized as being an intelligent and highly revealing text....

6.

However, if this text of Riberto e Castro is revealing, it is not just in one sense, but in a twofold sense. And the second sense is that AD still greatly fears the candidacy of Gen Ramalho Eanes, although it denies this; and it would be greatly encouraged and gratified if FRS would back another one, as it has constantly advised it to do, and may even try to do again now....

A week ago, I wrote here in an editorial that, while I did not consider either the victory of Soares Carneiro (his defeat would be certain if AD had not had the success that it did have in the legislative elections) or that of Ramalho Eanes to be certain, I though that the latter was still in a better position in the race for Belem; and that what happened from then on,especially in the area of the campaign, would be critical.

Today, I think that a press conference which should have been essential to Eanes and his future reelection, apart from any possible appearances right now, ended up being unfavorable for him. And, from now on, both will be on an equal footing in that race.

However, I think that, for the "arrival," Eanes is still in a better position, if it is the last, at least the last serious mistake that he makes; and if he makes use of this lesson to immediately put into a operation a political machine in a serious manner, and devises an effective strategy and campaign.

We have no doubt that Eanes says things which exceed his intentions, the seriousness of which is out of the question, and that he has not explained well other things that he wished to say. Eanes is the candidate of consensus, tolerance and dialog. As we have always maintained here, Eanes cannot be the candidate of the right against the left, nor the candidate of the left against the right, much less a mixture, a candidate of the right with votes from the left, or a candidate of the left , only seeking votes from the right, with the spurious illusion that the others will never escape him...

I insist, Eanes must only be the candidate of the democratic regime, the guarantor of constitutional legality (without any hesitation, ambiguity or retrogression, particularly with respect to matters such as the referendum), the president who, at Belem, gave assurance that 25 April, restored on 25 November, would be fulfilled to the end.

And he does not need much to achieve that. I would even say that it would suffice if he would remain entirely faithful to the essence of his leadership during 4 years as president of the republic; and that it would suffice if he were, under all circumstances, the same as, or better than himself.

P.S. This text was written before the answers that the president of the republic gave to the questions that we asked him for O JORNAL, answers that are printed on

page 7 of this edition. Owing to the absolute impossibility of doing otherwise, the text has been published without any changes which the content of those answers may perhaps have warranted.

Eanes Clarifies Statements

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 17-23 Oct 80 p 2

[Interview with President Ramalho Eanes; date and place not given]

[Text] "I advocate the establishment of a central bloc which, to me, has always been the result of an understanding between social democracy and democratic socialism," declared Ramalho Eanes in a brief but important exclusive interview with O JORNAL.

The president of the republic clarified some controversial aspects of his statements at the press conference last Tuesday, which evoked much commentary among various political sectors and in national public opinion. "They will never cause me to take the paths leading to dictatorship, invoking the specter of the communist threat," stated Gen Ramalho Eanes at another juncture. The different interpretations which certain portions of his remarks at this press conference (the second during his term in office) produced make this interview a political document of major interest at the present time.

O JORNAL: At the press conference which you held, you said, specifically, that "the models of society advocated by the majority and by the PR are the same." Since it is certain, on the one hand, that observers do not discern exactly what model of society the majority as a whole advocates, and that others even identify such a model with a certain amount of retrogression, with retrogression to the past in the realm of economic authority, and since it is also certain, on the other hand, that the opposition forces, namely, PRS, backing your second candidacy are calling for a diverse model of society and social change, to what model of society were you referring, Mr President, when you made that comment? And, whatever it may be, why relate it to what the AD majority perhaps advocates, and not define it and defend it autonomously?

President of the Republic: It is interesting and symptomatic that my response at the press conference aroused so much comment. All this proves that there is too much equivocation in Portuguese political activity. Let us make it clear: Models of society are concepts of a general orientation of the society, and not government programs. Hence, the doubt amazes me, because assertions made repeatedly throughout recent years should have made the interpretation that I have of a democratic model of society clear. Moreover, the answer that evoked doubts, provided that it is read in the context in which it was given, should become clear as well.

Throughout the address, I advocated the establishment of a central bloc which, as you know, to me has always been the result of an understanding between social democracy and democratic socialism.

When I mentioned an identification between the AD's model of society and my own, my statement could not fail to apply only to what is the fundamental source of all

pluralistic democratic regimes: political democracy. It is obvious that I thought, and still think that this is also the source of the FRS' democratic model; in other words, democracy that is assumed in its entirety, social justice, constant cooperation between private industry and public industry (in the economy, in education, in health and in many other areas), recognition of the plurality of interests in the society, respect for the opposition as an essential source of alternation, and constant defense of negotiated solutions for all conflicts.

A completely different matter is the identification with methods of action, with political practice of forces which, though appearing to be identified with this model of society, do not uphold it in their concrete activity. I stressed this very point in the press conference, expressing my disagreement, for example, with a change in the electoral law that would be a means of harming the principle of alternation, by repudiating a concentration of powers that would deprive democracy of its essence. I could give many more examples of this.

'I Challenge Anyone Who Tries To Prove My Inconsistency'

[Question] Doesn't it appear to you that such a statement, as it was made, could be regarded as an attempt to stick to those who oppose you and to antagonize those who support you?

[Answer] Neither sticking nor antagonism. I do not need to do the one nor the other, nor is this a habit of mine. It is not my fault that the hypocrisy of some and the deliberate manipulation of certain news media have brought into question the consistent line that I have always maintained, and which I shall not abandon now. I do not fluctuate nor oscillate, and I challenge anyone who tries either to prove political inconsistency in my words or in my actions.

'I Also Identify Myself With Social Democracy'

[Question] Don't you think that it was going too far to have not only demarcated yourself from FRS and its campaign, as is understandable, but to have done so in the harsh, repeated manner in which you did so?

[Answer] You are a journalist and a good professional, and hence you are quite well aware that the major difficulty for anyone holding a press conference lies in the type of questions asked of him. If they are all aimed in the same direction, the repetition of the answers gives an impression of deliberateness and reinforcement that would never have appeared had the questions been more varied.

In fact, what has been termed a demarcation from FRS was first of all the explanation of an incident, an explanation which should only be made now, so that it would not interfere too much, or disproportionately, in the electoral process; and, secondly, the clear affirmation that, in advocating a central political solution for Portugal, I do not identify myself with democratic socialism alone, but also with the social democracy which lies in FRS and in various sectors of Portuguese society, specifically in sectors of PSD.

'They Will Never Cause Me To Take the Paths Leading to Dictatorship'

[Question] Do you think, Mr President, that anyone might seriously consider you to have some affinity and connection with the PC, since you found it necessary to repeat so often and so exhaustively as you did at your press conference that such connections or affinities do not exist?

[Answer] Obviously, no one with good sense would think that I had any affinity or connection with the PC. But it should not be forgotten that good sense exists only when there is information, and if there is not political bad faith. You read the newspapers, listen to radio and watch television. Therefore, you know what responsible individuals have said about me and about my attitude toward the PC. To what extent can the systematic repetition of such lies be corrected by sincere journalists? In fact, I am in a situation wherein I cannot miss any opportunity to make my political concepts quite clear. And, insofar as this point is concerned, it may be summarized in rather simple terms: They shall never cause me to take the paths leading to dictatorship, invoking the specter of the communist threat; they shall never cause me to cease considering the PC as what it represents, so long as it subjects itself to democratic legality, as it has since I became president of the republic. As you can see, these are clearcut principles that are not at all difficult to apply.

'Let Whoever Agrees Vote for Me'

[Question] As we know, you, Mr President deny any possibility of agreement, and refuse any backing negotiated with the PCP. Does this mean that the votes of the Portuguese people who are Communists could or should also be refused by the future candidate for the presidency, Ramalho Eanes?

[Answer] I do not accept distinctions among the Portuguese people. I do not accept judgments of intentions on the part of those who should not make them on major grounds. I am introducing myself to the electorate with a program, with an irrefutable democratic commitment and with political evidence that is not subject to doubt. Let whoever agrees vote for me. I hold myself responsible for upholding the concepts that I advocate. Or would anyone refuse votes in a democracy?

Casqueiro's Statements 'Are Slander'

[Question] Mr Jose Manuel Casqueiro made statements on TV in which he accused you, Mr President, of having attempted to form a presidentialist party, in which he himself was to be secretary general; and he interpreted the appointment of engineer Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo to head the Fifth Constitutional Government as an attempt to obliterate the existing parties, in order to foster the advent of the aforementioned new presidentialist group. What comments do those claims evoke from you?

[Answer] They would be ridiculous if this were ever the object of the slightest consideration. Since they have no grounds whatsoever, they are slander, applied to political officials, which shows the enormous gap that exists betwen programs and practices, and between hypocrisy and respect for democracy. In fact, we must not forget that Mr Jose Casqueiro spoke officially, on behalf of AD. In any event, this is an incident that can be very readily explained: One need only ask the individuals who have direct, firsthand knowledge of the facts.

2909
CSO: 3101

MARIO SOARES ON DEVELOPING ISSUES IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

Prospects for the Left

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 17-23 Oct 80 p 5

[Article by Mario Soares: "Politics and Courage"]

[Excerpt] Various explanations have been attempted regarding the electoral defeat of the left on 5 October of this year. There have been relatively successful timely alerts to the mistakes of the left, to its inevitable divisions, and to its inability to devise a consistent plan perceptible to the great popular masses. And, as is understandable in accordance with the views, an attempt has been made to stress one aspect or another, without forgetting a certain amount of pleasure in self-punishment and even self-destruction for which a certain type of thinking among the left is fertile ground.

Reconsideration of the Left

For my part, I think that, after the presidential elections (not before them, because the battle which had its first results in October will not end until then) it will be time for a collective reflection and a major democratic debate, the purpose of which would be to reconsider the left and, at the same time, the launching of a realistic plan for the modernization, development and transformation of Portuguese society, through democratic means. I agree that there must be courage to bring everything into question: individuals, theories and preconceptions; and to build anew, with firmness and daring.

With our feet planted on the Portuguese reality (which means an exhaustive study and thorough understanding of its contradictions and contrasts, in rural and urban areas, its regional diversity and its unity, in the pockets of progress and in the age-old shortcomings and lags), but also alert to the experience of others, in the European countries which are attempting to surmount difficulties and contradictions quite similar to ours; with a truly innovative spirit, rejecting ideological taboos (which have failed everywhere), with clear vision, and with adherence to our political and ethical principles and, in particular, with courage.

I stress political courage, because it seems to me to be an essential element in a strategy for the recovery of the democratic left. Because, in my opinion, one of the factors which explains the unexpected victory of the right (in addition to the inevitable ebb of the revolution, a result of the exaggerations of 1975, what might

be termed a certain revenge from the heart of the country, in the depths of its backwardness, underdevelopment and political and religious preconceptions, against the shock of the ecumenical and dialog-oriented activity of the Church of today, and also of the security reflex felt by the middle classes in particular, especially during a period of deepseated international crisis such as the one we are experiencing; in the fact that the left was put on the defensive against the attacks from the right, and, out of neglect or cowardice, did not wage battle in the politico-cultural area.

Encouragement and Solidarity

In the realm of serious study, we have not exempted fascism from its actual liabilities and its crimes, without rhetoric, and we have allowed crude attempts to misrepresent history, in order to restore the prestige of the dictator Salazar, for example, to go unchallenged. We have not sufficiently explained the colonial wars, and why the country was dragged into them, from bad to worse, without a solution and without greatness, allowing ourselves to be exploited, with impunity, by the inevitable traumas of a decolonization carried out 20 years too late, and in a state of genuine national collapse.

In the theoretical realm, we have not assumed our battle for democracy, with calculated advances and retreats, because they are necessary, nor the effort that we must make on behalf of democratic normalization and of the country's financial recovery, after the revolutionary wave. We have not dissected the gross misrepresentations of the right regarding the spurious issue of Marxism, nor have we established, without reservations (and to the final consequences) the reformism of our democratic socialism.

With courage, we shall now have time, confined in the opposition, to delve deeply into these issues and many others, and to wage the battle in the politicocultural area that we lacked during recent years. We must do so in order to win over the youth, which is always agitated and nonconformist; making an appeal to intellectuals and artists, spokesmen who are in essence dissident and nonaligned. We must unhesitatingly back the workers in the news media, who have been so harshly hit by the AD government; respecting the confidence of the poor, working electorate that has always been on our side. We must widen our social base of support, clearing up misunderstandings which have harmed the natural relations between the Socialists and the cadres, progressive business owners, and decisive sectors of the petty and intermediate bourgeoisie.

The Battle for Freedom

Confronted with the arrogance of the "restorationist" right (and I am not making the mistake of confusing the AD electorate with that right, which is only one of its components, the most aggressive and visible, but surely the least numerous), confronted with the hatred, intolerance, violence, and even verbal and at times even physical attacks, on the streets and in business firms, of which the members of the opposition have been victims, since the last election, I feel that I owe them a word of encouragement and solidarity: all of them, yes, even the Communists and the members of the extreme left, regardless of how utopian and unrealistic they may

be; and, of course, the military of April, whatever their subsequent records may have been.

Without forgetting 1975 and the directness with which the defense of freedom was assumed, and without forgetting the Polish workers (and everything else that this mere reference recalls), I feel that, here and now, in 1980, in Portugal, the battle of the true democrats is against the restorationist, fascist-oriented right, and in the defense of the constitutional democratic regime, without misrepresentation or ambiguity; a battle which I would like very much to include the internal area of AD, but which will surely be understood by a considerable portion of the electorate who voted for AD on 5 October, with the best intentions, because that is still, and always will be the battle for liberty.

Socialist Support for Eanes

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 14-21 Aug 80 pp 4-5

[Interview with Socialist Party Secretary General Mario Soares by Jose Silva Pinto during the week of 14-21 August 1980; place not given]

[Text] "I consider it very odd that the prime minister does not think that he should give an explanation to the country," declared Mario Soares, secretary general of the Socialist Party, concerning the charges that have been brought against Dr Sa Carneiro regarding an alleged debt of his to the banks amounting to several thousand contos. In an interview granted to O JORNAL this week, Mario Soares seemed clearly confident of the victory of the Republican Socialist Front, of which the PS is a member, and heavily criticized the present executive branch, specifically for the lack of dialog with which he charges the prime minister, and for what he claims to have been "absolute senselessness" in meeting with the presumed candidate, Soares Carneiro.

As for the question of the presidential candidate to be backed by the Socialist Party, Mario Soares disclosed that he was "equipped to give the account of the existing possibilities" to the party's national commission, which will meet for this purpose on 23 August. Soares declined to confirm that there is already an agreement signed between the PS and Gen Ramalho Eanes, to back the second candidacy of the current president; stressing that, when there is an understanding, "it will be made public by both parties."

O JORNAL: Dr Mario Soares has held talks with Gen Ramalho Eanes in connection with the latter's possible second candidacy for the presidency of the republic. What political conditions have been imposed by the Socialist Party or by FRS for backing that second candidacy?

Mario Soares: When the question of backing a presidential candidacy arose, my party's commission of directors instructed me to hold talks with Gen Ramalho Eanes, in order to assess the possibilities concretely. Those talks took place in a cordial atmosphere on both sides, and I think that I am equipped to give the account of the existing possibilities to the commission of directors on 23 August. As you can certainly understand, until that time I shall not make any disclosures concerning these talks...

[Question] But wasn't an agreement signed?

[Answer] Well, when an agreement is reached between PS and Gen Ramalho Eanes, it will be made public by both parties. Anything that may be said before that is at least premature. As for the conditions, as is understandable, I would not want the members of my party's commission of directors to learn about them from your newspaper....

[Question] But why is 23 August the only date for the meeting of the commission of directors? According to what has been claimed, other dates have already been set for that purpose....

[Answer] It was I who was assigned to convoke the commission of directors, and if I have not done so until now, it was because I did not feel that I was in a position to set the date until now. Earlier, there was a merely hypothetical possibility of its taking place last weekend; but, at the proper time, I said that I was not yet in a position to propose it.

[Question] Can it be said that, today, the possibility of PS backing for a second candidacy of Ramalho Eanes is more likely than it was 6 months ago, for example?

[Answer] What can be said is that, at the present time, I have an idea of the real possibilities, which I shall submit to the commission of directors. With regard to the course of action that the commission of directors will take, I obviously cannot give advance information, although I am advising an option that I shall announce at the proper time.

[Question] Could the PS, or FRS, have another alternative, or do they?

[Answer] The evidence that there have been talks means that there are other alternatives. It remains to be seen whether any other one is as good, better or worse. Moreover, as Ramalho Eanes himself has said, in democracy there are always alternatives. To think that there were no alternatives would be ridiculous, to say the least.

Of course we want to find the solution which will best serve the Portuguese people and democracy; in other words, the best one for the Socialist Party, inasmuch as we still think that the PS is the mainstay of Portuguese democracy.

[Question] Might one of those alternatives be Maj Vasco Lourenco, for example?

[Answer] There are political personages from the Socialist area who have expressed that view personally. It was one of the alternate hypotheses aired in certain sectors close to the Socialist Party.

If Soares Carneiro Should Win, 'That Would Be a Misfortune for the Portuguese People'

[Question] Some of the presumable candidates for the presidency are already known. I would like to learn your views concerning them....

[Answer] Of course the Socialist Party does not intend to back any of them. It is true that there is a presumable candidate who is in direct opposition to what we represent and want for the Portuguese society. You will not be surprised if I tell you that it is Gen Soares Carneiro, precisely. There is nothing personal in this but, in the political realm, he does not offer us any guarantee of being a good president; quite the contrary.

If, through some absurd coincidence, he should win the elections, from our point of view that would be a misfortune for the Portuguese people, jeopardizing the institutions which govern us, as we conceive of them.

[Question] Then do you think that there would be a danger to democracy?

[Answer] I think so, because the candidacy of Gen Soares Carneiro is opposed to the democratic regime, as it resulted from the Portuguese Constitution. This is the only explanation for his motion of the referendum, his desire to destroy the Constitution through the referendum, that is, through a simple majority.

[Question] There are some who think that there might even be antidemocratic risks of the kind that have occurred in Latin America....

[Answer] One has to have a sense of dimension: Gen Soares Carneiro will run in democratic elections and attempt to destroy the existing constitutional system, through methods which do not seem orthodox to us; but he will not head a coup d'etat carried out by force, as has occurred in certain Latin American countries.

Besides, there are no conditions in Portugal for coups d'etat of that type, inasmuch as the Armed Forces are organized in a chain of command, and are sufficiently respectful of the democratic institutions to realize that they would not have any national acceptance, and would be faced with the repudiation of the international conscience if they were to intervene illegally in political activity, through a Pinochet-type coup or one such as that recently carried out in Bolivia.

[Question] Gen Soares Carneiro was recently claimed to have put his patriotism in doubt. Would you care to comment?

[Answer] In this matter, the last statement made by him contradicts an earlier one. The first one seems correct to me, but the second one is rather confused. I think that this is due to pressure from the electoral situation, as well as from clientele which, as I have always said, is, indeed, antidemocratic.

Adriano Moreira, 'Liberal': 'If I Were Sa Carneiro or Balsemao, I Would Dot the I's'

[Question] What do you think of the recently announced candidacy for deputy of Prof Adriano Moreira, on the CDS ticket in Braganca?

[Answer] I am surprised that Adriano Moreira would agree to be number 2 on a Braganca ticket. He must have a great desire to be involved in the political electoral process to accept such a humiliation....He is a person who had been an ideologue of the Portuguese right wing, and he was, I don't know whether rightfully or unrightfully, one of the most notorious ministers in the Salazar governments.

[Question] Some claim that he was the first liberal wing of the former regime...

[Answer] The one who said that is Dr Lucas Pires. It means that, in the mind of Dr Lucas Pires "liberal wings" are confused, and a man like Dr Adriano Moreira is confused, in the same ethical and political realm, with his current allies, Sa Carneiro or Pinto Balsemao. If I were Sa Carneiro or Balsemao, I would feel obliged to dot the I's....If they do not do so, it will demonstrate the limitations, contradictions and confusion that prevail within the so-called Democratic Alliance....

[Question] In using that expression, are you calling into question the democratic nature of AD?

[Answer] With respect to some of its members, indisputably. One need only listen to them talk or shout, at certain rallies, to realize that they are the old Salazarists there....However, it is true that there are within the Alliance democratic people as well, although they are of the right and conservative.

[Question] How do you view the action of the present government?

[Answer] I view it in the worst manner, in all aspects. And I don't think that my position is much different from that of the majority of the Portuguese people. It is only the rulers themselves who feel very self-satisfied, and have the courage to go on television saying that this government is the one which has done the most of all time....They do not lack the brazenness and daring to make such claims!

[Question] As an opposition leader, have you been in any way heeded by the prime minister?

[Answer] Unlike what has happened in the case of other governments, I have never had any kind of contact, much less dialog, with the current prime minister. He has never wanted to listen to my opinion, nor has he felt obliged to make any contact of any kind with me. This is in marked contrast to what happened when I was prime minister; because not a single month passed without my holding talks with the leaders of the opposition parties who, at that time, represented far less than I myself represent today, from an electoral standpoint.

[Question] How would you comment on that attitude?

[Answer] It is related to a total lack of ability to dialog and is a result of a concept of the state and the government that is quite alien to a democrat. The prime minister does not feel obliged to give an account of his administration, nor to respond to the charges made against him. He uses silence (sometimes rather embarrassing for his own fellow party members) as a main weapon of defense.

'I Think That Even Within AD There Is Great Chagrin Over Charges Not Countered Nor Refuted'

[Question] For example, would you comment on the charges brought against the prime minister concerning alleged bank debts?

[Answer] I consider it very strange that the prime minister does not feel obligated to give an explanation to the country, regardless of whether or not there are any grounds for those accusations.

We might note the example of President Carter, who felt obliged to give an explanation to his country concerning a case in which his brother, Billy, was involved. Moreover, here in Portugal, when certain newspapers began disseminating slander about the president of the Socialist Party, Dr Antonio Macedo, it was the president of the PS himself who proposed the holding of a parliamentary investigation, which furthermore exonerated him completely.

I am greatly amazed that he has not given any explanation when confronted with claims accompanied by documentation. I am incapable of accusing anyone without hearing him, nor is it up to me to judge; but I think that, even within AD there is great chagrin over charges which, oddly, have not been countered nor refuted.

[Question] Will another challenge be made of the prime minister, for his dismissal?

[Answer] The challenge that I made of him still stands, and with abundant reason. The government is in a state of democratic illegitimacy, because it no longer has the parliamentary majority; but it does not consider this reason to have to bring into question the confidence in the Assembly of the Republic. When, after this, there have been charges, some of them serious, hanging over the prime minister, and conflicts of various kinds with organs of sovereignty, the fact that the government continues to act as if it were nothing, with complete disregard for public opinion, shows that it does not want to be a government of all the Portuguese people, but only a factional government.

[Question] What would you be willing to say about the government's recent meeting with the presumable candidate, Soares Carneiro?

[Answer] This is extremely serious and absolute senselessness on the part of the government which, by so doing, has proved that it has no sense whatsoever of the dignity of the state. I regret to say so, but it is true.

The Socialist Party has already submitted its public protest, and we hope that other political forces will do so as well. As everyone knows, the potential candidate, Soares Carneiro, has an extremely controversial status within the Armed Forces. His political and partisan positions have been subject to doubt on the part of the organs of sovereignty, as in the case of the Council of the Revolution, or at least some of its members.

[Question] How do you view the conflict between the government and the Council of the Revolution with regard to the salaries of the military?

[Answer] It seems to me to be a rather strange conflict, the underlying reasons for which elude me. I do not see why the government has refused certain increases for the military called for in the OGE [General State Budget], and has made statements which appear to me to be slightly rash and demagogic.

FRS-Reformers: 'A Possibility of Cooperation Is Afforded'

[Question] What, in fact, is the Republican Socialist Front seeking?

[Answer] Comprised of ASDI [Independent Social Democratic Association], UEDS [Leftist Union for Socialist Democracy] and the Socialist Party, FRS is not only an agreement among the three parties; it has dynamics which transcend them. We are embarking on a second phase, wherein we are engaged in negotiations with other groups in the same area, situated between APU [United People's Alliance], with the totalitarian plan of the Communist Party and its allies in MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/ Democratic Electoral Commission], and the conservative right, associated in the heterogeneous conglomerate of AD.

It is that broad electoral area that the Republican Socialist Front seeks to represent. We are counting on FRS gaining an absolute majority in Parliament, and being able to govern this country, as the only effective alternative to the reactionary forces.

[Question] But if the Front does not gain that absolute majority, what solution does the PS secretary general see for the situation resulting from the next elections?

[Answer] A priori, I have no doubt that the electorate will respond affirmatively to the appeal from FRS. The situation is so clearcut that I refuse to embark on an analysis of alternative sub-scenarios. Why? In past elections, AD too was far removed from having a majority. It gained one, by a slight margin of deputies, not votes, thanks to the Hondt method, until the reformers left the AD area.

What is out of the question for us is to conclude any agreement, either with APU or with AD. Even now, a PCP official has claimed that it is necessary for FRS to become allied with APU, but he is quite well aware that this will not happen. We have always repudiated the so-called leftist majority that is so dear to our adversaries. We are not making it, nor shall we make it.

Of course, the Communist Party is pretending not to notice: it is a purely deceptive tactic for accruing electoral results.

[Question] And what about AD?

[Answer] No alliance between FRS and AD, as such, is conceivable....

[Question] As such....and with respect to any of the parties comprising it?

[Answer] Well, if AD were to disband, and there were a return to the social democratic leanings of the PSD (if one accepted that hypothesis, which I consider highly unlikely to materialize, in view of its current political practice), then other possibilities would be afforded. But, for the present, what we are counting on, and what we are asking of the electorate, is that it give us the majority, so that we may govern with stability.

[Question] And what about the reformers, whom you mentioned just now, is there any prospect for an agreement with them?

[Answer] The current position of the reformers is close to ours. When the AD's deviation to the right occurred, they perceived the dangers stemming therefrom for the Portuguese society, and they did not go along with it. In this respect, a possibility of cooperation is afforded.

[Question] Have there been any contacts yet?

[Answer] It is public knowledge that I have had talks with Dr Medeiros Ferreira in the Assembly of the Republic.

[Question] Recently?

[Answer] Not during the past few days.

[Question] What about the independents? Why are there virtually no independents included on the FRS tickets?

[Answer] I would like more independents on our tickets. But, opposing this there has emerged a force with great influence within a party: namely, the legitimate ambitions that the party members themselves have. We have made room for the parties associated with us, leaving on a secondary level certain Socialist Party members who could have produced great deputies. This is based on an agreement which was deemed in the national interest. Furthermore, it would be extremely difficult to make more room for independents, because, in order to make room, it is necessary to exclude others who are present. This is the explanation, which does not preclude our desire for receptiveness in relation to the independents. Many will participate in our campaign, and with them we shall develop many types of cooperation outside of the Assembly of the Republic. It is, moreover, for this reason that we maintain contacts with various organizations, with MSD [Social Democratic Movement], RAS [Socialist Reflection and Action], CES [Socialist Studies Center] and the New Left....

[Question] After the failure of the attempts to include Acacio Barreiros on the FRS ticket, do you think that an agreement with the New Left, of which he is one of the promoters, is possible?

[Answer] I think that it is possible, despite difficulties of various kinds. As you know, the small political groups are very solicitous about their independence, something that is normal, and they place the main stress on ideological matters, which we do not consider the essential ones. But this does not preclude the establishment of bases for cooperation. There is a real danger of retrogression from an arrogant, revanchist extreme right, which must be impeded.

'I Want To Believe That the AD Parties Will Not Oppose the Petition for Investigation'

"How do you think the Standing Committee of the Assembly of the Republic will receive the petition for a parliamentary investigation that has now been submitted by PS?"

To this question, asked during the press conference at which he announced his party's proposal, the PS secretary general replied:

"The Standing Committee of the Assembly of the Republic is comprised of representatives of the parliamentary groups with seats in the Assembly of the Republic. I want to believe that the representatives of CDS, PSD and PPM [Popular Monarchist Party] and the reformers will not oppose a petition for an investigation that will dignify the institutions and would exonerate Dr Sa Carneiro from any suspicions, if he is innocent of the charges brought against him, as they certainly desire. The opposite attitude would only reinforce the suspicions and heighten the uneasiness that already exists among many AD members.

"Moreover, in all the Western democracies the identical procedure is used, and so as to dispel any doubts harbored by the public. Why should we have to be different, and revert to the disdainful silence of old? It is just a shame that so many days have elapsed and AD (or Dr Sa Carneiro) has not brought up the matter."

2909
CSO: 3101

- END -

END OF FICHE DATE FILMED

December 1, 1980

Debbie